From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.192] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-3.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1XJlp5-0008Hx-PQ for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Tue, 19 Aug 2014 15:59:47 +0000 X-ACL-Warn: Received: from mail-ig0-f180.google.com ([209.85.213.180]) by sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1XJlp4-0004Je-JV for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Tue, 19 Aug 2014 15:59:47 +0000 Received: by mail-ig0-f180.google.com with SMTP id l13so9856441iga.7 for ; Tue, 19 Aug 2014 08:59:41 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:content-type:mime-version:subject:from :in-reply-to:date:cc:message-id:references:to; bh=nGctgX7YqcnAml0XLWIod/P/exbYjVFiqpcuLIcyW28=; b=DT29uWabOCr2NCEjD3+Y5puqA8gVm7woy4C8r163OFVs2mjO0u++eu4mhyrSuKu1iy tuRaN2yX26KpXzWvktsaKlNj41KOGa0qBhhOO9+cljRYd1Fd4ysb9eoL1ewSDY3i6sp0 Cfzexqb4EtZRlNm26sbNjVM5UB2aTLQa6rVcP2LsVgWrwWgA5fEwixU8rTjx7ugZdEIL wl5JvIz614sczCjWi/o8guVWawAAmbAiI3FGKVtWMLJRng1fRgVmkkBZ2xgYQkk7F+HW RaOx2yRNeC3K+KuVtAj083gTE67MQQUErxIyju9Wm4a25SNidKoo9wSq93EICLmpOu1N EsKA== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQnspd78ZewxnyWvzKo59q01AE0pcrwJo3Rv0FkYq/Wc5IgR8xtO/gsAtpgQWBAOXLbtCebm X-Received: by 10.50.43.137 with SMTP id w9mr6676781igl.36.1408462249410; Tue, 19 Aug 2014 08:30:49 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [192.168.2.25] (135-23-143-85.cpe.pppoe.ca. [135.23.143.85]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPSA id jg9sm7022638igb.6.2014.08.19.08.30.47 for (version=TLSv1 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA bits=128/128); Tue, 19 Aug 2014 08:30:48 -0700 (PDT) Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="Apple-Mail=_8409A5BC-9426-41D2-A8B5-A93C3BA54565" Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 7.3 \(1878.6\)) From: Richard Moore In-Reply-To: Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2014 11:30:45 -0400 Message-Id: <33D4B2E3-DBF0-444E-B76A-765C4C17E964@ricmoo.com> References: <0C0EF7F9-DBBA-4872-897D-63CFA3853726@ricmoo.com> To: =?iso-8859-1?Q?Ra=FAl_Mart=EDnez?= X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1878.6) X-Spam-Score: 0.9 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1XJlp4-0004Je-JV Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Proposal: Encrypt bitcoin messages X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2014 15:59:48 -0000 --Apple-Mail=_8409A5BC-9426-41D2-A8B5-A93C3BA54565 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Oh, I see. I misread, thinking you wanted the dev team to have a private = key and share the public key, similar to alerts. But each peer would = have a public/private key pair and use something akin to ECDH for a = symmetric key and transport using a block cipher? How would you share the public key? If I were a man-in-the-middle, I = could intercept the public key, generate my own and pass that along and = then decouple the pipe when the other side shares their public key. Also, you should not ignore your SSH fingerprint, as you exactly open = yourself to mitm attacks. On Aug 19, 2014, at 11:11 AM, Ra=FAl Mart=EDnez wrote: > Only messages between peers are encrypted, only during transit. >=20 > Before sending a transaction to Node B you use his public key, so Node = B has the key >=20 > El 19/08/2014 17:05, "Richard Moore" escribi=F3: > If you encrypt all messages with an asymmetric cipher, how would each = node make use of the blockchain in an encrypted form? Each node would be = able to encrypt the data, but only the Bitcoin Core Dev could decrypt = it? >=20 >=20 > On Aug 19, 2014, at 5:49 AM, Ra=FAl Mart=EDnez wrote: >=20 >> Hi, >> I believe that all comunications should be encrypted by default, no = matter that is public information (tx info), the only exception I would = make would be block packets (to avoid increasing propagation time). >>=20 >> I suggest that Bitcoin Core should generate a public/private key pair = and share the public one with peers. >>=20 >> This could provide privacy and integrity but not autentication. >>=20 >> This way you can impersonate a bitcoin node (active mitm) but you = cant just be passive and record all transactions send or recieved by an = IP address. >>=20 >> Today you can just watch for incoming/outgoing transactions to = determine what tx are created in the Node, when you find one you can see = the Bitcoin address inputs and outputs and track that person's bitcoins. >> As an example, SSH provides this kind of encryption, althogh Bitcoin = Core should ignore fingerprint changes (caused due to reinstalls). >>=20 >> Please feel free to disqus why this is not needed or why you like = this idea. >>=20 >> = --------------------------------------------------------------------------= ---- >> _______________________________________________ >> Bitcoin-development mailing list >> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net >> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development >=20 > .=B7=B4=AF`=B7.=B8=B8.=B7=B4=AF`=B7.=B8=B8.=B7=B4=AF`=B7.=B8=B8.=B7=B4=AF= `=B7.=B8=B8.=B7=B4=AF`=B7.=B8><(((=BA> >=20 > Richard Moore ~ Founder > Genetic Mistakes Software inc. > phone: (778) 882-6125 > email: ricmoo@geneticmistakes.com > www: http://GeneticMistakes.com >=20 .=B7=B4=AF`=B7.=B8=B8.=B7=B4=AF`=B7.=B8=B8.=B7=B4=AF`=B7.=B8=B8.=B7=B4=AF`= =B7.=B8=B8.=B7=B4=AF`=B7.=B8><(((=BA> Richard Moore ~ Founder Genetic Mistakes Software inc. phone: (778) 882-6125 email: ricmoo@geneticmistakes.com www: http://GeneticMistakes.com --Apple-Mail=_8409A5BC-9426-41D2-A8B5-A93C3BA54565 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1 Oh, I = see. I misread, thinking you wanted the dev team to have a private key = and share the public key, similar to alerts. But each peer would have a = public/private key pair and use something akin to ECDH for a symmetric = key and transport using a block cipher?

