From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.191] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-2.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1Yrit2-0007gc-94 for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Mon, 11 May 2015 08:16:28 +0000 Received-SPF: softfail (sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: transitioning domain of hashingit.com does not designate 89.145.69.228 as permitted sender) client-ip=89.145.69.228; envelope-from=dave@hashingit.com; helo=heron.directrouter.co.uk; Received: from heron.directrouter.co.uk ([89.145.69.228]) by sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:AES256-SHA:256) (Exim 4.76) id 1Yrisz-0007Yq-DS for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Mon, 11 May 2015 08:16:28 +0000 Received: from host109-155-54-156.range109-155.btcentralplus.com ([109.155.54.156]:52660 helo=[192.168.1.82]) by heron.directrouter.co.uk with esmtpsa (TLSv1:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:256) (Exim 4.85) (envelope-from ) id 1Yrisr-000Reu-V4; Mon, 11 May 2015 08:16:18 +0000 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="Apple-Mail=_ACE953B9-3758-4DA2-AAA3-021039D5B024" Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 8.2 \(2098\)) From: Dave Hudson In-Reply-To: Date: Mon, 11 May 2015 09:16:17 +0100 Message-Id: <4C4AB2DC-CB50-4733-B341-7B7A6B7AD801@hashingit.com> References: To: Thy Shizzle X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.2098) X-AntiAbuse: This header was added to track abuse, please include it with any abuse report X-AntiAbuse: Primary Hostname - heron.directrouter.co.uk X-AntiAbuse: Original Domain - lists.sourceforge.net X-AntiAbuse: Originator/Caller UID/GID - [47 12] / [47 12] X-AntiAbuse: Sender Address Domain - hashingit.com X-Get-Message-Sender-Via: heron.directrouter.co.uk: authenticated_id: dave@hashingit.com X-Source: X-Source-Args: X-Source-Dir: X-Spam-Score: 2.0 (++) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. 1.0 SPF_SOFTFAIL SPF: sender does not match SPF record (softfail) 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message X-Headers-End: 1Yrisz-0007Yq-DS Cc: "bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net" Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Reducing the block rate instead of increasing the maximum block size X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 11 May 2015 08:16:28 -0000 --Apple-Mail=_ACE953B9-3758-4DA2-AAA3-021039D5B024 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 I proposed the same thing last year (there's a video of the presentation = I was giving somewhere around). My intuition was that this would require = slowly reducing the inter-block time, probably by step reductions at = particular block heights. Having had almost a year to think about it some more there are a few = subtleties: 1) I think it could discourage decentralisation if the nominal 2 week = period per difficulty retarget is retained. If we reached 4032 blocks = and a 5 minute block time then there would be 2x as many blocks at any = given difficulty which increases the odds of a smaller pool finding a = block and thus getting a reward. Block rewards would have to drop in = proportion to the reduced interval to keep the total schedule of 21M = coins on track though, but the reduction in variance is a win for = smaller miners. 2) There are limits to the block time. The speed of light is an = ultimately limiting factor here, but we would want to avoid excessive = orphan rates. 3) There would be some amount of confusion about numbers of = confirmations. I actually think that confirmation numbers are a really = misleading idea anyway and it would be safer to think in terms of = "minutes of security". A zero conf transaction has "zero minutes", while = right now 1, 2, 3 and 6 would be "ten minutes", "twenty minutes", = "thirty minutes" and "sixty minutes" respectively. If our block time = were 5 minutes then 8 confirmations would be "forty minutes" of = security; if the block time was 2.5 minutes then 8 confirmations would = be "twenty minutes" of security. The "minutes of security" measure = indicates the mean number of minutes of the entire network's hash rate = would be required to undo a transaction. 4) Reducing the inter-block time reduces the variance in reaching that = "sixty minutes" of security level. The variance around finding 6 blocks = with a ten minute interval is much wider than the variance for finding = 12 blocks with a 5 minute interval. > On 11 May 2015, at 08:30, Thy Shizzle wrote: >=20 > Yes This! >=20 > So many people seem hung up on growing the block size! If gaining a = higher tps throughput is the main aim, I think that this proposition to = speed up block creation has merit! >=20 > Yes it will lead to an increase in the block chain still due to 1mb ~1 = minute instead of ~10 minute, but the change to the protocol is minor, = you are only adding in a different difficulty rate starting from hight = blah, no new features or anything are being added so