From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D5691D9B for ; Tue, 10 Apr 2018 13:15:12 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-wr0-f170.google.com (mail-wr0-f170.google.com [209.85.128.170]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 44C11627 for ; Tue, 10 Apr 2018 13:15:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-wr0-f170.google.com with SMTP id o3so465950wri.2 for ; Tue, 10 Apr 2018 06:15:11 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=subject:to:references:from:openpgp:message-id:date:user-agent :mime-version:in-reply-to:content-language; bh=C4rFb24ZZKbj7PXA75gCBrHfJ0YUBDrqwolBydbGSrY=; b=J3dhGWigjFROzUDDOaGiF8uk75aAGx5PwOFIaP9ODJDlo+hHDosxETFl61pFIR/M5s +5ZIw4p217CjmzXJrmU/fyobSCeXRwP+ALlma1KqGNmAPrazHyXVBoaFP7M0JvtEWg38 rfSvdIp1A8/n9fvhsZGXSpcGgNsrFW9ASbi67X9eNtd8isx6atRu8nxBFOrx/R4dUCWE PAg2Yu8iGZENa1by/E+7AWt2m0KeYalSDlzg/O0BUpc/DnfMKCjuhNYeqT/8BOD/nETn ejx9UKFIZs9Xhgc6FL+f1WQfTgAad3Xw9XgZDdJ8DgfvLcVZkEuXGXETOedUpIa0tCWK ipCg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:subject:to:references:from:openpgp:message-id :date:user-agent:mime-version:in-reply-to:content-language; bh=C4rFb24ZZKbj7PXA75gCBrHfJ0YUBDrqwolBydbGSrY=; b=YJJrnLILiSX6cYFn48NUfvq59WdSdXTLASHkJ4kuv2JD15yajewP5+/IzPWwLhqLAz HtQnZipFm4BF++/JGnDWdntiojKAFaA1JePYXWZIBQYAOtqBqtdvukX6EktffBA5W2Vv aWXAa8YNrrX+cqlEAY4i42HjadyfqfR93cdoZKmpAeQBXbt0QnIp4u8N8CrJiX5xCFNc W1Le+EHSOjMTUuoY3KpJ71cELmhaqptp6T0j6UU3RBwxZzxlUvzcCb93955yHvqAJEhH LK5jPG1FXgpS/V1RjDIhtP6iun8D9jU+ferSBKLSxNIR+JD0AdsjUNSQIDar2+tBx8ix E7Hg== X-Gm-Message-State: ALQs6tDo3dmxGxZQmik4wWk7d6bipOgZkSoOIm5UlijHYwGvenqKt+zE WIIzMP6JeD59vWuWLwm+snnlhQ== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AIpwx483tpPf7c9b6yiuTYCPN5sMQnCUpkTDsbbTthoNod1Vjh7gPlK008wDqJtydslgHdVTPY+Zdg== X-Received: by 10.223.170.4 with SMTP id p4mr282935wrd.226.1523366109516; Tue, 10 Apr 2018 06:15:09 -0700 (PDT) Received: from ?IPv6:2a01:cb1d:44:6500:9d6d:71b2:cb71:cb17? ([2a01:cb1d:44:6500:9d6d:71b2:cb71:cb17]) by smtp.googlemail.com with ESMTPSA id k14sm3106011wrc.62.2018.04.10.06.15.07 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Tue, 10 Apr 2018 06:15:08 -0700 (PDT) To: Jason Davies , Bitcoin Protocol Discussion References: <84976adb75bef1dfdb12b98c19811278@national.shitposting.agency> <921edfdb-e0e5-8ce4-55d8-ba4e84ef633f@musalbas.com> <010e34a3-f9cf-fba1-5482-de06bc350d64@musalbas.com> <69fb5cc4-7b3d-e23d-2b7e-cddcd7b2877b@musalbas.com> <333F9973-6092-45B7-A87F-32730D752501@jasondavies.com> From: Aymeric Vitte Openpgp: preference=signencrypt Message-ID: <33a9f602-6185-cac5-e457-e5a9af047dbc@gmail.com> Date: Tue, 10 Apr 2018 15:15:22 +0200 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/52.7.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <333F9973-6092-45B7-A87F-32730D752501@jasondavies.com> Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="------------7C080149BFEE5477173C69C5" Content-Language: fr X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.0 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, FREEMAIL_FROM, HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] KETAMINE: Multiple vulnerabilities in SecureRandom(), numerous cryptocurrency products affected. X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 10 Apr 2018 13:15:12 -0000 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------7C080149BFEE5477173C69C5 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit I used jsbn in the past, then I made some research too Apparently window.crypto.getRandomValues was introduced in jsbn mid 2012 (according to the wayback machine, but 2012/2013 does not make any difference, see below), was available in Chrome since 2011 (but indeed see "window.crypto.getRandomValues() uses a weak CSPRNG" https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=552749 fixed *end *of 2015, funny to see that those that did specify the Webcrypto API did not implement it correctly...), in FF in 2013 (https://website-archive.mozilla.org/www.mozilla.org/firefox_releasenotes/en-US/firefox/21.0/releasenotes/) , in IE in 2013 and Safari ~2012/2013, at