How would you = share the public key? If I were a man-in-the-middle, I could intercept = the public key, generate my own and pass that along and then decouple = the pipe when the other side shares their public = key.

Also, you should not ignore your SSH = fingerprint, as you exactly open yourself to mitm = attacks.



On Aug 19, = 2014, at 11:11 AM, Ra=FAl Mart=EDnez <rme@i-rme.es> wrote:

Only messages between peers are encrypted, only during = transit.

Before sending a transaction to Node B you = use his public key, so Node B has the key

El 19/08/2014 17:05, "Richard Moore" <me@ricmoo.com> escribi=F3:
If you encrypt all messages with an = asymmetric cipher, how would each node make use of the blockchain in an = encrypted form? Each node would be able to encrypt the data, but only = the Bitcoin Core Dev could decrypt it?


On Aug 19, 2014, at 5:49 AM, Ra=FAl = Mart=EDnez <rme@i-rme.es> wrote:

Hi,
I believe that all comunications should be encrypted by default, no = matter that is public information (tx info), the only exception I would = make would be block packets (to avoid increasing propagation = time).

I suggest that Bitcoin Core should generate a public/private key pair = and share the public one with peers.

This could = provide privacy and integrity but not autentication.

This way you can impersonate a bitcoin node (active mitm) = but you cant just be passive and record all transactions send or = recieved by an IP address.

Today you can just watch = for incoming/outgoing transactions to determine what tx are created in = the Node, when you find one you can see the Bitcoin address inputs and = outputs and track that person's bitcoins.

As an example, SSH provides this kind of encryption, = althogh Bitcoin Core should ignore fingerprint changes (caused due to = reinstalls).

Please feel free to disqus why this is = not needed or why you like this idea.

= --------------------------------------------------------------------------= ----
_______________________________________________
Bitcoin-develop= ment mailing list
Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-dev= elopment

.=B7=B4=AF`=B7.=B8=B8.=B7=B4=AF`=B7.=B8=B8.=B7=B4=AF`=B7.=B8=B8.=B7=B4= =AF`=B7.=B8=B8.=B7=B4=AF`=B7.=B8><(((=BA>

Richard Moore ~ Founder
Genetic Mistakes Software inc.
phone: = (778) 882-6125
email: ricmoo@geneticmistakes.com
www: http://GeneticMistakes.com


ricmoo@geneticmistakes.com<= br>www: http://GeneticMistakes.com=

= --Apple-Mail=_8409A5BC-9426-41D2-A8B5-A93C3BA54565--