From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.194] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-1.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1Z5zOp-0000ff-UM for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Fri, 19 Jun 2015 16:44:15 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of riseup.net designates 198.252.153.129 as permitted sender) client-ip=198.252.153.129; envelope-from=justusranvier@riseup.net; helo=mx1.riseup.net; Received: from mx1.riseup.net ([198.252.153.129]) by sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:AES256-SHA:256) (Exim 4.76) id 1Z5zOo-0000Az-Ti for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Fri, 19 Jun 2015 16:44:15 +0000 Received: from plantcutter.riseup.net (plantcutter-pn.riseup.net [10.0.1.121]) (using TLSv1 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (Client CN "*.riseup.net", Issuer "COMODO RSA Domain Validation Secure Server CA" (verified OK)) by mx1.riseup.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 120DB41684; Fri, 19 Jun 2015 16:44:09 +0000 (UTC) Received: from [127.0.0.1] (localhost [127.0.0.1]) (Authenticated sender: justusranvier) with ESMTPSA id E2EDB1FC83 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2015 16:44:08 +0000 From: justusranvier@riseup.net To: Matt Whitlock In-Reply-To: <1727885.UUNByX4Jyd@crushinator> References: <20150619103959.GA32315@savin.petertodd.org> <04CE3756-B032-464C-8FBD-7ACDD1A3197D@gmail.com> <812d8353e66637ec182da31bc0a9aac1@riseup.net> <1727885.UUNByX4Jyd@crushinator> Message-ID: <15ea02cb53046dbe363d5d4876becb6d@riseup.net> X-Sender: justusranvier@riseup.net User-Agent: Riseup mail X-Virus-Scanned: clamav-milter 0.98.7 at mx1 X-Virus-Status: Clean X-Spam-Score: -1.9 (-) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain -0.0 RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE RBL: Sender listed at http://www.dnswl.org/, no trust [198.252.153.129 listed in list.dnswl.org] -0.0 SPF_HELO_PASS SPF: HELO matches SPF record -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record -0.3 RP_MATCHES_RCVD Envelope sender domain matches handover relay domain -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature 0.0 UNPARSEABLE_RELAY Informational: message has unparseable relay lines -0.0 AWL AWL: Adjusted score from AWL reputation of From: address X-Headers-End: 1Z5zOo-0000Az-Ti Cc: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2015 16:44:16 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On 2015-06-19 16:36, Matt Whitlock wrote: > On Friday, 19 June 2015, at 3:53 pm, justusranvier@riseup.net wrote: >> I'd also like to note that "prima facie" doesn't mean "always", it >> means >> that "the default assumption, unless proven otherwise." > > Why would you automatically assume fraud by default? Shouldn't the > null hypothesis be the default? Without any information one way or > another, you ought to make *no assumption* about the fraudulence or > non-fraudulence of any given double-spend. If we have ECDSA proof that an entity intentionally made and publicly announced incompatible promises regarding the disposition of particular Bitcoins under their control, then why shouldn't that be assumed to be a fraud attempt unless shown otherwise? There are ways of achiving transaction fee adjustment after broadcast that do not present the appearance of, or opportunity for, fraud. If those options are available and the user chooses not to use them in favor of the option that does, that makes bad intentions even more probable. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJVhEasAAoJECpf2nDq2eYjcwIP/25yoRpNvZkkdFfYiBKaiL/g XRH8iFAyM5q3/75sA23vD/fzCNGIRRWYyp8PWk+23NF1gdsgVU6gFNNCUmDbjANv nWTt2Bd926St24jcU+OxMewSGlxpenDSFDNQVtxhNFKst6hoPatwK1Zfa0Eq7/Qw +r0H2Pse1ulrN4P1n5xnrYMq2w/GF3zinNZbrn2KOZCnsDa8lKlP8y9eNFHBJ//Z wDrOcfZ1WLhf5/5xlV1NiH0tdxzABilH0ITimm2LCKbj3JcSJayZlyu4n3NypE0E cVFeYpBaVZW9wuKUv/va5fzcyWDFPAo+OrR2B3siAb8nfY1jONXNhuV3yZ76pzMr j39lvuSpoTbLobnEWMCJQ5bI/ngbhatT57gqMfF92sO0YjMe/gi/iU6urR9fi5Gz 3Ov6QA78vxzy/YduFjkc/1FV2dNdbGJtq6b0stmz5TtM1uljeGUoj6JZ8kOJ0EXn 857KFAqEd3hG9eYtBdFQcYeV2ShndALBQE0k3cqQvV6XYdHwHuTY15i1nq+u91MZ VwsR1M69PrDX5Ps6qo1F6QYJA/fA4fyOZ9dwIvh+cgtu4wBptr/NOpL3XH0kE2+G b2FRGOwdb2KlejIXSL9p4mfJTX9lmk4twbZe2Spjiy4FinOUyzxEobNoUTMcFCU7 Zu2i5yjMlJzrDB8yXz/N =xtXD -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----