From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.191] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-4.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1YHgKg-0001JB-R1 for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Sat, 31 Jan 2015 22:16:02 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.216.43 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.216.43; envelope-from=brian.erdelyi@gmail.com; helo=mail-qa0-f43.google.com; Received: from mail-qa0-f43.google.com ([209.85.216.43]) by sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1YHgKf-0007hO-KK for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Sat, 31 Jan 2015 22:16:02 +0000 Received: by mail-qa0-f43.google.com with SMTP id v10so24664657qac.2 for ; Sat, 31 Jan 2015 14:15:56 -0800 (PST) X-Received: by 10.229.19.3 with SMTP id y3mr26681464qca.1.1422742556121; Sat, 31 Jan 2015 14:15:56 -0800 (PST) Received: from [192.168.1.58] ([64.147.83.112]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPSA id g7sm2851351qag.26.2015.01.31.14.15.55 for (version=TLSv1 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA bits=128/128); Sat, 31 Jan 2015 14:15:55 -0800 (PST) From: Brian Erdelyi X-Pgp-Agent: GPGMail 2.5b4 Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="Apple-Mail=_C54F50CA-8B96-4AEA-951B-713510857F83"; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; micalg=pgp-sha512 Date: Sat, 31 Jan 2015 18:15:53 -0400 Message-Id: <27395C55-CF59-4E65-83CA-73F903272C5F@gmail.com> To: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 8.2 \(2070.6\)) X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.2070.6) X-Spam-Score: -0.6 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (brian.erdelyi[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1YHgKf-0007hO-KK Subject: [Bitcoin-development] Proposal to address Bitcoin malware X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 31 Jan 2015 22:16:02 -0000 --Apple-Mail=_C54F50CA-8B96-4AEA-951B-713510857F83 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="Apple-Mail=_8D6BCAAD-07BE-4D6B-8E28-5FDE3C76084F" --Apple-Mail=_8D6BCAAD-07BE-4D6B-8E28-5FDE3C76084F Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Hello all, The number of incidents involving malware targeting bitcoin users = continues to rise. One category of virus I find particularly nasty is = when the bitcoin address you are trying to send money to is modified = before the transaction is signed and recorded in the block chain. This = behaviour allows the malware to evade two-factor authentication by = becoming active only when the bitcoin address is entered. This is very = similar to how man-in-the-browser malware attack online banking = websites. Out of band transaction verification/signing is one method used with = online banking to help protect against this. This can be done in a = variety of ways with SMS, voice, mobile app or even security tokens. = This video demonstrates how HSBC uses a security token to verify = transactions online. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DSh2Iha88agE = . Many Bitcoin wallets and services already use Open Authentication (OATH) = based one-time passwords (OTP). Is there any interest (or existing = work) in in the Bitcoin community adopting the OATH Challenge-Response = Algorithm (OCRA) for verifying transactions? I know there are other forms of malware, however, I want to get thoughts = on this approach as it would involve the use of a decimal representation = of the bitcoin address (depending on particular application). In the = HSBC example (see YouTube video above), this was the last 8 digits of = the recipient=E2=80=99s account number. Would it make sense to convert = a bitcoin address to decimal and then truncate to 8 digits for this = purpose? I understand that truncating the number in some way only = increases the likelihood for collisions=E2=80=A6 however, would this = still be practical or could the malware generate a rogue bitcoin address = that would produce the same 8 digits of the legitimate bitcoin address? Brian Erdelyi --Apple-Mail=_8D6BCAAD-07BE-4D6B-8E28-5FDE3C76084F Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Hello all,

The number of incidents involving malware targeting bitcoin = users continues to rise.  One category of virus I find particularly = nasty is when the bitcoin address you are trying to send money to is = modified before the transaction is signed and recorded in the block = chain.  This behaviour allows the malware to evade two-factor = authentication by becoming active only when the bitcoin address is = entered.  This is very similar to how man-in-the-browser malware = attack online banking websites.

Out of band transaction = verification/signing is one method used with online banking to help = protect against this.  This can be done in a variety of ways with = SMS, voice, mobile app or even security tokens.  This video = demonstrates how HSBC uses a security token to verify transactions = online.  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DSh2Iha88agE.

Many Bitcoin wallets and = services already use Open Authentication (OATH) based one-time passwords = (OTP).  Is there any interest (or existing work) in in the Bitcoin = community adopting the OATH Challenge-Response Algorithm (OCRA) for = verifying transactions?

I know there are other forms of malware, however, I want to = get thoughts on this approach as it would involve the use of a decimal = representation of the bitcoin address (depending on particular = application).  In the HSBC example (see YouTube video above), this = was the last 8 digits of the recipient=E2=80=99s account number. =  Would it make sense to convert a bitcoin address to decimal and = then truncate to 8 digits for this purpose?  I understand that = truncating the number in some way only increases the likelihood for = collisions=E2=80=A6 however, would this still be practical or could the = malware generate a rogue bitcoin address that would produce the same 8 = digits of the legitimate bitcoin address?

Brian Erdelyi
= --Apple-Mail=_8D6BCAAD-07BE-4D6B-8E28-5FDE3C76084F-- --Apple-Mail=_C54F50CA-8B96-4AEA-951B-713510857F83 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=signature.asc Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name=signature.asc Content-Description: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Comment: GPGTools - https://gpgtools.org iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJUzVQZAAoJEOU8U1lTQFC+2aoP/0Ku/SKhWe9+/BR9cUohee/V k9j2n2qRkO9FvLdV7a26jVzn48qmK9S3ThCrAPAT8cUKHZMKemMJsB9WjSgMxTwF nsrJx61TK5Ks+ACyUOd1U9YBWtCqteDwhHUZDCea9Fq90nY8Cx1nKTDp9BAzVRSh 7ZBXEebOM1yN8dsnt0AfS/FtIigBZqUCHWN1BZ8c800CTcTa9EwUsex6N9f9uM24 YXh4a+fl3g98MQjUriZd2MRswx/qTJpVbc25+vccP+2lcBnqAQ/j2Pj0xCDrCb0B jmpyghocBsdWMAAtthW4Cm/MLUrDlunBzmFNyzltr/C3xig58zv1UaMgPkXUrjTc 7A1SXliGSTzEhKu6e/rD9O6NEaA2R1I6q6Wi8inyDkcxT8YV0D+kjSaSOF4OtksJ 3iAOvAT5b5vh+LNh1mOhfNF19nVjRIvObjjF+XBu1xAKeXuA5Ub3kVof4IWjmMJG zXSj7Q0bs1loKRU2KhE09X3IHuJrImtAWAyXsHcu78Q9iAn6QhUSAK19IHVN9ra2 3jW57bjhKV1GcP2Lz5364YE/3sJubfjfUKPslgxVO1eZjqtT8lEBPuMuhyb9Mpjk h+X9rGWgmlx+FNy7M0Kc/B+5jmaprnBP0Uw+b1sbpfVE7We15u6RN6IK84tFa6CG XZoVRGKBU6kA7aZ2CCbK =o89+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --Apple-Mail=_C54F50CA-8B96-4AEA-951B-713510857F83--