Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP 151

[Eric Voskuil <eric@voskuil.org>]

> On Jun 30, 2016, at 2:20 PM, Jonas Schnelli <dev@jonasschnelli.ch> wrote:
> 
> 
>> Yes, this is exactly what I meant. The complexity of the proposed construction is comparable to that of Bitcoin itself. This is not itself prohibitive, but it is clearly worthy of consideration.
>> 
>> A question we should ask is whether decentralized anonymous credentials is applicable to the authentication problem posed by BIP151. I propose that it is not.
>> 
>> The core problem posed by BIP151 is a MITM attack. The implied solution (BIP151 + authentication) requires that a peer trusts that another is not an attacker.
> 
> BIP151 would increase the risks for MITM attackers.
> What are the benefits for Mallory of he can't be sure Alice and Bob may
> know that he is intercepting the channel?

It is not clear to me why you believe an attack on privacy by an anonymous peer is detectable.

> MITM is possible today, it would still be possible (though under higher
> costs) with BIP151.
> 
> With BIP151 we would have the basic tool-set to effectively reduce the
> risks of being MITMled.
> 
> IMO we should focus on the risks and benefits of BIP151 and not drag
> this discussion into the realm of authentication. This can and should be
> done once we have proposals for authentication (and I'm sure this will
> be a heated debate).
> 
> The only valid risk I have on my list from you, Eric, is the false sense
> of security.
> 
> My countermeasure for that would be...
> - deploy BIP151 together with the simplest form of authentication
> (know_hosts / authorized_keys file, no TOFU only editable "by hand")
> - make it more clear (in the BIP151 MOTIVATION text) that it won't solve
> the privacy/MITM problem without additional authentication.
> 
> Or could you elaborate again – without stepping into the realm of
> authentication/MITM (which is not part of the BIP or possible already
> today) – why BIP151 would make things worse?
> 
> </jonas>
>