From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.193] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-3.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1VZul6-0001W8-Bi for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Sat, 26 Oct 2013 03:41:52 +0000 X-ACL-Warn: Received: from zinan.dashjr.org ([192.3.11.21]) by sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) id 1VZul5-0002Y1-K2 for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Sat, 26 Oct 2013 03:41:52 +0000 Received: from ishibashi.localnet (unknown [IPv6:2001:470:5:265:222:4dff:fe50:4c49]) (Authenticated sender: luke-jr) by zinan.dashjr.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 703BA108378F; Sat, 26 Oct 2013 03:41:49 +0000 (UTC) From: "Luke-Jr" To: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net Date: Sat, 26 Oct 2013 03:41:40 +0000 User-Agent: KMail/1.13.7 (Linux/3.10.15-gentoo; KDE/4.10.5; x86_64; ; ) References: In-Reply-To: X-PGP-Key-Fingerprint: E463 A93F 5F31 17EE DE6C 7316 BD02 9424 21F4 889F X-PGP-Key-ID: BD02942421F4889F X-PGP-Keyserver: hkp://pgp.mit.edu MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: Text/Plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <201310260341.41613.luke@dashjr.org> X-Spam-Score: -0.4 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -0.4 RP_MATCHES_RCVD Envelope sender domain matches handover relay domain X-Headers-End: 1VZul5-0002Y1-K2 Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Payment protocol for onion URLs. X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 26 Oct 2013 03:41:52 -0000 On Saturday, October 26, 2013 3:31:05 AM Gregory Maxwell wrote: > One limitation of the payment protocol as speced is that there is no > way for a hidden service site to make use of its full authentication > capability because they are unable to get SSL certificates issued to > them. > > A tor hidden service (onion site) is controlled by an RSA key. > > It would be trivial to pack a tor HS pubkey into a self-signed x509 > certificate with the cn set to foooo.onion. > ... > Thoughts? Is there any point to additional encryption over tor (which afaik is already encrypted end-to-end)? Is there a safe way to make this work through tor entry nodes/gateways? It'd be nice to have a way to support namecoin-provided keys too... Luke