From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from silver.osuosl.org (smtp3.osuosl.org [140.211.166.136]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 492C1C0177 for ; Fri, 27 Mar 2020 09:17:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by silver.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3AD3720411 for ; Fri, 27 Mar 2020 09:17:47 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org Received: from silver.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id BCJwxLCuFyGn for ; Fri, 27 Mar 2020 09:17:46 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from canndrew.org (canndrew.org [199.167.29.165]) by silver.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D705820410 for ; Fri, 27 Mar 2020 09:17:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: from shum by canndrew.org with local (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from ) id 1jHl7O-00020s-R0; Fri, 27 Mar 2020 05:17:34 -0400 Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2020 05:17:34 -0400 From: Andrew Cann To: ZmnSCPxj Message-ID: <20200327091734.GA6531@canndrew.org> References: <20200323125922.GA29881@canndrew.org> <20200325152302.GA3355@canndrew.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha1; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="T4sUOijqQbZv57TR" Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.23 (2014-03-12) X-Mailman-Approved-At: Fri, 27 Mar 2020 15:14:34 +0000 Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block solving slowdown question/poll X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2020 09:17:47 -0000 --T4sUOijqQbZv57TR Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable > To change the supply is far too big a change. It would also be a big change if bitcoin became unusable due to mining prof= its dropping low enough for a state actor with a warehouse full of asics to mou= nt a 51% attack and mine empty blocks all day. > What happens if I own a few million Bitcoin and then accidentally lose my > private keys in a tragic ear-cleaning accident? > Then the vote of that UTXO containing a few million Bitcoins will remain > forever fixed and unable to change according to whatever you believe would > make us as a community decide to change the inflation rate. All that matters is whether the long-term rate of deflation due to lost coi= ns is less or greater than the rate of inflation. This determines whether the proportion of coins whose signaled inflation rate is fixed in time would te= nd towards zero or one. I think it's /fairly/ safe to assume that it would rem= ain less. People obviously have a pretty strong incentive to not lose their coi= ns - particularly people who are holding massive amounts of bitcoin - and as bit= coin becomes more mainstream, regular users will necessarily be using forms of protection against losing their coins (whatever they might be). Contrast th= is against the inflation rate which should remain high enough to prevent very wealthy entities from being able to mount a 51% attack. What proportion of = the total market cap of bitcoin do you think your least favorite government cou= ld plausibly be willing to spend to take down bitcoin for a month? And do you think it's less or greater than the proportion of all bitcoins that get los= t in a month? > It is helpful to remember that as a UTXO gets buried deeper, its security= is > inevitably better, and once I have a sufficient level of security in my > ownership of the coin, I will not particularly care about any improved > security and will not be interested in paying for more. If we're talking about the possibility of your coin becoming worthless beca= use someone out there can unwind transactions at will and prevent you from spen= ding it then you should definitely be interested. > If I want to *spend* my Bitcoins on something --- and nothing has value u= ntil > I actually utilize it --- then I *will* pay transaction fees. The receive= r of > the coin would want to ensure that the received UTXO is deeply buried to = the > point that it has sufficient security for the receiver, before releasing = or > providing me with whatever I am exchanging the coin for. > > Thus, if I find that there are no miners at all, I could offer a high fee= to > get my transaction mined. Of course, you might say that this only pays for > one block. > > But in most cases I will have more value remaining beyond what I spend to= the > receiver, i.e. I have a change output from that transaction. > > In such a case, I can pay for more blocks by re-spending the change outp= ut > to myself, paying a transaction fee