there seems to me = much less of a security risk! Also that impact if a hard fork should be = minimal because there is nothing but absolute incentive for miners to = mine at the new easier difficulty! >=20 > I feel this deserves a great deal of consideration as opposed to = blowing out the block through miners voting etc!!!! > From: Sergio Lerner > Sent: =E2=80=8E11/=E2=80=8E05/=E2=80=8E2015 5:05 PM > To: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net = > Subject: [Bitcoin-development] Reducing the block rate instead of = increasing the maximum block size >=20 > In this e-mail I'll do my best to argue than if you accept that > increasing the transactions/second is a good direction to go, then > increasing the maximum block size is not the best way to do it. I = argue > that the right direction to go is to decrease the block rate to 1 > minute, while keeping the block size limit to 1 Megabyte (or = increasing > it from a lower value such as 100 Kbyte and then have a step = function). > I'm backing up my claims with many hours of research simulating the > Bitcoin network under different conditions [1]. I'll try to convince > you by responding to each of the arguments I've heard against it. >=20 > Arguments against reducing the block interval >=20 > 1. It will encourage centralization, because participants of mining > pools will loose more money because of excessive initial block = template > latency, which leads to higher stale shares >=20 > When a new block is solved, that information needs to propagate > throughout the Bitcoin network up to the mining pool operator nodes, > then a new block header candidate is created, and this header must be > propagated to all the mining pool users, ether by a push or a pull > model. Generally the mining server pushes new work units to the > individual miners. If done other way around, the server would need to > handle a high load of continuous work requests that would be difficult > to distinguish from a DDoS attack. So if the server pushes new block > header candidates to clients, then the problem boils down to = increasing > bandwidth of the servers to achieve a tenfold increase in work > distribution. Or distributing the servers geographically to achieve a > lower latency. Propagating blocks does not require additional CPU > resources, so mining pools administrators would need to increase > moderately their investment in the server infrastructure to achieve > lower latency and higher bandwidth, but I guess the investment would = be low. >=20 > 2. It will increase the probability of a block-chain split >=20 > The convergence of the network relies on the diminishing probability = of > two honest miners creating simultaneous competing blocks chains. To > increase the competition chain, competing blocks must be generated in > almost simultaneously (in the same time window approximately bounded = by > the network average block propagation delay). The probability of a = block > competition decreases exponentially with the number of blocks. In = fact, > the probability of a sustained competition on ten 1-minute blocks is = one > million times lower than the probability of a competition of one > 10-minute block. So even if the competition probability of six = 1-minute > blocks is higher than of six ten-minute blocks, this does not imply > reducing the block rate increases this chance, but on the contrary,=20 > reduces it. >=20 > 3, It will reduce the security of the network >=20 > The security of the network is based on two facts: > A- The miners are incentivized to extend the best chain > B- The probability of a reversal based on a long block competition > decreases as more confirmation blocks are appended. > C- Renting or buying hardware to perform a 51% attack is costly. >=20 > A still holds. B holds for the same amount of confirmation blocks, so = 6 > confirmation blocks in a 10-minute block-chain is approximately > equivalent to 6 confirmation blocks in a 1-minute block-chain. > Only C changes, as renting the hashing power for 6 minutes is ten = times > less expensive as renting it for 1 hour. However, there is no shop = where > one can find 51% of the hashing power to rent right now, nor probably > will ever be if Bitcoin succeeds. Last, you can still have a 1 hour > confirmation (60 1-minute blocks) if you wish for high-valued = payments, > so the security decreases only if participant wish to decrease it. >=20 > 4. Reducing the block propagation time on the average case is good, = but > what happen in the worse case? >=20 > Most methods proposed to reduce the block propagation delay do it only > on the average case. Any kind of block compression relies on both > parties sharing some previous information. In the worse case it's true > that a miner can create and try to broadcast a block that takes too = much > time to verify or bandwidth to transmit. This is currently true on the > Bitcoin network. Nevertheless there is no such incentive for miners, > since they will be shooting on their own foots. Peter Todd