least that's the official dates for the Webcrypto API implementation, maybe something existed before, but it's not so easy to seek for the history The window.crypto.random check is in jsbn since the begining (2006) and only returns true for Netscape browsers before Netscape 5/6, ie Firefox (2000), see https://books.google.fr/books?id=UooAblGoGN8C&pg=PA85&lpg=PA85&dq=browser+appversion+4&source=bl&ots=dVijsOR0ov&sig=6SnElm56-bAvmGlKqUAdoGLAs2A&hl=fr&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwirhtaqva_aAhUFchQKHQ4JCk4Q6AEwBXoECAAQcQ#v=onepage&q=browser%20appversion%204&f=false) >From the existing tools, there was not only jsbn, everybody was using Math.random (sjcl, cryptoJS, forge, etc) with different implementations and everybody did put a note stating that it might be insecure with an "improvement to come" comment We can probably assume that nobody was using Netscape any longer when Bitcoin started The conclusion seems to be that at least all wallets generated by js tools inside browsers since bitcoin exists until 2011 are impacted by the Math.random weakness if applicable to the related implementations, the Math.random or RC4 (Chrome) weakness between 2011 and 2013, and RC4 weakness for Chrome users until end of 2015 And all wallets using jsbn are impacted by Math.random and RC4 until 2013 (or end 2015 for Chrome), then still by the RC4 fallback step after > Note that even with v1.4, it still does not use high-quality entropy for Internet Explorer, because getRandomValues is provided under window.msCrypto for that browser I don't know for that one, what was the issue? Le 10/04/2018 à 10:51, Jason Davies via bitcoin-dev a écrit : > On 10 Apr 2018, at 00:39, mus@musalbas.com wrote: > >> The original disclosure didn't contain any information about the library >> in question, so I did some digging. >> >> I think that the vulnerability disclosure is referring to a pre-2013 >> version of jsbn, a JavaScript crypto library. Before it used the CSRNG >> in the Web Crypto API, it tried to use nsIDOMCrypto, but incorrectly did >> a string comparison when checking the browser version. >> >> In practice though, this doesn't really matter, because >> navigator.appVersion < "5" returns true anyway for old browsers. The >> real issue is that modern browsers don't have window.crypto.random >> defined, so Bitcoin wallets using a pre-2013 version of jsbn may not be >> using a CSPRNG, when run on a modern browser. > Yes, it looks like high-quality entropy via crypto.getRandomValues was only > added in Tom Wu's latest version (v1.4) in July 2013. > > Note that even with v1.4, it still does not use high-quality entropy for > Internet Explorer, because getRandomValues is provided under window.msCrypto > for that browser. > > http://www-cs-students.stanford.edu/~tjw/jsbn/rng.js > >> As is noted though, even if a CSPRNG is used, the library passes the >> output of the CSPRNG through RC4, which generates some biased bits, >> leading to possible private key recovery. > I think this is the real issue: even if high-quality entropy is utilised, the > RNG is RC4-based, which is known to generate biased output. > > Finally, note that even Chrome used RC4 for crypto.getRandomValues at one > point (as recently as 2015)! > > https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=552749 > > -- > Jason Davies, https://www.jasondavies.com/ > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev -- Bitcoin transactions made simple: https://github.com/Ayms/bitcoin-transactions Zcash wallets made simple: https://github.com/Ayms/zcash-wallets Bitcoin wallets made simple: https://github.com/Ayms/bitcoin-wallets Get the torrent dynamic blocklist: http://peersm.com/getblocklist Check the 10 M passwords list: http://peersm.com/findmyass Anti-spies and private torrents, dynamic blocklist: http://torrent-live.org Peersm : http://www.peersm.com torrent-live: https://github.com/Ayms/torrent-live node-Tor : https://www.github.com/Ayms/node-Tor GitHub : https://www.github.com/Ayms --------------7C080149BFEE5477173C69C5 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

