From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5E2CE955 for ; Tue, 6 Jun 2017 23:09:30 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from zinan.dashjr.org (zinan.dashjr.org [192.3.11.21]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 01FAA15F for ; Tue, 6 Jun 2017 23:09:29 +0000 (UTC) Received: from ishibashi.localnet (unknown [IPv6:2001:470:5:265:a45d:823b:2d27:961c]) (Authenticated sender: luke-jr) by zinan.dashjr.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B4B2338A0087; Tue, 6 Jun 2017 23:08:13 +0000 (UTC) X-Hashcash: 1:25:170606:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org::dGTl7Yf7jrP2pNkc:eaXvL X-Hashcash: 1:25:170606:contact@taoeffect.com::aHqO+JJSiMM8k0cW:cEKC7 From: Luke Dashjr To: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org, Tao Effect Date: Tue, 6 Jun 2017 23:08:11 +0000 User-Agent: KMail/1.13.7 (Linux/4.9.16-gentoo; KDE/4.14.29; x86_64; ; ) References: <31833011-7179-49D1-A07E-8FD9556C4534@taoeffect.com> In-Reply-To: <31833011-7179-49D1-A07E-8FD9556C4534@taoeffect.com> X-PGP-Key-Fingerprint: E463 A93F 5F31 17EE DE6C 7316 BD02 9424 21F4 889F X-PGP-Key-ID: BD02942421F4889F X-PGP-Keyserver: hkp://pgp.mit.edu MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: Text/Plain; charset="iso-8859-15" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <201706062308.12531.luke@dashjr.org> X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.2 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED, T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Replay attacks make BIP148 and BIP149 untennable X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 06 Jun 2017 23:09:30 -0000 On Tuesday 06 June 2017 10:39:28 PM Tao Effect via bitcoin-dev wrote: > I believe the severity of replay attacks is going unvoiced and is not > understood within the bitcoin community because of their lack of > experience with them. Replay is a solved problem. It can be improved on and made simpler, but at this point, replay only occurs when the sender is either negligent or intending it. > Both of the coin-splitting techniques given so far by the proponents BIP148 > are also untenable: > > - Double-spending to self with nLockTime txns is insanely complicated, > risky, not guaranteed to work, extremely time consuming, and would likely > result in a massive increase in backlogged transactions and increased > fees. This is nothing but unfounded FUD. It is very simple to implement and guaranteed to work eventually. It may be time consuming, but that is the only truth here. The only risk is that of a long reorg, the same as double spend attacks. > - Mixing with 148 coinbase txns destroys fungibility. What kind of "fungibility" does this FUD claim it destroys? Destroying cross- chain fungibility is the very *intent* of replay protection. And it does not destroy same-chain fungibility any more than any other miner spending. > Without a coin, there is no real threat from BIP148. Lack of replay protection does not mean there is no coin. Replay protection is equally a concern for the main (BIP148) chain and any legacy chains malicious miners might choose to split off. And none of this changes the fact that such miners will be unable to sell their legacycoins at Bitcoin market prices, because whether other transactions are replayed or not, *their* coins won't be valid on the main chain. Luke