Hi Jonas,

Few remarks from a cursory reading on the abstract, contributions and technical overview sections.

As you're underscoring too in the paper, I think one of the main scalability bottleneck of the
paper is the 64 byte of data to be written in the blockchain, plus a small constant overhead,
that 64 byte be it a plaintext of atomic client-side validation transaction, or an aggregation
in some of cryptographically efficient representation such as an accumulator.

(The 64 byte of data or whatever the size must be public in the blockchain, otherwise a distributed
publication board of the pay-to-contract commitment in the blockchain must be available to make the
reveal of the commitment available to CSV clients in a interactively mininized fashion).

On the nullifier itself, i.e "Thus far, our protocol lacks a mechanism to prevent double spending. To
address this issue, we require that all coins spent in a transaction are ”nullified” by publishing
a corresponding nullifier on the blockchain". There is a point that Peter Todd made me once about
his old tree chain scheme and the probabilistic validation by clients if my memory is correct,
where a client does not have to verify the whole of the transactions total, where in this proposed
CSV scheme it sounds each nullifier verification participant needs the banwidth cost to read the whole
of the blockchain.

Beyond, about the privacy claim, i.e "coin proofs reveal no information other than the validity
of the coin and its creation time" there could be a way to hide the coin creation time, which
can be a huge factor of deanonymization if you apply cross-layers deanonymization techniques,
by using some range proofs like pedersen commitments where the lower and upper bound of the
range value are logically ordered on sequence of chain blocks time and height (those
maps themselves ordered in a discrete fashion).

Without entering in a debate about perfectly hidding versus perfectly binding cryptographic
properties, which can be very quickly degenerates in a debate about axioms and corollary
in mathematics, I think such cryptographic structure could have a consensus-level usage in
the future, e.g if we extend it as dedicated structure in the taproot annex, where the field
is accounted accordingly as witness units.

Best,
Antoine
ots hash: eb285459dacfd0b4b58506f58360fea8b005a66beccc6fdb525ab203341a18c8

Le mardi 24 septembre 2024 à 14:34:15 UTC+1, Jonas Nick a écrit :
Hello list,

We (Liam Eagen, Robin Linus, and I) are pleased to announce the release of the
Shielded CSV whitepaper, which describes a private and efficient client-side
validation (CSV) protocol. Shielded CSV builds upon previous work proposed on
this mailing list, including contributions by Peter Todd [0], RGB [1], Taproot
Assets [2], and zkCoins [3].

The whitepaper is available here:
https://github.com/ShieldedCSV/ShieldedCSV/releases/latest/download/shieldedcsv.pdf

Our work differs from previous approaches in two main aspects:
1. Shielded CSV is defined using the "Proof-Carrying Data" abstraction, which
can be instantiated via recursive zkSNARKs or folding schemes. This provides
"full" privacy (hiding of the transaction graph) and ensures that coin proofs
and verification time are independent of the transaction graph.
2. Instead of using Bitcoin transactions for CSV-payments, a Shielded CSV
payment only requires posting 64 bytes of data to the blockchain (regardless
of the CSV-transaction size) and a small constant overhead, significantly
reducing on-chain cost.

The Shielded CSV protocol is currently defined using Rust-based pseudocode. We
believe that Shielded CSV is both a promising candidate for implementation and
provides an extensible framework for further innovation in the CSV space. We
welcome feedback and look forward to discussing and expanding upon this work.

[0] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2013-November/003714.html
[1] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2023-April/021554.html
[2] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-April/020196.html
[3] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2023-May/021679.html


# Abstract

Cryptocurrencies allow mutually distrusting users to transact monetary value
over the internet without relying on a trusted third party.

Bitcoin, the first cryptocurrency, achieved this through a novel protocol used
to establish consensus about an ordered transaction history. This requires every
transaction to be broadcasted and verified by the network, incurring
communication and computational costs. Furthermore, transactions are visible to
all nodes of the network, eroding privacy, and are recorded permanently,
contributing to increasing storage requirements over time. To limit resource
usage of the network, Bitcoin currently supports an average of 11 transactions
per second.

Most cryptocurrencies today still operate in a substantially similar manner.
Private cryptocurrencies like Zcash and Monero address the privacy issue by
replacing transactions with proofs of transaction validity. However, this
enhanced privacy comes at the cost of increased communication, storage, and
computational requirements.

Client-Side Validation (CSV) is a paradigm that addresses these issues by
removing transaction validation from the blockchain consensus rules. This
approach allows sending the coin along with a validity proof directly to its
recipient, reducing communication, computation and storage cost. CSV protocols
deployed on Bitcoin today~\cite{rgbblackpaper, taprootassets} do not fully
leverage the paradigm's potential, as they still necessitate the overhead of
publishing ordinary Bitcoin transactions. Moreover, the size of their coin
proofs is proportional to the coin's transaction history, and provide limited
privacy. A recent improvement is the Intmax2~\cite{rybakken2023intmax2} CSV
protocol, which writes significantly less data to the blockchain compared to a
blockchain transaction and has succinct coin proofs.

In this work, we introduce Shielded CSV, which improves upon state-of-the-art
CSV protocols by providing the first construction that offers truly private
transactions. It addresses the issues of traditional private cryptocurrency
designs by requiring only 64 bytes of data per transaction, called a
\emph{nullifier}, to be written to the blockchain. Moreover, for each nullifier
in the blockchain, Shielded CSV users only need to perform a single Schnorr
signature verification, while non-users can simply ignore this data. The size
and verification cost of coin proofs for Shielded CSV receivers is independent
of the transaction history. Thus, one application of Shielded CSV is adding
privacy to Bitcoin at a rate of 100 transactions per second, provided there is
an adequate bridging mechanism to the blockchain.

We specify Shielded CSV using the Proof Carrying Data (PCD) abstraction. We then
discuss two implementation strategies that we believe to be practical, based on
Folding Schemes and Recursive STARKs, respectively. Finally, we propose future
extensions, demonstrating the power of the PCD abstraction and the extensibility
of Shielded CSV. This highlights the significant potential for further
improvements to the Shielded CSV framework and protocols built upon it.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/33cd30ab-c5c2-4785-9815-4a2da3c7e267n%40googlegroups.com.