each time, until the original transac= tion > that spends to the receiver is deeply buried and the receiver credits it = and > then releases the product or service I am exchanging *for*. Alternately t= he > receiver can do the same for its *own* UTXO, and will increase the paymen= t it > demands from me in order to perform this itself; thus I still end up payi= ng > for the security of the *transaction* and not the security of the *holdin= g*. In your example though it's just you or the receiver paying for blocks. In = that case you're only paying for your own security and so there's no tragedy of = the commons and the system works. But once you have a thousand people putting transactions in every block and everyone is collectively paying for everyon= e's collective security then, without some mechanism to force everyone to pay t= heir fair share, you're inviting Moloch to the party. Here's a better explanation than I could write of the phenomenon I'm talking about: > As a thought experiment, let=E2=80=99s consider aquaculture (fish farming= ) in a lake. > Imagine a lake with a thousand identical fish farms owned by a thousand > competing companies. Each fish farm earns a profit of $1000/month. For a > while, all is well. >=20 > But each fish farm produces waste, which fouls the water in the lake. Let= =E2=80=99s > say each fish farm produces enough pollution to lower productivity in the > lake by $1/month. >=20 > A thousand fish farms produce enough waste to lower productivity by > $1000/month, meaning none of the fish farms are making any money. Capital= ism > to the rescue: someone invents a complex filtering system that removes wa= ste > products. It costs $300/month to operate. All fish farms voluntarily inst= all > it, the pollution ends, and the fish farms are now making a profit of > $700/month =E2=80=93 still a respectable sum. >=20 > But one farmer (let=E2=80=99s call him Steve) gets tired of spending the = money to > operate his filter. Now one fish farm worth of waste is polluting the lak= e, > lowering productivity by $1. Steve earns $999 profit, and everyone else e= arns > $699 profit. >=20 > Everyone else sees Steve is much more profitable than they are, because h= e=E2=80=99s > not spending the maintenance costs on his filter. They disconnect their > filters too. >=20 > Once four hundred people disconnect their filters, Steve is earning > $600/month =E2=80=93 less than he would be if he and everyone else had ke= pt their > filters on! And the poor virtuous filter users are only making $300. Steve > goes around to everyone, saying =E2=80=9CWait! We all need to make a volu= ntary pact > to use filters! Otherwise, everyone=E2=80=99s productivity goes down.=E2= =80=9D >=20 > Everyone agrees with him, and they all sign the Filter Pact, except one > person who is sort of a jerk. Let=E2=80=99s call him Mike. Now everyone i= s back using > filters again, except Mike. Mike earns $999/month, and everyone else earns > $699/month. Slowly, people start thinking they too should be getting big > bucks like Mike, and disconnect their filter for $300 extra profit=E2=80= =A6 >=20 > A self-interested person never has any incentive to use a filter. A > self-interested person has some incentive to sign a pact to make everyone= use > a filter, but in many cases has a stronger incentive to wait for everyone > else to sign such a pact but opt out himself. This can lead to an undesir= able > equilibrium in which no one will sign such a pact. Won't a thousand bitcoin-spenders, individually paying for their transactio= ns but collectively paying for their security, end up falling into the same dynamic? - Andrew --T4sUOijqQbZv57TR Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" Content-Description: Digital signature -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJefcSuAAoJEJQq94U5BTTO5aUQAI3PKH1/8iOOMACvQZp+sU/S n9I98636kcibcnwlJysbzQAirjSLDJMdEZEQUzeRZFEGOgiurk5NVQ30Y5PdWDYv rPfzWIqEAgziiOPzpE7QjH1e2148e3YNv1NddP1+I6rgZKCa6OeywTOY47DnVzcq fEtRr4C0Xbh3p3H1HsIji6Z1k7DHSbVbzrAyaZWbu51AcymZEQVYe8EvC+WqjRwW y776P99DL6GimDp204Ow0n219wZ7ZHEzI/bzNxffwCsQvv75EQfPlpAfHtA0TFbx etgAzsCgRzlJqN4cb2n+Jpbhknjn6XtovtdkftqbUJpAG495nq2h4mKnWPLMkagx 4gVUzrZ+UQLBiYyxZs46hlezBVmLe5VDL1kNnmtkS4/yZEPYUoPC9K3295cXQ8W6 QSD0nWFWFFD3JiztQWKR1SjC09vjj1AUtN8Saz2h/wJ6JUyUGL6ZXbdQpmkHl8ZM 8z2xR5kvV49BbrEJgVLhKudrijwrgqPZ+r4ex3KJ0Pb0lrm7kkV7jtIkgu2M8ehe NBmDFsho+s0dNcIcnoED/XZB049PrP5f6WbV/PtZC/xt7+en8nNNZDIgO6CufB+n 9NAElKNvOO+QR8yLQau5StTBMpP7NF1U+wkgypCORMEgx1Ubusn80kGfpvw9YOda D4EFpxh8HLpZvN8DnZID =kggM -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --T4sUOijqQbZv57TR--