From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 08341491 for ; Sat, 25 Nov 2017 15:51:19 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: delayed 00:09:24 by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from forward2.bravehost.com (forward2.bravehost.com [65.39.211.66]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A85AAF1 for ; Sat, 25 Nov 2017 15:51:18 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at bravehost.com Received: from [10.137.3.35] (this-is-a-tor-exit-node---keywebtor1.artikel5ev.de [87.118.116.90]) (Authenticated sender: cannon@cannon-ciota.info) by forward2.bravehost.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id BD14731D2; Sat, 25 Nov 2017 07:41:50 -0800 (PST) To: adan@stampery.com, =?UTF-8?Q?Ad=c3=a1n_S=c3=a1nchez_de_Pedro_Crespo?= , Bitcoin Protocol Discussion References: <15502d41-61f2-9a17-a4cf-03cd20a87368@stampery.com> From: CANNON Message-ID: <22ba8756-c661-8504-8de3-108626066df0@cannon-ciota.info> Date: Sat, 25 Nov 2017 15:41:44 +0000 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101 Icedove/45.6.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <15502d41-61f2-9a17-a4cf-03cd20a87368@stampery.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org X-Mailman-Approved-At: Sun, 26 Nov 2017 14:33:13 +0000 Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Why SegWit Anyway? X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 25 Nov 2017 15:51:19 -0000 On 11/21/2017 01:16 PM, Adán Sánchez de Pedro Crespo via bitcoin-dev wrote: > 2. SegWit signatures can be cheaper to verify (linear instead of > quadratic). Prior to this, DoS attacks were possible by using forged > transactions including signatures which could take several minutes to > verify. Where can I find more resources on this described DoS attack? And how does SegWit prevent this if using SegWit transactions are not enforced? Thanks