From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.194] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-4.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1VhOmT-0005YN-0N for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Fri, 15 Nov 2013 19:10:13 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of petertodd.org designates 62.13.148.95 as permitted sender) client-ip=62.13.148.95; envelope-from=pete@petertodd.org; helo=outmail148095.authsmtp.com; Received: from outmail148095.authsmtp.com ([62.13.148.95]) by sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) id 1VhOmR-00017m-Qg for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Fri, 15 Nov 2013 19:10:12 +0000 Received: from mail-c235.authsmtp.com (mail-c235.authsmtp.com [62.13.128.235]) by punt8.authsmtp.com (8.14.2/8.14.2) with ESMTP id rAFJ9jPf014671; Fri, 15 Nov 2013 19:09:45 GMT Received: from petertodd.org (petertodd.org [174.129.28.249]) (authenticated bits=128) by mail.authsmtp.com (8.14.2/8.14.2/) with ESMTP id rAFJ9eHi050028 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA bits=128 verify=NO); Fri, 15 Nov 2013 19:09:43 GMT Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2013 14:09:40 -0500 From: Peter Todd To: Michael Gronager Message-ID: <20131115190940.GA29469@petertodd.org> References: <528367F5.9080303@ceptacle.com> <20131115095413.GA17034@savin> <5285FBD9.2070106@ceptacle.com> <20131115111204.GF17034@savin> <52860C56.7000608@ceptacle.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha256; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="82I3+IH0IqGh5yIs" Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <52860C56.7000608@ceptacle.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) X-Server-Quench: 7c6d49f8-4e29-11e3-b802-002590a15da7 X-AuthReport-Spam: If SPAM / abuse - report it at: http://www.authsmtp.com/abuse X-AuthRoute: OCd2Yg0TA1ZNQRgX IjsJECJaVQIpKltL GxAVKBZePFsRUQkR aAdMdwcUFloCAgsB AmUbWl1eUFR7XWA7 ag1VcwRfa1RMVxto VEFWR1pVCwQmQ213 fBdLKkBycgVGenY+ ZEZrXXgVWxd8IUJ0 FEZJETgEbHphaTUc TRJQdwFJcANIexZF O1F6ACIKLwdSbGoL NQ4vNDcwO3BTJTpY RgYVKF8UXXNDMyAx QVgZHDA3GUAfDyAy KR0jN1tUEkscek47 NVA8XVsEMhgUaEVQ GFtIHStQdREPD3xj BwRHW1IPUjNaWyRr GBQ0L1hBHDFIUyVV M0FBTBoMECJXXUEw X-Authentic-SMTP: 61633532353630.1023:706 X-AuthFastPath: 0 (Was 255) X-AuthSMTP-Origin: 174.129.28.249/587 X-AuthVirus-Status: No virus detected - but ensure you scan with your own anti-virus system. 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[URIs: petertodd.org] X-Headers-End: 1VhOmR-00017m-Qg Cc: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Even simpler minimum fee calculation formula: f > bounty*fork_rate/average_blocksize X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2013 19:10:13 -0000 --82I3+IH0IqGh5yIs Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Fri, Nov 15, 2013 at 12:58:14PM +0100, Michael Gronager wrote: > My Q and q are meant differently, I agree to your Q vs Q-1 argument, > but the q is "me as a miner" participating in "a pool" Q. If I > participate in a pool I pay the pool owner a fraction, e, but at the > same time I become part of an economy of scale (well actually a math > of scale...) and that can end up paying for the lost e. The question > is what is the ratio q/Q where I should rather mine on my own ? This > question is interesting as it will make bigger miners break away from > pools into solo mining, but I also agree that from pure math the most > advantageous scenario is the 100% mining rig. The underlying issue is what is the pools expenses compared to yours. There is an overhead to mining, you need to spend money and time (and hence money) running and administering full nodes at the very minimum. The pool can amortise that cost over many hashers; the solo miner can't. Pools will of course have some profit margin, but why would you expect that margin to not be sufficiently low to make it in a solo-miner's interest to join the pool? Both the pool and the former solo-miner earn more return after all if they centralize. The fundemental issue is that in the design of Bitcoin there is an incentive for miners to join into pools, and that incentive exists at any amount of hashing power. Sure second order effects like regulation and social pressure can counteract that incentive in some circumstances, but that's not very strong protection. > > The equations give an incentive to centralize all the way up to 1 > > miner with 100% hashing power. > >=20 > > Of course, if that one pool were p2pool, that might be ok! >=20 > Ha, yes, and then the math for p2pool starts... a math where we have > much more stales... However p2pool doesn't necessarily need a linear blockchain to function, so there is a potential for stales to be much less relevant. --=20 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org 000000000000000772f720b0a231150f22af20760c1463ef920f71ba3daab819 --82I3+IH0IqGh5yIs Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" Content-Description: Digital signature -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJShnF0AAoJEBmcgzuo5/CF+3UIAJc1NaAww4FuGHTZ5ciK1rSw YCcdsIzeQigl//9jPiilYRA22zhzhTQDxuvINwfAcl/ymhV8MBDNObeGUQuTMJ+A HMeUNx/aoO9f2d/XbbAuPabkeU1sGoyQprxA5oM8htiGiioJy5p3CigPoWj1IWXU Fv6bYltnQo/Wr2OF3J5Utcq27GCog7thohiCiIsNwETJN4dE1nnk9gxrmJw8MTwL LBZKZpHFtesgvA7YHXZlBtzhBvxEPmGRy4d+4klqu7JbIRRfZlAlC2ZbucXGOPM4 GYFsYY+URzGRg2vzzvAO2BbCLkj/SSvaI/L4pcV9mml1MRSp6wyJ0ZCDXnC4MQo= =SI4r -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --82I3+IH0IqGh5yIs--