From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.192] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-4.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1UZPbg-0004IY-L2 for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Mon, 06 May 2013 17:53:48 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of petertodd.org designates 62.13.149.82 as permitted sender) client-ip=62.13.149.82; envelope-from=pete@petertodd.org; helo=outmail149082.authsmtp.co.uk; Received: from outmail149082.authsmtp.co.uk ([62.13.149.82]) by sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) id 1UZPbf-0008UR-Ax for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Mon, 06 May 2013 17:53:48 +0000 Received: from mail-c232.authsmtp.com (mail-c232.authsmtp.com [62.13.128.232]) by punt14.authsmtp.com (8.14.2/8.14.2/) with ESMTP id r46Hrerj008686; Mon, 6 May 2013 17:53:40 GMT Received: from petertodd.org (petertodd.org [174.129.28.249]) (authenticated bits=128) by mail.authsmtp.com (8.14.2/8.14.2/) with ESMTP id r46HrVxn081173 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA bits=128 verify=NO); Mon, 6 May 2013 18:53:34 +0100 (BST) Date: Mon, 6 May 2013 13:53:31 -0400 From: Peter Todd To: Gregory Maxwell Message-ID: <20130506175331.GB22505@petertodd.org> References: <20130506161216.GA5193@petertodd.org> <20130506163732.GB5193@petertodd.org> <20130506171943.GA22505@petertodd.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha1; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="mxv5cy4qt+RJ9ypb" Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) X-Server-Quench: df37036b-b675-11e2-b10b-0025903375e2 X-AuthReport-Spam: If SPAM / abuse - report it at: http://www.authsmtp.com/abuse X-AuthRoute: OCd2Yg0TA1ZNQRgX IjsJECJaVQIpKltL GxAVKBZePFsRUQkR aQdMdgQUFVQNAgsB AmUbWlxeVV57Wmc7 ag1VcwRfa1RMVxto VEFWR1pVCwQmQxgH flx4GkdyfwRHf30+ ZEJiW3IVCBJ5ckZ+ RBxJR2sBYHphaTUd TRJZd1FJcANIexZF aVN4USYPLwdSbGoL NQ4vNDcwO3BTJTpY RgYVKF8UXXNDMj8n TBccEC8+WkQJSz97 NxUtKVMABw5RLUwp YxMaVEgGMhQfQgdf A1ovSCFePREZXTct AA8SW0kSHSYcKQAA X-Authentic-SMTP: 61633532353630.1019:706 X-AuthFastPath: 0 (Was 255) X-AuthSMTP-Origin: 174.129.28.249/587 X-AuthVirus-Status: No virus detected - but ensure you scan with your own anti-virus system. X-Spam-Score: -1.5 (-) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record X-Headers-End: 1UZPbf-0008UR-Ax Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Discovery/addr packets (was: Service bits for pruned nodes) X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 06 May 2013 17:53:48 -0000 --mxv5cy4qt+RJ9ypb Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Mon, May 06, 2013 at 10:42:19AM -0700, Gregory Maxwell wrote: > On Mon, May 6, 2013 at 10:19 AM, Peter Todd wrote: > >> running hash of all messages sent on a connection so far. Add a new > >> protocol message that asks the node to sign the current accumulated > >> hash. > > We already depend on OpenSSL, why not just use standard SSL? >=20 > SSL doesn't actually provide non-repudiation. We actually want > non-repudiation. I want to be able to prove to others that some node > deceived me. We don't have non-repudiation now, why make that a requirement for the first version? Adding non-repudiation is something that has to happen at the Bitcoin protocol level,(1) so it's orthogonal to using SSL to make sure you're connection isn't being tampered with and is encrypted. 1) Non-repudiation is only useful with fraud proofs, and they will have to be thought out for everything the node might claim. > (there are a number of other arguments I could make against SSL, but > that one is probably sufficient=E2=80=94 or rather, it's an argument that= we > should have some way of cheaply getting non-reputable signatures > regardless of the transport) Exactly. Implement an SSL-protected transport, and leave non-repudiation and broader issues of node identity as a later, long-term project. Many client won't even want to support all that complexity, but they'll still want to cheaply get the advantages SSL has with regard to MITM resistance and privacy with little effort. Anyway, the concept of a per-node identity keypair is the first step towards non-repudiation, and implementing SSL transport. > couple attempts it can be minutes before it gets a connection. We're > short on onion peers and I sometimes get inbound connections before I I run a fast node on EC2 that only accepts inbound connections over Tor and I regularly have about ~50 inbound peers. --=20 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org 0000000000000042d8b5bc3ca04847f711b82b66f08b7360a565ebd0b131621c --mxv5cy4qt+RJ9ypb Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" Content-Description: Digital signature -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) iEYEARECAAYFAlGH7hsACgkQpEFN739thoyRcwCfctytT/KH+KknfgJUY1uHc3Ey 1wYAmQG169jI9wMTu0iRqFEBMNtAVG1O =0pZX -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --mxv5cy4qt+RJ9ypb--