Re: [Bitcoin-development] Zeroconf-safe tx replacement (replace-for-fee)

[Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org>]

Might leak less wiggle room and be simpler/more robut to validate that
*everything* has to be the same except for the amount going to one (presumed
change) address.  A privacy leak I know, but dont do that - ie send enough
change the first time.  And network analysis has shown change addresses
arent adding hardly any privacy.

We need more robust privacy fixes independently.  I do not support damaging
the 0-conf feature, so I think this later approach is a better track for
revising fees.

Adam

On Mon, Nov 04, 2013 at 05:52:43AM -0500, Peter Todd wrote:
>On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 07:17:50AM +0000, John Dillon wrote:
>> This discussion seems to be a lot of hot air over a simple observation that
>> estimates are imperfect and always will be. I do not understand you vehement
>> opposition the notion that a backup is a good thing except in the context that
>> replacement to change fees is halfway to profit-seeking replacement by fee.
>>
>>
>> Peter Todd:
>>
>> You did a fair bit of leg work for replace-by-fee. Seems to me that
>> replace-for-fee will help prep infrastructure to eventual replace-by-fee usage,
>> while avoiding some of the politics around zero-conf transactions.