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([2a01:cb1d:44:6500:9d6d:71b2:cb71:cb17]) by smtp.googlemail.com with ESMTPSA id 23sm11340278wmg.10.2020.06.05.08.41.43 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Fri, 05 Jun 2020 08:41:44 -0700 (PDT) To: ZmnSCPxj References: <2e8fba65-f7fa-4c37-a318-222547e25a06@Spark> <9e4dfaa7-895a-48a1-8116-eaafc80da34f@Spark> <2phhD75B8ww3hFQ8Do039wAIlW8EVOjUeiedm-JtIek-TEnVocYSx-untchGrO3VoRLoPzinVAG95UN1yR3CadNWBJGSu19vJpFJ_yN-wZY=@protonmail.com> From: Aymeric Vitte Autocrypt: addr=vitteaymeric@gmail.com; prefer-encrypt=mutual; keydata= xsFNBFdW8uABEAC7HJScbB2d/lmYoY5Cn9loEjJwfLs1LC3om030bWFGiH3Ceo5XeHUT94rw Pi+HaHU8ea94425SXIFsnqp/ouoT/8Ffn6vED0OoRmK0jE4fqDApXSpoL2mHX9PAGdUItMtD YrxBiBZNfMkctEsm4NrQ4TCvB3Yrm6Fc69inXJjUoYgPw5tHafEeI8Qwh0j99JZZDKcAqIra JF3MPc59rATz0qOJtRP9EpsPVFwjJe13zN6CHILwiVgrL8EtT5WKCVO6ATxh60LHi8+MwPxV V31zp/NNI5Hck+XocEMO98ZvUu9X8ZxmnOk/+9pBxXEwUqSGUNWdmPJLncpI23Usce3u/MOo M2C4T4rD4J0XrXiyBvbeTvwq4qVNlyggeWzlBH+YpEYgDctPq4gNh4eoTtAkf8URtBeke5bQ CGdaZt/jxv8nvmxs9V/iSyg5ldJLQktHStXOo0OZ7FEB2C6Ggtymm4hm2MHYg07Q1MGJrFLa oJZkJ3JeXnVsZMam7ypQtld6rRa96CvH+llXwux6aQ5hKdzmBBMQ10LlkZhkExgTawbeqdiG RMP2DjD5go6TPdAHS4NN34SBkrTWLqgWOjN/lnG77bbLnpMl0P+xBTuqw1oSXaDbcdHE2nGY lRno/ZZIfr+1Bq56DZLBX/WpnAT4f5WtofL4CxQM9SbG6byyewARAQABzSJBeW1lcmljIFZp dHRlIDxheW1lcmljQHBlZXJzbS5jb20+wsF/BBMBCAApBQJXVvLgAhsjBQkJZgGABwsJCAcD AgEGFQgCCQoLBBYCAwECHgECF4AACgkQKh17NCYnrDm3WhAAlYmgtSmtfqjBvQMqkmtqiQJA aZkzFZWt6+zroduHH5/Tp8jh73gFqCUyRrl/kcKvs2+XQhfrOwk1R6OScF25bpnrZSeuyJnZ MZu4T0P2tGS8YdddQvWUHMtI9ZnQRuYmuZT23/hgj1JnukuGvGLeY0yDUa1xFffPN39shp5X FPMcpIVOV3bs+xjAdsyfRyO3qJAD1FGiR7ggJeoaxUbKZ6NtcVUPPRMjVTKfopkuDwKY318m BE0epfxSZ/iRhsJ0/sREUWgbgq4/QvCFwBKzgz7fTikGmf8OELWSdofmXs7gOtmMc3el8fJu W8PVa/OsIQHDmwSzvxmE8ba5M8bdwOYEraTWFArIymAAtRXKxmuYpkqKfeSlbCwae3W+pgNT 8nKYRVAFlMtIxYkmPYyMTk9kCscmSqugGWbWdnqe/dhVaa31xa1qO1tDH24D2/tjCJRQt4Jk AEWNSmjCmjfeArMEFTGlZwMTAjVXErLSPbLOsZiZhD9sjvSbfzrtJiMli2h9+Dvds+AJk1PM O8LW7cCNyFoCk4OdAxzJHobZ25G+uy4NSQEHgxLC2iuh/tugz1tOHnQczPc/3AkVVI9A5DF1 gbVRBJh6rI7sAcwuR76uoOs0Rpp7r6I66xqU/5eq8g1OsJp89tw0ppSIa0YmaxNqQZ0l3rVX o/ZwpBjtNQTOwU0EV1by4AEQANhlz3Ywff4dY1HTdn05v0wVUxZzW2PUih+96m6EhpUrD9BT vxriKtbgxm/zl+5YAlThbrk9f0QyVTHJ95Z1/M5qjuksP9Zn3qZ/8ylANDkN2s3z8Bq/LJA+ u7+APhMqyFWK0FqNCOogClvijiKPEzkU6tmDGO6wZ5pR/u8Fdq7DGQgwgyGZZc7qstte0M7l yx7bVRlPBqvd6kyX3YubQHzkctf46nFjiYZgKawdWFsA3PCdSBupbhixL5d/t1UK9ZTiQJcf 0uhHzT06qwolFrm/ugkLDHtE4Zo3BuKch47Sms8P2hJ08gABxeJHg0ZgkIUy/Xf4nHbDCBJw T8tE8pWYWA2ECiPNo0TOCMVOueEzISUNKINfCuFHSbMQU39hgt3ofxODbAjOiO3e/iu1ptck AkuVBdtjOBP4tHRGxVrbf5EuAV5U5xtiSxMwMgojg0GIXZjnT/8uvWqcLqtJILRMmmu+WNvD oxuiJzcTJhDai9oujmxQwcpMvgrBB89KSTDyitO5XVjZqaR7Zxvvn3rM4bAms/lotv9+pTyh spazTIxb80u0ifJ6y1RxAkxQCfWwps1i3VbsM6OKX78aUyOf5V4ihXF57M37tOqPRwFvz6a+ AIIhUNMTLo2H+o6Vw9qbX8SUxPHPs6YpJ8lWQJ9OMWHE+SbaDFAi/D5hYRubABEBAAHCwWUE GAEIAA8FAldW8uACGwwFCQlmAYAACgkQKh17NCYnrDmk4Q/9Fuu0h5HvIiO3ieYA2StdE7hO vv2THuesjJDsj6aQUTgknaxKptJogNe3dDyIT+FHxXmCw0Nrbm9Q3ryl80z/G9utfFNO3Gwc q31QW3n3LJHnpqdrV3WsRzT5NwJMVtiIAGRrX8ZomtarWHT0PeEHC2xBdFzRrJtmkrwer0Wc 0nBzD7vk1XEXC9nODbmlgsesoHFgRwQBst3wClCbX1gv8aSfxQNpaf9UBC8DmyrQ621UXpBo PvcFEtWxV44vJfP0WOLCCN0Pzv2F2I66iKo7VMqbr5jlNAXJN9I1hXb7qwYJmBC9j5oeEoqv A9d44WWpxrdAr8qih4Nv89k9+9F6NoqORY3FGuVDKiW8CVhCmGT7bIvNeyicVBZFipXqPcKL VFduO2c5Ubc2npMWLUF1k9JJc9tH75l3+F/0RbYVTzGAZ+zSaudwR6h8YiCN2DBZGZkJEZbh 3X/l6jtijMN/W9sPHyyKvm/TmeEC27S3TqZPZ8PUQLxZC70V6gMbenh01JdSQsn5t8Ru0RNh Blt0g7IyZyIKCE9b+TyzbYpX6qgqEBUHia5b0vyPtQacWQlZ8uqnghAqNkLluEsy7Q/7xG6M wXUYEDsFOmB9dKOzcAOIhpxlVjSKu5mzXJ11sEtE8nyF5NJ/riCA7FGcjlki3zIpzQUNo9v7 vXl2h6Tivlk= Message-ID: <03508424-639f-2f3f-8b0e-5b1013f5269a@gmail.com> Date: Fri, 5 Jun 2020 17:41:48 +0200 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.3.