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From: email@yancy.lol
To: Jeremy Rubin <jeremy.l.rubin@gmail.com>
Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Does Bitcoin require or have an honest majority or a rational one? (re rbf)
Date: Tue, 18 Oct 2022 00:31:39 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2f4344b4c7952c3799f8766ae6b590bf@yancy.lol> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAD5xwhgKw+jWkadAvUU3KOqT19LmGX6vhUQFpZfJ_Zk0AjTcNA@mail.gmail.com>

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Hi Jeremy,

Thanks for the reply. I do find the semantics of mempool and block org 
interesting (although there's a lot on the topic I don't know).

> E.g., suppose:
> 
> Block N: Fees = 10, reward = 1
> 
> Mempool: Fees = 2
> 
> Mining block N+1 with the mempool leads to reward 2+1 = 3, reorging
> leads to reward of up to 10 + 1 + c, (c < 2, where c is the extra
> transactions that fit).

If I'm reading this correctly, Block N was already mined, but the miner 
who mined block N+1 repacks the transactions from block N because they 
have more to gain.  Wouldn't such a situation be resolved in the same 
way as two miners who find a block at a similar time? E.g the network 
will choose depending on when block N+2 is created.

> Assume instead your reward is 8, leaving 3+c on the table.

Mining block N+1 with the mempool leads to reward 2+8 = 10, reorging 
leads to 10 + 8 + c?  Wouldn't that leave 8+c?

> If you assume all other miners are tip miners, and there are two
> conflicting tips, they should pick the one with the more profit for
> them, which is the new one you made as a non-tip miner since you
> "shared" some fee.

I'm curious how the "fee sharing" would be organized.  To see if I 
understand, You're asking what would happen if one of the two miners 
incentives (bribes in this case) the next miner (block N+1) to choose 
one of the competing tip miners?

> You aren't particularly more likely to remine block N or N+1, before
> someone builds on it, as opposed to deeper reorgs (which require
> larger incentive).

Agree.

> However, as many have pointed out, perhaps not following the simple
> "honest tip mining" strategy is bad for bitcoin, so maybe we should
> expect it not to happen often?

The idea that people won't do something because it's "bad for Bitcoin" 
doesn't fit an adversarial model.  Even in the above examples (which I 
think wouldn't expect to happen often), I would argue the network still 
conforms to a Nash Equilibrium without requiring trust.  Although It's 
mostly speculation without some empirical data.

Cheers,
-Yancy

On 2022-10-17 21:10, Jeremy Rubin wrote:

