From: "Luke-Jr" <luke@dashjr.org>
To: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Subject: [Bitcoin-development] Defeating the block withholding attack
Date: Sun, 3 Jun 2012 00:52:14 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <201206030052.17128.luke@dashjr.org> (raw)
Analysis, comments, constructive criticism, etc welcome for the following:
==Background==
At present, an attacker can harm a pool by intentionally NOT submitting shares
that are also valid blocks. All pools are vulnerable to this attack, whether
centralized or decentralized and regardless of reward system used. The
attack's effectiveness is proportional to ratio of the attacker's hashrate to
the rest of the pool.
There are obvious solutions that can be used to defeat this attack on
centralized pools. For example, including a secret in the coinbase transaction
that is accepted by the network as a partial preimage proof-of-work. All these
solutions require changes to Bitcoin's proof-of-work acceptance terms, and
since centralized pools can be harmful to the network's security, these rule
changes are not likely to gain enough acceptance among the greater Bitcoin
community.
==Proposed Solution==
Please comment on the viability of this new proof-of-work algorithm, which I
think should be viable for even decentralized pools:
Blocks are accepted at a lower difficulty N (choosable by the pool; eg, the
share difficulty) iff they are submitted with a candidate for the next block
and SHA256(SHA256(NewBlockHash + NextBlockCandidateHash)) meets difficulty M.
The relationship between M and N must be comparable to the normal network
difficulty; details on the specifics of this can be figured out later, ideally
by someone more qualified than me. M and N must be chosen prior to searching
for the block: it should be safe to steal some always-zero bytes from the
prevblock header for this.
This algorithm should guarantee that every share has an equal chance of being
a valid block at the time it is found, and that which ones are actually blocks
cannot be known until the subsequent block is found. Thus, attackers have no
way to identify which shares to withhold even while they have full knowledge
of the shares/blocks themselves.
==Backward Compatibility==
Obviously, this change creates a hard-fork in the blockchain. I propose that
if it solves the block withholding risk, the gain is sufficient that the
community may approve a hard-fork to take place 1-2 years from consensus.
Since mining continues to use a double-SHA256 on a fixed 80 byte header,
existing miners, FPGAs, etc should work unmodified. Poolservers will need to
adapt significantly.
next reply other threads:[~2012-06-03 0:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-06-03 0:52 Luke-Jr [this message]
[not found] ` <CACsn0c=+xrVvGMAkPZffpVhRcAc09RuOW7LeOwi0TOD88VbuqQ@mail.gmail.com>
2012-06-03 3:40 ` [Bitcoin-development] Fwd: Defeating the block withholding attack Watson Ladd
2012-06-04 1:43 ` [Bitcoin-development] " Peter Vessenes
2012-06-04 2:04 ` Luke-Jr
2012-06-04 20:49 ` Mike Koss
2012-06-04 21:05 ` Luke-Jr
2012-06-05 0:00 ` Mike Koss
2012-06-05 1:05 ` Luke-Jr
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=201206030052.17128.luke@dashjr.org \
--to=luke@dashjr.org \
--cc=bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox