From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.194] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-2.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1WdLBy-0004zU-4h for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Thu, 24 Apr 2014 15:04:02 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of petertodd.org designates 62.13.149.43 as permitted sender) client-ip=62.13.149.43; envelope-from=pete@petertodd.org; helo=outmail149043.authsmtp.co.uk; Received: from outmail149043.authsmtp.co.uk ([62.13.149.43]) by sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) id 1WdLBs-0003gd-8o for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Thu, 24 Apr 2014 15:04:02 +0000 Received: from mail-c235.authsmtp.com (mail-c235.authsmtp.com [62.13.128.235]) by punt17.authsmtp.com (8.14.2/8.14.2/) with ESMTP id s3OF3nNc015997; Thu, 24 Apr 2014 16:03:49 +0100 (BST) Received: from savin (76-10-178-109.dsl.teksavvy.com [76.10.178.109]) (authenticated bits=128) by mail.authsmtp.com (8.14.2/8.14.2/) with ESMTP id s3OF3gP5010863 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA bits=128 verify=NO); Thu, 24 Apr 2014 16:03:44 +0100 (BST) Date: Thu, 24 Apr 2014 11:03:37 -0400 From: Peter Todd To: Christophe Biocca Message-ID: <20140424150337.GA24314@savin> References: <20140424134441.GE16884@savin> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha256; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="k1lZvvs/B4yU6o8G" Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) X-Server-Quench: a1aea8fe-cbc1-11e3-b802-002590a15da7 X-AuthReport-Spam: If SPAM / abuse - report it at: http://www.authsmtp.com/abuse X-AuthRoute: OCd2Yg0TA1ZNQRgX IjsJECJaVQIpKltL GxAVKBZePFsRUQkR aAdMdAYUGUUGAgsB AmIbWlJeUF57XWY7 bAxPbAVDY01GQQRq WVdMSlVNFUsrAmN3 BUl+Vxlzdw1AezBx ZkJqWz4KXRUvJE4r F1MHRz4HeGZhPWMC AkhYdR5UcAFPdx8U a1UrBXRDAzANdhES HhM4ODE3eDlSNilR RRkIIFQOdA4gGT86 TRkZEH01EEQBQyI4 JgAnLVhUAEFZPkQp Olw8Q1sXPlc8CwtY ElAvSCZFO1AKRDFD X-Authentic-SMTP: 61633532353630.1023:706 X-AuthFastPath: 0 (Was 255) X-AuthSMTP-Origin: 76.10.178.109/587 X-AuthVirus-Status: No virus detected - but ensure you scan with your own anti-virus system. X-Spam-Score: -1.5 (-) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record X-Headers-End: 1WdLBs-0003gd-8o Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Coinbase reallocation to discourage Finney attacks X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 24 Apr 2014 15:04:02 -0000 --k1lZvvs/B4yU6o8G Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Thu, Apr 24, 2014 at 10:47:35AM -0400, Christophe Biocca wrote: > Actually Peter, coinbase confiscations are a much worse mechanism for > enforcement of widespread censorship rules than simple orphaning. They > lose their power when the transaction miners are punished for can > build up over time without losing their usefulness: > Of course, in such a dystopian future, orphaning would be the > enforcement mechanism. It would be stupid to rely on coinbase > reallocation/burning to do this task when the existing tools work so > much better. I don't disagree with you at an end stage, but the thing with coinbase blacklists/confiscation is because it's a voting mechanism the initial stages of enforcing widespread censorship rules with it are much easier. For instance, if a 10% pool that has been forced/wants to blacklist certain transactions can do so, and then vote to blacklist blocks that do not abide by that blacklist. Casting that vote does them no harm. Every time another pool joins the blacklist, there's no harm to them to doing so. At some point they will reach a majority, which causes the blacklist to actually apply. The whole process happens smoothly, letting the blacklist be applied safely and easily. With orphaning/reorging on the other hand you just can't be sure that the other miners will actually adopt it, making adoption risky. Of course, that's above and beyond the fact that you can't prove a Finney attack happened to a third-party, making it easy to attack smaller miners with Sybil attacks, get them creating blocks with double-spends in them, and using that as an excuse to punish them. > What's interesting is that this mechanism is especially tailored to > blocking time sensitive transactions (that need to be confirmed > now/soon, or are worthless), such that their total out-of-band fees > can't build up over time. Double spending is one such category. I'm at > a loss to come up with something else, but maybe someone has a good > example? Decentralized markets are a great example: the bids and orders they depend on are time-senstive and become much less valuable if they get delayed greatly. --=20 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org 0000000000000000091ae589c034bc0466e2feca51dc018bb2c3303e8ab8648b --k1lZvvs/B4yU6o8G Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" Content-Description: Digital signature -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.14 (GNU/Linux) iQGrBAEBCACVBQJTWSfFXhSAAAAAABUAQGJsb2NraGFzaEBiaXRjb2luLm9yZzAw MDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwOTFhZTU4OWMwMzRiYzA0NjZlMmZlY2E1MWRjMDE4YmIy YzMzMDNlOGFiODY0OGIvFIAAAAAAFQARcGthLWFkZHJlc3NAZ251cGcub3JncGV0 ZUBwZXRlcnRvZC5vcmcACgkQJIFAPaXwkfvNYAf/SzKD2sONRQsZX74ZimhXMZJa GsCYJKIH6ZYU6ToL93jotCSKYR+iuRhxRIvYYI1JmCdVEwXbLtuMJfRmM4ufuy6A RtSGrhwWFJ4h1rSOC8aBReJ9dg5/4Y+YlQjdlkejZKTz2QqVcr/h+smaJpHV5O+6 mdj15H6Ziyv5gE62slsz2AvW9vzfJqLSX9/Mr/EPAsLlZQe8PCdzfJtdvHswtPS9 ZuWR6mFtmcTjh4Pxd2YVjXMMmtvr3ndrxRE9Q2TafT1BR0yClKMbLz/bbeOVB7iM OwppTqiBTbYIKCqxnl0Iu9r4hoGBY53ZiHrswfXuoiD20ZUKwEm6tHAkuzD4BA== =crLw -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --k1lZvvs/B4yU6o8G--