> Building on the most work chain is perhaps not rational in many normal
> circumstances that can come up today under the stated reference
> strategy:
> 
> 1) Take highest paying transactions that fit
> 2) Mine on tips
> 
> E.g., suppose:
> 
> Block N: Fees = 10, reward = 1
> 
> Mempool: Fees = 2
> 
> Mining block N+1 with the mempool leads to reward 2+1 = 3, reorging
> leads to reward of up to 10 + 1 + c, (c < 2, where c is the extra
> transactions that fit). Assume instead your reward is 8, leaving 3+c
> on the table.
> 
> If you assume all other miners are tip miners, and there are two
> conflicting tips, they should pick the one with the more profit for
> them, which is the new one you made as a non-tip miner since you
> "shared" some fee.
> 
> You aren't particularly more likely to remine block N or N+1, before
> someone builds on it, as opposed to deeper reorgs (which require
> larger incentive).
> 
> However, as many have pointed out, perhaps not following the simple
> "honest tip mining" strategy is bad for bitcoin, so maybe we should
> expect it not to happen often? Or other strategies to emerge around
> selecting transactions so that the next M blocks have a similar fee
> profile, as opposed to picking greedily for the next block.
> 
> --
> @JeremyRubin [1 [1]]
> 
> On Sun, Oct 16, 2022 at 3:03 PM <email@yancy.lol> wrote:
> 
> The proof-of-work also solves the problem of determining
> representation in majority decision
> making. If the majority were based on one-IP-address-one-vote, it
> could be subverted by anyone
> able to allocate many IPs. Proof-of-work is essentially
> one-CPU-one-vote. The majority
> decision is represented by the longest chain, which has the
> greatest
> proof-of-work effort invested
> in it. If a majority of CPU power is controlled by honest nodes,
> the
> honest chain will grow the
> fastest and outpace any competing chains. To modify a past block,
> an
> attacker would have to
> redo the proof-of-work of the block and all blocks after it and
> then
> catch up with and surpass the
> work of the honest nodes. We will show later that the probability
> of a
> slower attacker catching up
> diminishes exponentially as subsequent blocks are added.
> It's interesting that Nash Equilibrium isn't mentioned here.  Since
> each miner has the option to either contribute to the longest chain
> or not, even if the miners know what strategy the other miners will
> use, they still wouldn't change their decision to contribute to the
> majority.
> 
> For example, if I run a shop that takes rain checks, but I sell an
> item to a higher bidder who didn't have a hold on the item, that
> is
> not honest, but it may be selfish profit maximizing.
> It would be honest if the store policy said ahead of time they are
> allowed to sell rain checks for more in such an occurrence.
> Although this is a good example of the difference between honest and
> rational.  I think this means it's not a Nash Equilibrium if we
> needed to rely on the store owner to be honest.
> 
> Satoshi said an honest majority is required for the chain to be
> extended. Honest is not really defined though. Honesty, in my
> definition, is that you follow a pre specified rule, rational or
> not.
> My take is that "rational" is probably a better word than honest.
> In terms of a Nash Equilibrium, each participant is simply trying to
> maximize their outcome and honesty doesn't matter (only that
> participants are rational).
> 
> It seems a lot of the RBF controversy is that Protocol developers
> have
> aspired to make the honest behavior also be the rational behavior.
> This is maybe a good idea because, in theory, if the honest
> behavior
> is rational then we can make a weaker assumption of selfishness
> maximizing a parameter.
> I'm curious, can RBF can be described by a Nash Equilibrium?  If
> yes, then it also shouldn't matter if participants are honest?
> 
> Overall, it might be nice to more tightly document what bitcoins
> assumptions are in practice and what those assumptions do in terms
> of
> properties of Bitcoin, as well as pathways to weakening the
> assumptions without compromising the behaviors users expect the
> network to have.  An "extended white paper" if you will.
> White paper 1.1 :D
> 
> A last reflection is that Bitcoin is specified with an honest
> majority
> assumption, but also has a rational dishonest minority assumption
> over
> both endogenous (rewards) and exogenous (electricity) costs.
> Satoshi
> did not suggest, at least as I read it, that Bitcoin works with an
> rational majority assumption. (If anyone thinks these three are
> similar properties you can make some trivial counterexamples)
> My take is the opposite unless I'm missing something.  Participants
> are always incentivized to choose the rational solution (Not to
> waste electricity on a minority chain).
> 
> Cheers,
> -Yancy
> 
> On 2022-10-16 19:35, Jeremy Rubin via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> 
> The Bitcoin white paper says:
> 
> The proof-of-work also solves the problem of determining
> representation in majority decision
> making. If the majority were based on one-IP-address-one-vote, it
> could be subverted by anyone
> able to allocate many IPs. Proof-of-work is essentially
