From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp3.osuosl.org (smtp3.osuosl.org [IPv6:2605:bc80:3010::136]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8C623C002D for ; Wed, 17 Aug 2022 09:04:16 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp3.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6063161096 for ; Wed, 17 Aug 2022 09:04:16 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp3.osuosl.org 6063161096 Authentication-Results: smtp3.osuosl.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=op.pl header.i=@op.pl header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=2011 header.b=fx4Yw0vZ X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -0.7 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.7 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_05=-0.5, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from smtp3.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp3.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 2u-f4BAGQeLd for ; Wed, 17 Aug 2022 09:04:15 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: delayed 00:09:54 by SQLgrey-1.8.0 DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp3.osuosl.org D1B5560B24 Received: from smtpo78.poczta.onet.pl (smtpo78.poczta.onet.pl [141.105.16.28]) by smtp3.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D1B5560B24 for ; Wed, 17 Aug 2022 09:04:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: from pmq7v.m5r2.onet (pmq7v.m5r2.onet [10.174.35.192]) by smtp.poczta.onet.pl (Onet) with ESMTP id 4M71z84vSpz2K2nXm; Wed, 17 Aug 2022 10:54:12 +0200 (CEST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=op.pl; s=2011; t=1660726452; bh=W+1YrGNKKapj6xd33KjJdYV7i2NqGWnlTV5GUL5sf6c=; h=From:To:Date:Subject:From; b=fx4Yw0vZX5yakfPPf5viE6aV+zpi7j8n2FUdB+cUAPJwN3IJtDilnVUbg0dfs2Nph DAkNCrhj3lVBT3aE+MLM8M7wXVRTh6f++T+ZZ6OTnWykUzaA4mg7FtV6mY+eW2uqUL +Ilzp048f0QxaIk5RhG7252A+hQIYihM6fZzqK8E= Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Received: from [89.64.64.124] by pmq7v.m5r2.onet via HTTP id ; Wed, 17 Aug 2022 10:54:12 +0200 From: jk_14@op.pl X-Priority: 3 To: dizzle@pointbiz.com, bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org, pete@petertodd.org Date: Wed, 17 Aug 2022 10:54:11 +0200 Message-Id: <165909427-fcabd7e2d86a7077513853cede692955@pmq7v.m5r2.onet> X-Mailer: onet.poczta X-Onet-PMQ: ;89.64.64.124;PL;3 X-ONET_PL-MDA-SEGREGATION: 0 X-Mailman-Approved-At: Wed, 17 Aug 2022 11:06:20 +0000 Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Surprisingly, Tail Emission Is Not Inflationary X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 17 Aug 2022 09:04:16 -0000 Hi, Peter Thanks to human nature, still: 1. Bitcoin large holders are able to communicate with each other... - and as a large bitcoin holder someone will very well understand that he s= hould run his Antminers at loss for goodness of Bitcoin network security. But he won't communicate that - due to his greed - he just betrayed it. May= be someone will communicate that he is running Anminers... But it doesn't c= hange a lot. We can assume this additional possibility of communication (especially taki= ng into account big number of large holders and their anonimity) - doesn't = change this Prisoner's Dilemma into a "not textbook case enough". 2. The existing incentive that miners earn money for including transactions= is enough to motivate human nature... - but paying $50 usd per such transaction (the amount necessary to compensa= te lack of block reward right now) - is "no way" to motivate a human nature= , just due to: personal interest (as you correctly highlighted). It really = doesn't matter that the process of disappearance of block reward is spreade= d over the long run. (the same, but more terse: https://twitter.com/hasufl/status/15114706684576= 52224 ) 3. In many jurisdictions you can take back from grid for free - the amount = you have produced and uploaded earlier (I'm in one of such). So I won't inv= est and oversize my solar panels by additional ~24kW of power for additiona= l Antminer runing 24h/day - if I know it will be running at loss. (side not= e: it's not a good idea to be dependant with future health of bitcoin - on= what type of jurisdiction is the most popular one in given moment) There are two statements to repeat then, but more precisely: A. Bitcoiners (me too) are proud the bitcoin system is designed so clever, = that from the beginning till now - is able to run without the trust to anyo= ne. And utilise even people's greed - for system goodness/expansion. But wh= en I wrote the FIRST edge case is behind us, but the SECOND one - with no d= oubt with pathological Friedman's "free lunches" for part of participants -= is only some years ahead (like in a Titanic scene) - then most of them sud= denly say: "Ok, then... Bitcoin idea is so brilliant that maybe the game theory won't = apply anymore. Let's TRUST the large holders they will run Antminers at los= s." It's not The Satoshi's Vision anymore. B. Bitcoiners (me too) want to remove or neutralise all destructive things = to Bitcoin, like for example: unfriendly government regulations, etc. But w= hen I wrote there will be in the future (and the only question is: when) an= alarm siren that halvings start to be destructive to the Bitcoin network, = while start to cause consecutive network security/hashrate regressions - th= en most of them suddenly say: "Ok, then... I'm to greed to resign from it." It's not The Satoshi's Vision anymore. Regards Jaroslaw W dniu 2022-08-16 23:21:30 u=C5=BCytkownik Peter via bitcoin-dev napisa=C5=82: Hi Jaroslaw, In the Prisoner's Dilemma the prisoners cannot communicate. In Bitcoin larg= e holders are able to communicate with each other. Also, prisoners need not= make an all or nothing decision in Bitcoin. Miners can join and leave the = network freely over time. You can change your decision based on the decisio= n of others. The Bitcoin design is such that security is volatile but the issuance of bl= ocks is timely and evened out to a 10 minutes average even after the reward= is exhausted. The existing incentive that miners earn money for including transactions is= enough to motivate human nature. Transaction initiators have an incentive = to mine and run full nodes for personal interest. >Noone will waste his renewable energy on unprofitable Antminer while he/sh= e can sell this energy for the market price. The law in most jurisdictions prevents the resale of spare electricity unle= ss an expensive license is obtained (and in most cases no license is availa= ble as the government maintains a monopoly). Mining with waste electricity = is reducing losses. Another incentive to motivate human nature. Bitcoin holders can be enfranchised into any new system. So, no need for bi= ke shedding the original design which is a Schelling Point. Regards Peter Kroll pointbiz/ BTCCuracao