From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.194] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-4.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1W3g3S-0005mX-4E for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Thu, 16 Jan 2014 06:03:50 +0000 X-ACL-Warn: Received: from quidecco.de ([81.169.136.15]) by sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:AES256-SHA:256) (Exim 4.76) id 1W3g3Q-0008BU-T3 for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Thu, 16 Jan 2014 06:03:50 +0000 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by quidecco.de (Postfix) with SMTP id E5C60DB1D40; Thu, 16 Jan 2014 04:54:43 +0100 (CET) From: Isidor Zeuner To: Bitcoin Dev References: In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Message-Id: <20140116035443.E5C60DB1D40@quidecco.de> Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2014 04:54:43 +0100 (CET) X-Spam-Score: -0.3 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -0.3 RP_MATCHES_RCVD Envelope sender domain matches handover relay domain X-Headers-End: 1W3g3Q-0008BU-T3 Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Tor / SPV X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2014 06:03:50 -0000 quote: > > but then you remove the implication that a node has to give both public > > and private IPs to a peer. If it's part of a batch of "addr"s, it could be > > my own hidden service ID, but it could also be one that I learned from > > someone else and is now propagating, for anyone to bootstrap with Tor > > hidden service peers if they'd like. > > > > Hmm. So you mean that we pick a set of peers we believe to not be sybils of > each other, but they might give us hidden services run by other people? I > need to think about that. If they're getting the hidden services just from > addr announcements themselves, then you just punt the issue up a layer - > what stops me generating 10000 hidden service keys that all map to my same > malicious node, announcing them, and then waiting for the traffic to > arrive? If clearnet nodes inform of their own hidden service IDs, that > issue is avoided. > Considering that the clearnet sybil protection also relies on scaling up the resource requirements for an attacker, why not require hidden service addresses following a certain pattern, like a fixed prefix? Essentially also a PoW scheme... > My goal here is not necessarily to hide P2P nodes - we still need lots of > clearnet P2P nodes for the forseeable future no matter what. What would you consider as the main merits of clearnet nodes? Best regards, Isidor