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Language: fr Cc: Gleb Naumenko , Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Time-dilation Attacks on the Lightning Network X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 05 Jun 2020 15:41:51 -0000 Hi, As far as I understand your answer is "let's try to use what exists", this is not what I am proposing and not the Tor network, no "standard" exit nodes, different hidden services, decentralized anonymizer network unlike the Tor network, nodes are anonymizing themselves Comments below, please let me know what is unclear in the description of the project so I can modify it because all the time I get the impression that it is mixed with the Tor network while it just has a very little to do with it, and I don't get that the simple principle of communicating between nodes using the Tor protocol without RDV points is never considered Regards, Le 05/06/2020 à 13:44, ZmnSCPxj a écrit : > Good morning Aymeric, > >> The issue each time there are discussions/research linking to Tor is that it is biased since the beginning because based on a wrong postulate: using the Tor network >> > Well, in the interest of using the wrong tool for a highly important job, let me present this thought: Then for an important job people should use the right tool... > > * The Tor network is weakened due to its dependence on a limited set of exit nodes. And centralized structure, limited set of nodes to make it short, for some (or a lot) misbehaving, not designed for bitcoin, nothing prevents bitcoin from operating its own anonymizer system, which I am proposing > * "Direct", within-Tor rendezvous points are good, i.e. Tor hidden services. Good to a certain extent... if you want to hide that you are operating a bitcoin node you can use RDV points (ie hidden services) but if you don't care you just connect anonymized circuits between bitcoin nodes, this is more "direct" and does not exist in the Tor network, this includes light clients that can act as relays also > * Thus, there is no issue with Tor-to-Tor or clearnet-to-clearnet connections, the issue is with Tor-to-clearnet connections. There are plenty of Tor-to-Tor issues, not theoretical but in the real world, "Tor-to-clearnet" can be done outside of the Tor network, ie the bitcoin network > * Of course, no miner is going to run over Tor because latency, so all the miners will be on clearnet. Probably, again I am not proposing a remake of the Tor network, I don't see the use for a miner to hide (neither for a bitcoin node to use RDV points), but they can be part of the global anonymized system, please see below > * So make your own bridge between Tor and clearnet. > * Run two fullnodes on your computer (with sufficient ingenuity, you can probably share their block storages, or make one pruning). > * One fullnode is on the public network but runs in `blocksonly` so it does not propagate any transactions (which might be attached to your public IP). > * The other fullnode is on the Tor network and has an `-addnode` to the public-network node via `localhost`, which I assume is very hard for an eclipse attacker to get at. > * Use the Tor-fullnode to propagate your transactions. Yes but one full node should be able to do this alone, ie implement both interfaces, like miners and everybody in fact (or Peersm bridges with bittorrent if you look at the history of the project) > > Of course, the eclipse attacker can still attack all Tor exit nodes and block outgoing transaction traffic to perform eclipse attacks. > And if you decide to propagate transactions to the public-network node then you pretty much lose your privacy there. Please see the convergence link, it's not based on the assumption that "the more you are the better you can hide and the lesser you can get attacked", this does not work at all, it's based on the assumption that even with a reduced set of peers it becomes very difficult to know who is doing what and whom is talking to whom, the concept of exiting/bridging to clearnet(s) is not clearly detailed in this version but appears on the drawings