I used jsbn in the past, then I made some research too

Apparently window.crypto.getRandomValues was introduced in jsbn mid 2012 (according to the wayback machine, but 2012/2013 does not make any difference, see below), was available in Chrome since 2011 (but indeed see "window.crypto.getRandomValues() uses a weak CSPRNG" https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=552749 fixed end of 2015, funny to see that those that did specify the Webcrypto API did not implement it correctly...), in FF in 2013 (https://website-archive.mozilla.org/www.mozilla.org/firefox_releasenotes/en-US/firefox/21.0/releasenotes/) , in IE in 2013 and Safari ~2012/2013, at least that's the official dates for the Webcrypto API implementation, maybe something existed before, but it's not so easy to seek for the history

The window.crypto.random check is in jsbn since the begining (2006) and only returns true for Netscape browsers before Netscape 5/6, ie Firefox (2000), see https://books.google.fr/books?id=UooAblGoGN8C&pg=PA85&lpg=PA85&dq=browser+appversion+4&source=bl&ots=dVijsOR0ov&sig=6SnElm56-bAvmGlKqUAdoGLAs2A&hl=fr&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwirhtaqva_aAhUFchQKHQ4JCk4Q6AEwBXoECAAQcQ#v=onepage&q=browser%20appversion%204&f=false)

From the existing tools, there was not only jsbn, everybody was using Math.random (sjcl, cryptoJS, forge, etc) with different implementations and everybody did put a note stating that it might be insecure with an "improvement to come" comment

We can probably assume that nobody was using Netscape any longer when Bitcoin started

The conclusion seems to be that at least all wallets generated by js tools inside browsers since bitcoin exists until 2011 are impacted by the Math.random weakness if applicable to the related implementations, the Math.random or RC4 (Chrome) weakness between 2011 and 2013, and RC4 weakness for Chrome users until end of 2015

And all wallets using jsbn are impacted by Math.random and RC4 until 2013 (or end 2015 for Chrome), then still by the RC4 fallback step after

> Note that even with v1.4, it still does not use high-quality entropy for Internet Explorer, because getRandomValues is provided under window.msCrypto for that browser

I don't know for that one, what was the issue?

Le 10/04/2018 à 10:51, Jason Davies via bitcoin-dev a écrit :
On 10 Apr 2018, at 00:39, mus@musalbas.com wrote:


The original disclosure didn't contain any information about the library
in question, so I did some digging.

I think that the vulnerability disclosure is referring to a pre-2013
version of jsbn, a JavaScript crypto library. Before it used the CSRNG
in the Web Crypto API, it tried to use nsIDOMCrypto, but incorrectly did
a string comparison when checking the browser version.

In practice though, this doesn't really matter, because
navigator.appVersion < "5" returns true anyway for old browsers. The
real issue is that modern browsers don't have window.crypto.random
defined, so Bitcoin wallets using a pre-2013 version of jsbn may not be
using a CSPRNG, when run on a modern browser.

Yes, it looks like high-quality entropy via crypto.getRandomValues was only
added in Tom Wu's latest version (v1.4) in July 2013.

Note that even with v1.4, it still does not use high-quality entropy for
Internet Explorer, because getRandomValues is provided under window.msCrypto
for that browser.

  http://www-cs-students.stanford.edu/~tjw/jsbn/rng.js


As is noted though, even if a CSPRNG is used, the library passes the
output of the CSPRNG through RC4, which generates some biased bits,
leading to possible private key recovery.

I think this is the real issue: even if high-quality entropy is utilised, the
RNG is RC4-based, which is known to generate biased output.

Finally, note that even Chrome used RC4 for crypto.getRandomValues at one
point (as recently as 2015)!

  https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=552749

--
Jason Davies, https://www.jasondavies.com/

_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


-- 
Bitcoin transactions made simple: https://github.com/Ayms/bitcoin-transactions
Zcash wallets made simple: https://github.com/Ayms/zcash-wallets
Bitcoin wallets made simple: https://github.com/Ayms/bitcoin-wallets
Get the torrent dynamic blocklist: http://peersm.com/getblocklist
Check the 10 M passwords list: http://peersm.com/findmyass
Anti-spies and private torrents, dynamic blocklist: http://torrent-live.org
Peersm : http://www.peersm.com
torrent-live: https://github.com/Ayms/torrent-live
node-Tor : https://www.github.com/Ayms/node-Tor
GitHub : https://www.github.com/Ayms
--------------7C080149BFEE5477173C69C5--