Re: [bitcoin-dev] SHA1 collisions make Git vulnerable to attakcs by third-parties, not just repo maintainers

[Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org>]

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On Sat, Feb 25, 2017 at 03:53:12PM -0500, Russell O'Connor wrote:
> On Sat, Feb 25, 2017 at 2:12 PM, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> 
> > On Sat, Feb 25, 2017 at 11:10:02AM -0500, Ethan Heilman via bitcoin-dev
> > wrote:
> > > >SHA1 is insecure because the SHA1 algorithm is insecure, not because
> > > 160bits isn't enough.
> > >
> > > I would argue that 160-bits isn't enough for collision resistance.
> > Assuming
> > > RIPEMD-160(SHA-256(msg)) has no flaws (i.e. is a random oracle),
> > collisions
> >
> > That's something that we're well aware of; there have been a few
> > discussions on
> > this list about how P2SH's 160-bits is insufficient in certain use-cases
> > such
> > as multisig.
> >
> > However, remember that a 160-bit *security level* is sufficient, and
> > RIPEMD160
> > has 160-bit security against preimage attacks. Thus things like
> > pay-to-pubkey-hash are perfectly secure: sure you could generate two
> > pubkeys
> > that have the same RIPEMD160(SHA256()) digest, but if someone does that it
> > doesn't cause the Bitcoin network itself any harm, and doing so is
> > something
> > you choose to do to yourself.
> >
> 
> Be aware that the issue is more problematic for more complex contracts.
> For example, you are building a P2SH 2-of-2 multisig together with someone
> else if you are not careful, party A can hand their key over to party B,
> who can may try to generate a collision between their second key and
> another 2-of-2 multisig where they control both keys. See
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2016-January/012205.html

I'm very aware of that, in fact I think I may have even been the first person
to post on this list the commit-reveal mitigation.

Note how I said earlier in the message you're replying to that "P2SH's 160-bits
is insufficient in certain use-cases such as multisig"

-- 
https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org

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