From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.191] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-1.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1Vt3TK-0001Ez-7e for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Tue, 17 Dec 2013 22:50:38 +0000 X-ACL-Warn: Received: from zinan.dashjr.org ([192.3.11.21]) by sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) id 1Vt3TJ-0001EP-0m for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Tue, 17 Dec 2013 22:50:38 +0000 Received: from ishibashi.localnet (unknown [IPv6:2001:470:5:265:be5f:f4ff:febf:4f76]) (Authenticated sender: luke-jr) by zinan.dashjr.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 4BFF51080838; Tue, 17 Dec 2013 22:50:45 +0000 (UTC) From: "Luke-Jr" To: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2013 22:50:24 +0000 User-Agent: KMail/1.13.7 (Linux/3.12.1-gentoo; KDE/4.10.5; x86_64; ; ) References: <20131217224130.GC3180@nl.grid.coop> In-Reply-To: <20131217224130.GC3180@nl.grid.coop> X-PGP-Key-Fingerprint: E463 A93F 5F31 17EE DE6C 7316 BD02 9424 21F4 889F X-PGP-Key-ID: BD02942421F4889F X-PGP-Keyserver: hkp://pgp.mit.edu MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: Text/Plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <201312172250.24887.luke@dashjr.org> X-Spam-Score: -0.5 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -0.5 RP_MATCHES_RCVD Envelope sender domain matches handover relay domain X-Headers-End: 1Vt3TJ-0001EP-0m Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] RFC: MERGE transaction/script/process for forked chains X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2013 22:50:38 -0000 On Tuesday, December 17, 2013 10:41:30 PM Troy Benjegerdes wrote: > I want to get some feedback.. I've used distributed version control > systems for a long time, and the most useful feature is to be able > to merge two different forks. > > So what's the equivalent of this for Bitcoin or other crypto-currencies? > > Let's suppose that me and my friends get 'islanded' from the rest of > the internet for a week, but we still want to trade bitcoin. It would > work if there are local miners, until we reconnect. > > Suppose we have the main chain (Alice), while bob is on a boat, trading > with some friends, but has no network connectivity. > > When bob reconnects with Alice, a 'Merge' transaction happens where a > miner looks at bob's forked blockchain, sees no double-spends, and > includes BOTH chains. > > Now suppose someone on bob's boat has a buggy client, or sent a > transaction before disconnect that results in a double-spend on the > merge. > > So we have a merge conflict, which generally requires human interaction, > so bob and his friends broadcast a MERGE request with a transaction fee > sufficient to cover reconciling the double-spends, AND incentivize a > miner to do some extra work to merge. > > Thoughts everyone? This is interesting, but I'm not sure it has the right incentives. First, it adds more reason for miners to *avoid* including transactions (they might turn out to be double-spends and make merging costly). Second, it gives people reason to double-spend (the miner might cover the cost of it). Finally, you don't appear to address how to deal with the subsidy - do both miners get it? Luke