From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp2.osuosl.org (smtp2.osuosl.org [140.211.166.133]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DF5E8C0001 for ; Mon, 3 May 2021 05:18:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp2.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D335B4027F for ; Mon, 3 May 2021 05:18:00 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.299 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.299 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, FROM_LOCAL_NOVOWEL=0.5, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H3=0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL=0.001, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: smtp2.osuosl.org (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=protonmail.com Received: from smtp2.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp2.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id COE9xbb3tm96 for ; Mon, 3 May 2021 05:17:59 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: domain auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.8.0 Received: from mail-40130.protonmail.ch (mail-40130.protonmail.ch [185.70.40.130]) by smtp2.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0396D4026F for ; Mon, 3 May 2021 05:17:58 +0000 (UTC) Date: Mon, 03 May 2021 05:17:46 +0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=protonmail.com; s=protonmail; t=1620019075; bh=P8yfHHp5E7DB/rN2aVjfLXGKKyqwuC6Q1pchjMT10bM=; h=Date:To:From:Cc:Reply-To:Subject:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=dNNKEVilRhtW0NYy5tv62HdZPg39jV9kSpTkCYXUskqz3CGKIP7KYiE1pbCIJBvtb 00D4ojUIlAsOssoMIbuvGkMrCo3kVQNcgfNjoyL498ijjsDPS6x9CDkN15fU7MVIE0 2uVcOxabwtmkzuQB6NLMxFvfEqtbbKpNO4UQG3c0= To: Ruben Somsen , Bitcoin Protocol Discussion From: ZmnSCPxj Reply-To: ZmnSCPxj Message-ID: <1m_DMz6Z562s0k_NXlvCLxOeXwOUdF4-teyh_XgnEyB6jirU8wJVWkXxMWJi9GfNfc5H89X0ac0keYSzV60CETvH0UB-7YI2ZXhLLP3UOy4=@protonmail.com> In-Reply-To: References: <050674b8bc51cff11e0a6e105880b647@cock.li> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Cc: "christopher.gilliard@gmail.com" Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP - limiting OP_RETURN / HF X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 03 May 2021 05:18:01 -0000 Good morning Ruben, > Hi Yanmaani, > > >Merged mining at present only needs one hash for a merkle root, and that= 's stored in the coinbase. > > Yes, but that method is not "blind", meaning BTC miners have to validate= =C2=A0the merged-mined chain, which is a significant downside. > > >It would be even simpler to add the following rules > > That would require a specific soft fork, whereas the method described in = my post avoids doing that. > > >do I need to put in a transaction that burns bitcoins for the tx fee > > The blind merged-mined chain (which I call a "spacechain") needs its own = native token in order to pay for fees. The mechanism I proposed for that is= the perpetual one-way peg, which allows fair "spacecoin" creation by burni= ng BTC, and circumvents creating bad speculative altcoin incentives. Anyone= can create a spacechain block and take the fees, and then try to get BTC m= iners to include it by paying a higher fee than others (via RBF). What bothers me about BMM is the B. Mainchain miners assume that sidechain functionaries check the sidechain ru= les. Their rule is that if the sidechain functionary is willing to pay an amount= , then obviously the sidechain functionary must benefit by at *least* that = amount (if not, the sidechain functionary is losing funds over time and wil= l go out of business at some point). Thus the BMM is an economic incentive for sidechain functionaries to be hon= est, because dishonesty means that sidechain nodes will reject their blocks= and they will have earned nothing in the sidechain that is of equal or gre= ater value than what they spend on the mainchain. But the BMM on mainchain is done by bidding. Suppose a sidechain functionary creates a block where it gets S fees, and i= t pays (times any exchange rates that arise due to differing security profi= les of mainchain vs sidechain) M in fess to mainchain miners to get its com= mitment on the mainchain. Then any other competing sidechain functionary can create the same block ex= cept the S fees go to itself, and paying M+1 in fees to mainchain miners to= get *that* commitment mainchain. This triggers a bidding war. Logically, further sidechain functionaries will now bid M+2 etc. until M=3D= S (times exchange rates) and the highest bidder earns nothing. That means that sidechain functionaries will not earn anything once there a= re at least 2 functionaries, because if there are two sidechain functionari= es then they will start the above bidding war and all earnings go to mainch= ain miners, who are not actually validating anything in the sidechain. So they are doing all this work of validating the sidechain blocks, but gai= n nothing thereby, and are thus not much better than fullnodes. Even if you argue that the sidechain functionaries might gain economic bene= fit from the existence of the sidechain, that economic benefit can be quant= ified as some economic value, that can be exchanged at some exchange rate w= ith some number of mainchain tokens, so M just rises above S by that econom= ic benefit and sidechain functionaries will still end up earning 0 money. If there is only one sidechain functionary the above bidding war does not o= ccur, but then the entire sidechain depends on this one sidechain functiona= ry. So it does not seem to me that blinded merge mining would work at scale. Maybe. Regards, ZmnSCPxj