Re: [Bitcoin-development] Consensus-enforced transaction replacement via sequence numbers

[Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org>]

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On Tue, May 26, 2015 at 06:50:29PM -0700, Mark Friedenbach wrote:
> Sequence numbers appear to have been originally intended as a mechanism for
> transaction replacement within the context of multi-party transaction
> construction, e.g. a micropayment channel. The idea is that a participant
> can sign successive versions of a transaction, each time incrementing the
> sequence field by some amount. Relay nodes perform transaction replacement
> according to some policy rule making use of the sequence numbers, e.g.
> requiring sequence numbers in a replacement to be monotonically increasing.

Can you provide a worked example of this in use? I think I see a major
flaw, but I'd like to see a worked example first.

Keep in mind that there's absolutely no reason to have pending
transactions in mempools until we actually expect them to be mined.
Equally this proposal is no more "consensus enforcement" than simply
increasing the fee (and possibly decreasing the absolute nLockTime) for
each replacement would be; increasing the fee for each mempool
replacement is a hard requirement as an anti-DoS anyway. (this was all
discussed on the mailing list two years ago when RBF was first proposed)

-- 
'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
00000000000000000ec0c3a90baa52289171046469fe4a21dc5a0dac4cb758a9

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