Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP 174 thoughts

[Tomas Susanka <tomas.susanka@satoshilabs.com>]

Hi,

On 19.6.2018 19:16, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> Yes, the reason is address reuse. It may be discouraged, but it still
> happens in practice (and unfortunately it's very hard to prevent
> people from sending to the same address twice).
>
> It's certainly possible to make them per-input (and even per-output as
> suggested below), but I don't think it gains you much. At least when a
> signer supports any kind of multisig, it needs to match up public keys
> with derivation paths. If several can be provided, looking them up
> from a global table or a per-input table shouldn't fundamentally
> change anything.
>
> However, perhaps it makes sense to get rid of the global section
> entirely, and make the whole format a transaction plus per-input and
> per-output extra fields. This would result in duplication in case of
> key reuse, but perhaps that's worth the complexity reduction.
I think having a global section with just one record (the transaction)
is just fine, in case we come up with some other fields later on which
would fit the global section. Otherwise I totally agree.
>> 2) The global items 0x01 (redeem script) and 0x02 (witness script) are
>> somewhat confusing. Let's consider only the redeem script (0x01) to make
>> it simple. The value description says: "A redeem script that will be
>> needed to sign a Pay-To-Script-Hash input or is spent to by an output.".
>> Does this mean that the record includes both input's redeem script
>> (because we need to sign it), but also a redeem script for the output
>> (to verify we are sending to a correct P2SH)? To mix those two seems
>> really confusing.
>>
>> Yet again, adding a new output section would make this more readable. We
>> would include the input’s redeem script in the input section and the
>> output’s redeem script again in the output section, because they’ll most
>> likely differ anyway.
> I think here it makes sense because there can actually only be (up to)
> one redeemscript and (up to) one witnessscript. So if we made those
> per-input and per-output, it may simplify signers as they don't need a
> table lookup to find the correct one. That would also mean we can drop
> their hashes, even if we keep a key-value model.
Yes, indeed. Just to clarify: in the first sentence you mean "per
output", right? There can actually only be (up to) one redeemscript and
(up to) one witnessscript *per output*.
>> 4) Is it a good idea to skip records which types we are unaware of? We
>> can't come up with a reasonable example, but intuitively this seems as a
>> potential security issue. We think we should consider  introducing a
>> flag, which would define if the record is "optional". In case the signer
>> encounters a record it doesn't recognize and such flag is not set, it
>> aborts the procedure. If we assume the set model we could change the
>> structure to <type><optional flag><length>{data}. We are not keen on
>> this, but we wanted to include this idea to see what you think.
> Originally there was at least this intuition for why it shouldn't be
> necessary: the resulting signature for an input is either valid or
> invalid. Adding information to a PSBT (which is what signers do)
> either helps with that or not. The worst case is that they simply
> don't have enough information to produce a signature together. But an
> ignored unknown field being present should never result in signing the
> wrong thing (they can always see the transaction being signed), or
> failing to sign if signing was possible in the first place. Another
> way of looking at it, the operation of a signer is driven by queries:
> it looks at the scriptPubKey of the output being spent, sees it is
> P2SH, looks for the redeemscript, sees it is P2WSH, looks for the
> witnessscript, sees it is multisig, looks for other signers'
> signatures, finds enough for the threshold, and proceeds to sign and
> create a full transaction. If at any point one of those things is
> missing or not comprehensible to the signer, he simply fails and
> doesn't modify the PSBT.
The rationale behind this was, what if at some point we come up with a
PSBT record, which forbids some kind of operation or alters some
behaviour. In another words, by omitting such record the signer would
create a signature, which is valid, but actually signed something
different than the Creator intended.

> However, if the sighash request type becomes mandatory, perhaps this
> is not the case anymore, as misinterpreting something like this could
> indeed result in an incorrect signature.
I believe this use case illustrates it quite well. Let’s suppose the
sighash record is binding and the Signer does not know it. The Creator
creates a PSBT with sighash set SIGHASH_SINGLE. The Signer sings the
transaction with SIGHASH_ALL, because they are not aware of such field.
This results in a valid signature, however not what the Creator intended
it to be.

>> We’d also like to note that the “number of inputs” field should be
>> mandatory - and as such, possibly also a candidate for outside-record field.
> If we go with the "not put signatures/witnesses inside the transaction
> until all of them are finalized" suggestion, perhaps the number of
> inputs field can be dropped. There would be always one exactly for
> each input (but some may have the "final script/witness" field and
> others won't).
Agree. I'm be fine with dropping the field completely in that case.


Thanks,
Tomas