From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.194] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-3.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1YqBMw-0004fJ-Nk for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Thu, 07 May 2015 02:16:58 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of petertodd.org designates 62.13.149.113 as permitted sender) client-ip=62.13.149.113; envelope-from=pete@petertodd.org; helo=outmail149113.authsmtp.com; Received: from outmail149113.authsmtp.com ([62.13.149.113]) by sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) id 1YqBMv-0002wj-9V for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Thu, 07 May 2015 02:16:58 +0000 Received: from mail-c237.authsmtp.com (mail-c237.authsmtp.com [62.13.128.237]) by punt15.authsmtp.com (8.14.2/8.14.2/) with ESMTP id t472GnvT037256; Thu, 7 May 2015 03:16:49 +0100 (BST) Received: from savin.petertodd.org (75-119-251-161.dsl.teksavvy.com [75.119.251.161]) (authenticated bits=128) by mail.authsmtp.com (8.14.2/8.14.2/) with ESMTP id t472GiGK047221 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA bits=128 verify=NO); Thu, 7 May 2015 03:16:47 +0100 (BST) Date: Wed, 6 May 2015 22:16:44 -0400 From: Peter Todd To: Matt Corallo Message-ID: <20150507021644.GA21742@savin.petertodd.org> References: <554A91BE.6060105@bluematt.me> <554A9FD1.80103@bluematt.me> <554AA6B1.8030701@bluematt.me> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha256; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="sm4nu43k4a2Rpi4c" Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <554AA6B1.8030701@bluematt.me> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) X-Server-Quench: 1d63fe62-f45f-11e4-9f74-002590a135d3 X-AuthReport-Spam: If SPAM / abuse - report it at: http://www.authsmtp.com/abuse X-AuthRoute: OCd2Yg0TA1ZNQRgX IjsJECJaVQIpKltL GxAVKBZePFsRUQkR aQdMdgUUFVQNAgsB AmMbW1deUVt7XWs7 bA9PbARUfEhLXhtr VklWR1pVCwQmRRgG BGlHJWJycwJEen8+ ZEJnWHQVXRB8dhAo RExJQ2kDM3phaTUb TUkOcAdJcANIexZF O1F8UScOLwdSbGoL NQ4vNDcwO3BTJTpY RgYVKF8UXXNDNDo7 TBNKJjQ9EAUkQS4p IhU9JzYB X-Authentic-SMTP: 61633532353630.1024:706 X-AuthFastPath: 0 (Was 255) X-AuthSMTP-Origin: 75.119.251.161/587 X-AuthVirus-Status: No virus detected - but ensure you scan with your own anti-virus system. X-Spam-Score: -1.5 (-) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record X-Headers-End: 1YqBMv-0002wj-9V Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Block Size Increase X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 07 May 2015 02:16:58 -0000 --sm4nu43k4a2Rpi4c Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Wed, May 06, 2015 at 11:41:37PM +0000, Matt Corallo wrote: > Yes, but this does NOT make an actual policy. Note that the vast > majority of miners already apply their own patches to Bitcoin Core, so > applying one more is not all that hard. When blocks start to become > limited (ie there is any fee left on the table by transactions not > included in a block) there becomes incentive for miners to change that > behavior pretty quick. Not just that, the vast majority of the hashpower > is behind very large miners, who have little to no decentralization > pressure. This results in very incompatible incentives, mainly that the > incentive would be for the large miners to interconnect in a private > network and generate only maximum-size blocks, creating a strong > centralization pressure in the network. I'll also point out that miners with the goal of finding more blocks than their competition - a viable long-term strategy to increase market share and/or a short-term strategy to get more transaction fees - actually have a perverse incentive(1) to ensure their blocks do *not* get to more than ~30% of the hashing power. The main thing holding them back from doing that is that the inflation subsidy is still quite high - better to get the reward now than try to push your competition out of business. It's plausible that with a limited blocksize there won't be an opportunity to delay propagation by broadcasting larger blocks - if blocks propagate in a matter of seconds worst case there's no opportunity for gaming the system. But it does strongly show that we must build systems where that worst case propagation time in all circumstances is very short relative to the block interval. 1) http://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/ms= g03200.html --=20 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org 000000000000000004dc867e4541315090329f45ed4dd30e2fd7423a38a72c0e --sm4nu43k4a2Rpi4c Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" Content-Description: Digital signature -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQGrBAEBCACVBQJVSssIXhSAAAAAABUAQGJsb2NraGFzaEBiaXRjb2luLm9yZzAw MDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwNGRjODY3ZTQ1NDEzMTUwOTAzMjlmNDVlZDRkZDMwZTJm ZDc0MjNhMzhhNzJjMGUvFIAAAAAAFQARcGthLWFkZHJlc3NAZ251cGcub3JncGV0 ZUBwZXRlcnRvZC5vcmcACgkQJIFAPaXwkfu2Jwf8CvszkuiQXvZXp9T+pLt5MV8Z IdjDhJAXXOpevzNBpy6i1TjXDjRBeZ+Bdlru8IaFw9PVS7dx+AJ0+SC4qevHvyT1 7zj+E87j1jDt+JkAEgcFyFLQ4mdJgZVJ/5yZzaCOS/n+17wifmR0CkClSs14bgCS RdtksFwQblmTEAyHRBW6GCeuWYl5NDc4yKewK27oErVuzWkbFvBx5MjJ2RDkDGM1 ZR8z5zDSPoSCTWC5lqJON4nSdMudT+z6oNL9uZUCuxNynkHGaOE+mna0G6BOhAlG Fz4+Y1tlRrnPfQlBXEuJ77k8ZRTSUSaiBWyKOsH2XOVUOxawU7+6QDGsxieY/A== =Q9UA -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --sm4nu43k4a2Rpi4c--