From: Anthony Towns <aj@erisian.com.au>
To: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Let's deploy BIP65 CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY!
Date: Tue, 6 Oct 2015 16:20:31 +1000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20151006062030.GB1054@navy> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+w+GKRjURkV40iG=6RLhFyQ-t2G_YAinKk7Os_8zK4+hyYJaw@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, Oct 05, 2015 at 06:46:28PM +0200, Mike Hearn via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> The example is this: find someone that accepts 1-block confirmed
> transactions in return for something valuable. There are plenty of them out
> there. Once the soft fork starts, send a P2SH transaction that defines a
> new output controlled by OP_CLTV. It will be incorporated into the UTXO set
> by all miners because it's opaque (p2sh).
>
> Now send a transaction that pays the merchant, and make it spend your
> OP_CLTV output with an invalid script. New nodes will reject it as a rule
> violator. Old nodes won't.
Old nodes running bitcoind will see it as OP_NOP2, and will reject it
unless they've manually disabled SCRIPT_VERIFY_DISCOURAGE_UPGRADABLE_NOPS,
which (aiui) has been available since bitcoin 0.10 [0], but not backported
to 0.8 or 0.9.
[0] https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/commit/0391423
That covers about 4700/5880 nodes going by bitnodes.21.co; but I can't
tell how many miners it covers.
Further, AIUI, nodes running 0.8 or 0.9 will still apply IsStandard()
checks to scripts attempting to spend p2sh outputs [1], so will also
fail to either mine or relay your OP_NOP2 payment.
[1] https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/commit/6259937
> So at some point an old miner will create a
> block containing your invalid transaction, the merchant will think they got
> paid, they'll give you the stuff and the fraud is done.
My understanding is that this isn't supposed to be a problem because you
won't be able to find an old miner that will do that; released versions
of bitcoin already block it by default.
Sure, someone could disable those checks and not pay attention to a soft
fork that will cause their blocks to be orphaned, but I'm not seeing why
that's any different a threat compared to someone deliberately mining
invalid blocks to do 1-confirmation doublespends against merchants not
running a full node.
At least, that's my understanding, and I'm not an expert, so corrections
appreciated.
Cheers,
aj
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-10-06 6:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 93+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-10-02 1:57 [bitcoin-dev] Let's deploy BIP65 CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY! NotMike Hearn
2015-10-02 2:12 ` GC
2015-10-05 10:59 ` Mike Hearn
2015-10-05 11:23 ` Jeff Garzik
2015-10-05 11:28 ` Mike Hearn
2015-10-05 12:04 ` Jorge Timón
2015-10-05 12:08 ` Clément Elbaz
2015-10-05 12:16 ` Jorge Timón
2015-10-05 12:29 ` Clément Elbaz
2015-10-05 15:42 ` Jorge Timón
2015-10-05 12:10 ` Mike Hearn
2015-10-05 15:33 ` Jorge Timón
2015-10-05 16:46 ` Mike Hearn
2015-10-06 6:20 ` Anthony Towns [this message]
2015-10-07 6:13 ` Micha Bailey
2015-10-05 13:29 ` Jorge Timón
2015-10-05 13:24 ` Jorge Timón
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2015-09-27 18:50 Peter Todd
2015-09-27 20:26 ` jl2012
2015-09-27 20:27 ` Peter Todd
2015-09-27 20:27 ` Mark Friedenbach
2015-09-27 20:41 ` Btc Drak
2015-09-28 10:10 ` s7r
2015-09-28 10:48 ` Mike Hearn
2015-09-28 11:00 ` Adam Back
2015-09-28 11:40 ` Mike Hearn
2015-09-28 12:20 ` Eric Lombrozo
2015-09-28 12:26 ` Mike Hearn
2015-09-28 12:44 ` Eric Lombrozo
2015-09-28 12:54 ` Mike Hearn
2015-09-29 6:17 ` Eric Lombrozo
2015-09-29 12:02 ` Mike Hearn
2015-09-28 14:05 ` Btc Drak
2015-09-28 14:17 ` Mike Hearn
2015-09-28 21:12 ` odinn
2015-09-28 22:16 ` Dave Scotese
2015-09-28 11:04 ` Eric Lombrozo
2015-09-28 12:47 ` Tier Nolan
2015-09-28 13:01 ` Gavin Andresen
2015-09-28 13:28 ` Peter Todd
2015-09-28 13:43 ` Gavin Andresen
2015-09-28 14:14 ` Peter Todd
2015-09-28 13:21 ` Peter Todd
2015-09-28 13:41 ` Mike Hearn
2015-09-28 14:29 ` Peter Todd
2015-09-28 14:33 ` Mike Hearn
2015-09-28 14:43 ` Peter Todd
2015-09-28 14:51 ` Mike Hearn
2015-09-28 15:05 ` Peter Todd
2015-09-28 15:38 ` Mike Hearn
2015-09-28 16:52 ` jl2012
2015-09-28 17:14 ` Mike Hearn
2015-09-28 23:17 ` Jorge Timón
2015-09-29 12:07 ` Mike Hearn
2015-09-29 13:30 ` Jonathan Toomim (Toomim Bros)
2015-09-29 15:59 ` jl2012
2015-09-29 19:54 ` odinn
2015-09-29 18:31 ` Gregory Maxwell
2015-09-30 17:11 ` Mike Hearn
2015-09-30 17:58 ` Jorge Timón
2015-10-01 14:23 ` Tom Harding
2015-09-30 18:15 ` Adam Back
2015-09-30 19:26 ` Jeff Garzik
2015-09-30 19:56 ` Mike Hearn
2015-09-30 20:37 ` Jorge Timón
2015-09-30 21:06 ` Mike Hearn
2015-09-30 22:14 ` Jorge Timón
2015-10-01 0:11 ` Jorge Timón
2015-09-30 22:17 ` Jeff Garzik
2015-09-30 23:25 ` Gregory Maxwell
2015-09-30 20:15 ` Gregory Maxwell
2015-09-30 21:01 ` Mike Hearn
2015-09-30 22:59 ` Gregory Maxwell
2015-10-07 15:00 ` Anthony Towns
2015-10-07 15:46 ` Jonathan Toomim (Toomim Bros)
2015-10-07 16:02 ` Eric Lombrozo
2015-10-07 16:25 ` Eric Lombrozo
2015-10-07 16:26 ` Jonathan Toomim (Toomim Bros)
2015-10-07 16:38 ` Anthony Towns
2015-10-10 7:23 ` Anthony Towns
2015-10-12 7:02 ` digitsu
2015-10-12 16:33 ` Anthony Towns
2015-10-12 17:06 ` Anthony Towns
2015-10-13 0:08 ` digitsu
2015-09-29 20:03 ` Wladimir J. van der Laan
2015-09-30 4:05 ` Rusty Russell
2015-09-30 6:19 ` Adam Back
2015-09-30 12:30 ` Mike Hearn
2015-09-30 15:55 ` Jorge Timón
2015-09-30 19:17 ` John Winslow
2015-10-01 0:06 ` Rusty Russell
2015-09-30 17:14 ` Adam Back
2015-10-01 0:04 ` Rusty Russell
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