You must be new here. MtGox very rarely comments on things like this publicly, outside of irc or their website.

Second, MtGox problem is a MtGox problem. You have no right to demand access to their private code. If you feel wronged as a customer, sue them. Otherwise, they have no obligation to you.

I believe you are "barking up the wrong tree".

Respectfully,

Nick

On February 10, 2014 10:14:02 AM CST, Troy Benjegerdes <hozer@hozed.org> wrote:
Okay, why the everloving FUCK is there not someone on this list with a
@mtgox.com address talking about this?

I started using bitcoin because I could audit the code, and when the
developer cabal does stuff 'off-list' what you do is hand over market
manipulation power to the selected cabal of company insiders who are
discussing things 'off-list'.

The people having a 'private' discussion about how to solve this are
TAKING MONEY from everyone else, by having access to insider information.

I don't think any of the developers actually have a clue this is the
result, because a good chunk of them are employed by for-profit companies
funded by venture capital, and VC lawyers are very good at writing
employment contracts that provide plausible deniability of insider
trading.

The press MAKES MONEY (okay, takes money) by manipulating markets,
and venture capitalists pay lots of money to ensure the market is
manipulated in ways they can profit from.

Private market manipulation is one of the costs of anonymity and privacy,
and I don't really like paying for some off-list discussion of what appears
to be a serious scalability and usability problem.

Bitcoin is such a powerful tool because it broadcasts transactions to
the network for everyone to see.

Can we please broadcast some more technical details to this mailing list,
including exactly what MtGox is doing, and how they wish to resolve it?

If you gave me the entire code stack that MtGox runs on under an AGPLv3
license, I'm pretty sure I, along with everyone else here could come up
with a workable solution. I think a code release would be a huge win
for MtGox as well, and would cement their position as market leader in
transparent cryptocurrency trading.

Otherwise we are just a bunch of dinghys getting capsized one by one
in a sea of market-manipulating white whales. Isn't the closed door
market manipulation of the big banks one of the reasons we all started
using Bitcoin in the first place?

Why do revolutions always put the same old bullshit back in power?

What we need is some transparent code evolution.

On Mon, Feb 10, 2014 at 01:28:42PM +0100, Pieter Wuille wrote:
Hi all,

I was a bit surprised to see MtGox's announcement. The malleability of
transactions was known for years already (see for example the wiki
article on it, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Transaction_Malleability it,
or mails on this list from 2012 and 2013). I don't consider it a very
big problem, but it does make it harder for infrastructure to interact
with Bitcoin. If we'd design Bitcoin today, I'm sure we would try to
avoid it altogether to make life easier for everyone.

But we can't just change all infrastructure that exists today. We're
slowly working towards making malleability harder (and hopefully
impossible someday), but this will take a long time. For example, 0.8
not supporting non-DER encoded signatures was a step in that direction
(and ironically, the trigger that caused MtGox's initial problems
here). In any case, this will take years, and nobody should wait for
this.

There seem to be two more direct problems here.
* Wallets which deal badly with modified txids.
* Services that use the transaction id to detect unconfirming transactions.

The first is something that needs to be done correctly in software -
it just needs to be aware of malleability.

The second is something I was unaware of and would have advised
against. If you plan on reissuing a transaction because on old version
doesn't confirm, make sure to make it a double spend of the first one
- so that not both can confirm.

I certainly don't like press making this sound like a problem in the
Bitcoin protocol or clients. I think this is an issue that needs to be
solved at the layer above - the infrastructure building on the Bitcoin
system. Despite that, I do think that we (as a community, not just
developers) can benefit from defining a standard way to identify
transactions unambiguously. This is something Mark Karpeles suggested
a few days ago, and my proposal is this:

We define the normalized transaction id as SHA256^2(normalized_tx +
0x01000000), where normalized_tx is the transaction with all input
scripts replaced by empty scripts. This is exactly what would be
signed inside transaction signatures using SIGHASH_ALL (except not
substituting the previous scriptPubKey to be signed, and not dealing
with the input being signed specially). An implementation is here:
https://github.com/sipa/bitcoin/commits/normtxid.

Note that this is not a solution for all problems related to
malleability, but maybe it can make people more aware of it, in
tangible way.

--
Pieter



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