[bitcoindev] Re: Shielded CSV: Private and Efficient Client-Side Validation

[Antoine Riard <antoine.riard@gmail.com>]

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Hi Jonas,

Few remarks from a cursory reading on the abstract, contributions and 
technical overview sections.

As you're underscoring too in the paper, I think one of the main 
scalability bottleneck of the
paper is the 64 byte of data to be written in the blockchain, plus a small 
constant overhead,
that 64 byte be it a plaintext of atomic client-side validation 
transaction, or an aggregation
in some of cryptographically efficient representation such as an 
accumulator.

(The 64 byte of data or whatever the size must be public in the blockchain, 
otherwise a distributed
publication board of the pay-to-contract commitment in the blockchain must 
be available to make the
reveal of the commitment available to CSV clients in a interactively 
mininized fashion).

On the nullifier itself, i.e "Thus far, our protocol lacks a mechanism to 
prevent double spending. To
address this issue, we require that all coins spent in a transaction are 
”nullified” by publishing
a corresponding nullifier on the blockchain". There is a point that Peter 
Todd made me once about
his old tree chain scheme and the probabilistic validation by clients if my 
memory is correct,
where a client does not have to verify the whole of the transactions total, 
where in this proposed
CSV scheme it sounds each nullifier verification participant needs the 
banwidth cost to read the whole
of the blockchain.

Beyond, about the privacy claim, i.e "coin proofs reveal no information 
other than the validity
of the coin and its creation time" there could be a way to hide the coin 
creation time, which
can be a huge factor of deanonymization if you apply cross-layers 
deanonymization techniques,
by using some range proofs like pedersen commitments where the lower and 
upper bound of the
range value are logically ordered on sequence of chain blocks time and 
height (those
maps themselves ordered in a discrete fashion).

Without entering in a debate about perfectly hidding versus perfectly 
binding cryptographic
properties, which can be very quickly degenerates in a debate about axioms 
and corollary
in mathematics, I think such cryptographic structure could have a 
consensus-level usage in
the future, e.g if we extend it as dedicated structure in the taproot 
annex, where the field
is accounted accordingly as witness units.

Best,
Antoine
ots hash: eb285459dacfd0b4b58506f58360fea8b005a66beccc6fdb525ab203341a18c8

Le mardi 24 septembre 2024 à 14:34:15 UTC+1, Jonas Nick a écrit :

> Hello list,
>
> We (Liam Eagen, Robin Linus, and I) are pleased to announce the release of 
> the
> Shielded CSV whitepaper, which describes a private and efficient 
> client-side
> validation (CSV) protocol. Shielded CSV builds upon previous work proposed 
> on
> this mailing list, including contributions by Peter Todd [0], RGB [1], 
> Taproot
> Assets [2], and zkCoins [3].
>
> The whitepaper is available here:
>
> https://github.com/ShieldedCSV/ShieldedCSV/releases/latest/download/shieldedcsv.pdf
>
> Our work differs from previous approaches in two main aspects:
> 1. Shielded CSV is defined using the "Proof-Carrying Data" abstraction, 
> which
> can be instantiated via recursive zkSNARKs or folding schemes. This 
> provides
> "full" privacy (hiding of the transaction graph) and ensures that coin 
> proofs
> and verification time are independent of the transaction graph.
> 2. Instead of using Bitcoin transactions for CSV-payments, a Shielded CSV
> payment only requires posting 64 bytes of data to the blockchain 
> (regardless
> of the CSV-transaction size) and a small constant overhead, significantly
> reducing on-chain cost.
>
> The Shielded CSV protocol is currently defined using Rust-based 
> pseudocode. We
> believe that Shielded CSV is both a promising candidate for implementation 
> and
> provides an extensible framework for further innovation in the CSV space. 
> We
> welcome feedback and look forward to discussing and expanding upon this 
> work.
>
> [0] 
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2013-November/003714.html
> [1] 
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2023-April/021554.html
> [2] 
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-April/020196.html
> [3] 
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2023-May/021679.html
>
>
> # Abstract
>
> Cryptocurrencies allow mutually distrusting users to transact monetary 
> value
> over the internet without relying on a trusted third party.
>
> Bitcoin, the first cryptocurrency, achieved this through a novel protocol 
> used
> to establish consensus about an ordered transaction history. This requires 
> every
> transaction to be broadcasted and verified by the network, incurring
> communication and computational costs. Furthermore, transactions are 
> visible to
> all nodes of the network, eroding privacy, and are recorded permanently,
> contributing to increasing storage requirements over time. To limit 
> resource
> usage of the network, Bitcoin currently supports an average of 11 
> transactions
> per second.
>
> Most cryptocurrencies today still operate in a substantially similar 
> manner.
> Private cryptocurrencies like Zcash and Monero address the privacy issue by
> replacing transactions with proofs of transaction validity. However, this
> enhanced privacy comes at the cost of increased communication, storage, and
> computational requirements.
>
> Client-Side Validation (CSV) is a paradigm that addresses these issues by
> removing transaction validation from the blockchain consensus rules. This
> approach allows sending the coin along with a validity proof directly to 
> its
> recipient, reducing communication, computation and storage cost. CSV 
> protocols
> deployed on Bitcoin today~\cite{rgbblackpaper, taprootassets} do not fully
> leverage the paradigm's potential, as they still necessitate the overhead 
> of
> publishing ordinary Bitcoin transactions. Moreover, the size of their coin
> proofs is proportional to the coin's transaction history, and provide 
> limited
> privacy. A recent improvement is the Intmax2~\cite{rybakken2023intmax2} CSV
> protocol, which writes significantly less data to the blockchain compared 
> to a
> blockchain transaction and has succinct coin proofs.
>
> In this work, we introduce Shielded CSV, which improves upon 
> state-of-the-art
> CSV protocols by providing the first construction that offers truly private
> transactions. It addresses the issues of traditional private cryptocurrency
> designs by requiring only 64 bytes of data per transaction, called a
> \emph{nullifier}, to be written to the blockchain. Moreover, for each 
> nullifier
> in the blockchain, Shielded CSV users only need to perform a single Schnorr
> signature verification, while non-users can simply ignore this data. The 
> size
> and verification cost of coin proofs for Shielded CSV receivers is 
> independent
> of the transaction history. Thus, one application of Shielded CSV is adding
> privacy to Bitcoin at a rate of 100 transactions per second, provided 
> there is
> an adequate bridging mechanism to the blockchain.
>
> We specify Shielded CSV using the Proof Carrying Data (PCD) abstraction. 
> We then
> discuss two implementation strategies that we believe to be practical, 
> based on
> Folding Schemes and Recursive STARKs, respectively. Finally, we propose 
> future
> extensions, demonstrating the power of the PCD abstraction and the 
> extensibility
> of Shielded CSV. This highlights the significant potential for further
> improvements to the Shielded CSV framework and protocols built upon it.
>

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