[Bitcoin-development] There will be a release candidate 6...

[Bitcoin-development] There will be a release candidate 6...

[Gavin Andresen]

I got email from a tester who gave this feedback:

> I think that user behaviour: encrypt wallet -> backup -> do some activity ->
> restore backup -> BOOM. Is perfectly natural user behaviour and it will
> happen. For example when generating a wallet on a secure computer and then
> moving it to an insecure one.

I agree that is likely to happen and, when it does, will be disastrous.
So I'll be reworking the wallet encrypt/rewrite code today and
creating a release candidate 6.

My previous attempt (encrypt, invalidating keypool, then unlock and write
a new keypool) resulted in unencrypted private keys in the new wallet.

I think this will work, I'll implement and test today.

Invalidate all the old keypool keys in the old wallet.Write new
keypool keys to the old wallet.Encrypt all the keys in the old
wallet.Rewrite the old wallet to create a new wallet.Shutdown/restart.
IF ANYBODY IS WILLING TO HELP:

There is still a mysterious problem with bdb throwing an exception
when dbenv.close(0) is called during shutdown. If you can compile
a -g version of bdb and then step through DbEnv::close in a debugger
and tell me why it is throwing an exception that would be
extremely helpful.
-- 
--
Gavin Andresen

Re: [Bitcoin-development] There will be a release candidate 6...

[Michael Offel]

If you are going to support this use case, you should also notify the user
on wallet changes that results in invalidated backup. For example whenever
the key pool gets extended.

-----Original Message-----
From: Gavin Andresen [mailto:gavinandresen@gmail.com] 
Sent: 17 November 2011 14:28
To: Bitcoin Dev
Subject: [Bitcoin-development] There will be a release candidate 6...

I got email from a tester who gave this feedback:

> I think that user behaviour: encrypt wallet -> backup -> do some 
> activity -> restore backup -> BOOM. Is perfectly natural user 
> behaviour and it will happen. For example when generating a wallet on 
> a secure computer and then moving it to an insecure one.

I agree that is likely to happen and, when it does, will be disastrous.
So I'll be reworking the wallet encrypt/rewrite code today and creating a
release candidate 6.

My previous attempt (encrypt, invalidating keypool, then unlock and write a
new keypool) resulted in unencrypted private keys in the new wallet.

I think this will work, I'll implement and test today.

Invalidate all the old keypool keys in the old wallet.Write new keypool keys
to the old wallet.Encrypt all the keys in the old wallet.Rewrite the old
wallet to create a new wallet.Shutdown/restart.
IF ANYBODY IS WILLING TO HELP:

There is still a mysterious problem with bdb throwing an exception when
dbenv.close(0) is called during shutdown. If you can compile a -g version of
bdb and then step through DbEnv::close in a debugger and tell me why it is
throwing an exception that would be extremely helpful.
--
--
Gavin Andresen

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
All the data continuously generated in your IT infrastructure contains a
definitive record of customers, application performance, security threats,
fraudulent activity, and more. Splunk takes this data and makes sense of it.
IT sense. And common sense.
http://p.sf.net/sfu/splunk-novd2d
_______________________________________________
Bitcoin-development mailing list
Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development