> one-CPU-one-vote. The majority
> decision is represented by the longest chain, which has the
> greatest
> proof-of-work effort invested
> in it. If a majority of CPU power is controlled by honest nodes,
> the
> honest chain will grow the
> fastest and outpace any competing chains. To modify a past block,
> an
> attacker would have to
> redo the proof-of-work of the block and all blocks after it and
> then
> catch up with and surpass the
> work of the honest nodes. We will show later that the probability
> of a
> slower attacker catching up
> diminishes exponentially as subsequent blocks are added.
> 
> This, Satoshi (who doesn't really matter anyways I guess?) claimed
> that for Bitcoin to function properly you need a majority honest
> nodes.
> 
> There are multiple behaviors one can describe as honest, and
> economically rational or optimizing is not necessarily rational.
> 
> For example, if I run a shop that takes rain checks, but I sell an
> item to a higher bidder who didn't have a hold on the item, that
> is
> not honest, but it may be selfish profit maximizing.
> 
> Satoshi said an honest majority is required for the chain to be
> extended. Honest is not really defined though. Honesty, in my
> definition, is that you follow a pre specified rule, rational or
> not.
> 
> It seems a lot of the RBF controversy is that Protocol developers
> have
> aspired to make the honest behavior also be the rational behavior.
> This is maybe a good idea because, in theory, if the honest
> behavior
> is rational then we can make a weaker assumption of selfishness
> maximizing a parameter.
> 
> However, Satoshi did not particularly bound what aspects of
> honesty
> are important for the network, because there isn't a spec defining
> exactly what is honest or not. And also as soon as people are
> honest,
> you can rely on that assumption for good effect.
> 
> And sometimes, defining an honest behavior can be creating a
> higher
> utility system because most people are "law abiding citizens" who
> might not be short term rational. For example, one might expect
> that
> miners would be interested in making sure lightning closes are
> "accurate" because increasing the utility of lightning is good for
> Bitcoin, even if it is irrational.
> 
> It seems that the NoRBF crowd want to rely on an honest majority
> assumption where the honest behavior is not doing replacement if
> not
> requested. This is really not much different than trying to close
> lightning channels "the right way".
> 
> However, where it may be different, is that even in the presence
> of
> honest majority, the safety of 0conf isn't assured given the
> potential
> of race conditions in the mempool. Therefore it's not clear to me
> that
> 0conf working well is something you can drive from the Honest
> Majority
> Assumption (where honest includes first seen).
> 
> Overall, it might be nice to more tightly document what bitcoins
> assumptions are in practice and what those assumptions do in terms
> of
> properties of Bitcoin, as well as pathways to weakening the
> assumptions without compromising the behaviors users expect the
> network to have.  An "extended white paper" if you will.
> 
> It's somewhat clear to me that we shouldn't weaken assumptions
> that
> only seem local to one subsystem of Bitcoin if they end up
> destabilizing another system. In particular, things that decrease
> "transaction utility" for end users decrease the demand for
> transactions which hurts the fee market's longer term viability,
> even
> if we feel good about making an honest policy assumption into a
> self
> interested policy assumption.
> 
> A last reflection is that Bitcoin is specified with an honest
> majority
> assumption, but also has a rational dishonest minority assumption
> over
> both endogenous (rewards) and exogenous (electricity) costs.
> Satoshi
> did not suggest, at least as I read it, that Bitcoin works with an
> rational majority assumption. (If anyone thinks these three are
> similar properties you can make some trivial counterexamples)
> 
> Cheers,
> 
> Jeremy
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

Links:
------
[1] https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin

Links:
------
[1] https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin

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  reply	other threads:[~2022-10-17 22:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-10-16 17:35 [bitcoin-dev] Does Bitcoin require or have an honest majority or a rational one? (re rbf) Jeremy Rubin
2022-10-16 19:03 ` email
2022-10-17 19:10   ` Jeremy Rubin
2022-10-17 22:31     ` email [this message]
2022-10-18  3:34       ` Jeremy Rubin
2022-10-18 14:30         ` Russell O'Connor
2022-10-18 16:27           ` Jeremy Rubin
2022-10-18 17:33             ` Erik Aronesty
2022-10-18 18:57               ` email
2022-10-20 19:21             ` email
2022-10-20 22:19           ` Peter Todd
2022-10-17 15:51 ` Russell O'Connor
2022-10-17 19:02   ` Jeremy Rubin
2022-10-20 22:28 ` Peter Todd
2022-10-20 23:54   ` Jeremy Rubin
2022-10-21  0:26     ` Peter Todd
2022-10-21  8:47       ` email
2022-10-21 13:17         ` S kang

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