Re: [bitcoin-dev] Drivechain proposal using OP_COUNT_ACKS

[Johnson Lau <jl2012@xbt.hk>]

Some comments and questions

1. In the BIP you mentioned scriptSig 3 times, but I don't think you are really talking about scriptSig. Especially, segwit has aborted the use of scriptSig to fix malleability. From the context I guess you mean redeemScript (see BIP141)

2. It seems that 51% of miners may steal all money from the peg, right? But I think this is unavoidable for all 2-way-peg proposals. To make it safer you still need notaries.

3. Instead of using a OP_NOPx, I suggest you using an unused code such as 0xba. OP_NOPx should be reserved for some simple "VERIFY"-type codes that does not write to the stack.

4. I don't think you should simply replace "(witversion == 0)" with "((witversion == 0) || (witversion == 1))". There are only 16 available versions. It'd be exhausted very soon if we use a version for every new opcode. As a testing prototype this is fine, but the actual softfork should not waste a witversion this way. We need a better way to coordinate the use of new witness version. BIP114 suggests an additional field in the witness to indicate the script version (https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0114.mediawiki)

5. It seems this is the first BIP in markdown format, not mediawiki (but this is allowed by BIP1)

6. The coinbase space is limited to 100 bytes and is already overloaded by many different purposes. I think any additional consensus critical message should go to a dummy scriptPubKey like the witness commitment. You may consider to  have a new OP_RETURN output like BIP141, with different magic bytes. However, please don't make this output mandatory (cf. witness commitment output is optional if the block does not have witness tx)

6a. "..........due to lack of space to include the proper ack tag in a block": this shouldn't happen if you use a OP_RETURN output

7.  "It can be the case that two different secondary blockchains specify the same transaction candidate, but **at least** one of them will clearly be unauthentic."

8. Question: is an ack-poll valid only for 1 transaction? When the transaction is confirmed, could full nodes prune the corresponding ack-poll data? (I think it has to be prunable after spending because ack-poll data is effectively UTXO data) 

9. No matter how you design a softfork, "Zero risk of invalidating a block" couldn't be true for any softfork. For example, even if a miner does not include any txs with OP_COUNT_ACKS, he may still build on top of blocks with invalid OP_COUNT_ACKS operations.

 ---- On Sun, 02 Oct 2016 23:49:08 +0800 Sergio Demian Lerner via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote ---- 
 > Since ScalingBitcoin is close, I think this is a good moment to publish our proposal on drivechains. This BIP proposed the drivechain we'd like to use in RSK (a.k.a. Rootstock) two-way pegged blockchain and see it implemented in Bitcoin. Until that happens, we're using a federated approach. 
 > I'm sure that adding risk-less Bitcoin extensibility through sidechains/drivechains is what we all want, but it's of maximum importance to decide which technology will leads us there.
 > We hope this work can also be the base of all other new 2-way-pegged blockchains that can take Bitcoin the currency to new niches and test new use cases, but cannot yet be realized because of current limitations/protections.
 > 
 > The full BIP plus a reference implementation can be found here:
 > 
 > BIP (draft):
 > https://github.com/rootstock/bips/blob/master/BIP-R10.md
 > 
 > Code & Test cases:
 > https://github.com/rootstock/bitcoin/tree/op-count-acks_devel
 > (Note: Code is still unaudited)
 > 
 > As a summary, OP_COUNT_ACKS is a new segwit-based and soft-forked opcode that counts acks and nacks tags in coinbase fields, and push the resulting totals in the script stack.
 > 
 > The system was designed with the following properties in mind:
 > 
 > 1. Interoperability with scripting system 
 > 2. Zero risk of invalidating a block
 > 3. No additional computation during blockchain management and re-organization
 > 4. No change in Bitcoin security model
 > 5. Bounded computation of poll results
 > 6. Strong protection from DoS attacks
 > 7. Minimum block space consumption
 > 8. Zero risk of cross-secondary chain invalidation
 > 
 > Please see the BIP draft for a more-detailed explanation on how we achieve these goals.
 > 
 > I'll be in ScalingBitcoin in less than a week and I'll be available to discuss the design rationale, improvements, changes and ideas any of you may have.
 > 
 > Truly yours, 
 > Sergio Demian Lerner
 > Bitcoiner and RSK co-founder
 >  
 >  _______________________________________________ 
 > bitcoin-dev mailing list 
 > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org 
 > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev 
 >