From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.194] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-2.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1YIN8X-0006kS-Ua for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Mon, 02 Feb 2015 19:58:21 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.216.52 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.216.52; envelope-from=brian.erdelyi@gmail.com; helo=mail-qa0-f52.google.com; Received: from mail-qa0-f52.google.com ([209.85.216.52]) by sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1YIN8V-0007sG-8l for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Mon, 02 Feb 2015 19:58:21 +0000 Received: by mail-qa0-f52.google.com with SMTP id x12so30722874qac.11 for ; Mon, 02 Feb 2015 11:58:13 -0800 (PST) X-Received: by 10.140.35.106 with SMTP id m97mr16029023qgm.34.1422907093595; Mon, 02 Feb 2015 11:58:13 -0800 (PST) Received: from [192.168.1.58] ([64.147.83.112]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPSA id y5sm19200715qah.38.2015.02.02.11.58.12 (version=TLSv1 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA bits=128/128); Mon, 02 Feb 2015 11:58:12 -0800 (PST) Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 8.2 \(2070.6\)) From: Brian Erdelyi In-Reply-To: Date: Mon, 2 Feb 2015 15:58:11 -0400 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <4B53C1B0-A677-4460-8A69-C45506424D7F@gmail.com> References: <27395C55-CF59-4E65-83CA-73F903272C5F@gmail.com> <54CE3816.6020505@bitwatch.co> <68C03646-02E7-43C6-9B73-E4697F3AA5FD@gmail.com> <57186618-F010-42E6-A757-B617C4001B5B@gmail.com> To: Eric Voskuil X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.2070.6) X-Spam-Score: -1.3 (-) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (brian.erdelyi[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature 0.3 AWL AWL: Adjusted score from AWL reputation of From: address X-Headers-End: 1YIN8V-0007sG-8l Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Proposal to address Bitcoin malware X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 02 Feb 2015 19:58:22 -0000 > Confusing or not, the reliance on multiple signatures as offering = greater security than single relies on the independence of multiple = secrets. If the secrets cannot be shown to retain independence in the = envisioned threat scenario (e.g. a user's compromised operating system) = then the benefit reduces to making the exploit more difficult to write, = which, once written, reduces to no benefit. Yet the user still suffers = the reduced utility arising from greater complexity, while being led to = believe in a false promise. Just trying to make sure I understand what you=E2=80=99re saying. Are = you eluding to that if two of the three private keys get compromised = there is no gain in security? Although the likelihood of this occurring = is lower, it is possible. As more malware targets bitcoins I think the utility is evident. Given = how final Bitcoin transactions are, I think it=E2=80=99s worth trying to = find methods to help verify those transactions (if a user deems it to be = high-risk enough) before the transaction is completed. The balance is = trying to devise something that users do not find too burdensome. Brian Erdelyi=