has argued > that the best strategy for miners is actually to reach 51% of the > network, but not more. In other words, to exclude the slowest 49% > percent. But this strategy of creating bloated blocks is too risky in > practice, and surely doomed to fail, as network conditions dynamically=20= > change. Also it would be perceived as an attack to the network, and = the > miner (if it is a public mining pool) would be probably blacklisted. >=20 > 5. Thousands of SPV wallets running in mobile devices would need to be > upgraded (thanks Mike). >=20 > That depends on the current upgrade rate for SPV wallets like Bitcoin > Wallet and BreadWallet. Suppose that the upgrade rate is 80%/year: we > develop the source code for the change now and apply the change in Q2 > 2016, then most of the nodes will already be upgraded by when the > hardfork takes place. Also a public notice telling people to upgrade = in > web pages, bitcointalk, SPV wallets warnings, coindesk, one year in > advance will give plenty of time to SPV wallet users to upgrade. >=20 > 6. If there are 10x more blocks, then there are 10x more block = headers, > and that increases the amount of bandwidth SPV wallets need to catch = up > with the chain > =20 > A standard smartphone with average cellular downstream speed downloads > 2.6 headers per second (1600 kbits/sec) [3], so if synchronization = were > to be done only at night when the phone is connected to the power = line, > then it would take 9 minutes to synchronize with 1440 headers/day. If = a > person should accept a payment, and the smart-phone is 1 day > out-of-synch, then it takes less time to download all the missing > headers than to wait for a 10-minute one block confirmation. Obviously > all smartphones with 3G have a downstream bandwidth much higher, > averaging 1 Mbps. So the whole synchronization will be done less than = a > 1-minute block confirmation. > =20 > According to CISCO mobile bandwidth connection speed increases 20% = every > year. In four years, it will have doubled, so mobile phones with lower > than average data connection will soon be able to catchup. > Also there is low-hanging-fruit optimizations to the protocol that = have > not been implemented: each header is 80 bytes in length. When a set of > chained headers is transferred, the headers could be compressed, > stripping 32 bytes of each header that is derived from the previous > header hash digest. So a 40% compression is already possible by = slightly > modifying the wire protocol. > =20 > 7. There has been insufficient testing and/or insufficient research = into > technical/economic implications or reducing the block rate > =20 > This is partially true. in the GHOST paper, this has been analyzed, = and > the problem was shown to be solvable for block intervals of just a few > seconds. There are several proof-of-work cryptocurrencies in existence > that have lower than 1 minute block intervals and they work just fine. > First there was Bitcoin with a 10 minute interval, then was LiteCoin > using a 2.5 interval, then was DogeCoin with 1 minute, and then > QuarkCoin with just 30 seconds. Every new cryptocurrency lowers it a > little bit. Some time ago I decided to research on the block rate to > understand how the block interval impacts the stability and capability > of the cryptocurrency network, and I came up with the idea of the = DECOR+ > protocol [4] (which requires changes in the consensus code). In my > research I also showed how the stale rate can be easily reduced only > with changes in the networking code, and not in the consensus code. > These networking optimizations ( O(1) propagation using headers-first = or > IBLTs), can be added later. > =20 > Mortifying Bitcoin to accommodate the change to lower the block rate > requires at least: > =20 > - Changing the 21 BTC reward per block to 2.1 BTC > - Changing the nPowTargetTimespan constant > - Writing code to hard-fork automatically when the majority of miners > have upgraded. > - Allow transaction version 3, and interpret nLockTimes of transaction > version 2 as being multiplied by 10. >=20 > All changes comprises no more than 15 lines of code. This is much less > than the number of lines modified by Gavin's 20Mb patch. > =20 > As a conclusion, I haven't yet heard a good argument against lowering > the block rate. >=20 > Best regards, > Sergio. > =20 > [0] https://medium.com/@octskyward/the-capacity-cliff-586d1bf7715e = > [1] https://bitslog.wordpress.com/2014/02/17/5-sec-block-interval/ = > [2] http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks = > [3] > = http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/service-provider/visual-= networking-index-vni/white_paper_c11-520862.html = > [4] https://bitslog.wordpress.com/2014/05/02/decor/ = >=20 > = --------------------------------------------------------------------------= ---- > One dashboard for servers and applications across = Physical-Virtual-Cloud=20 > Widest out-of-the-box monitoring support with 50+ applications > Performance metrics, stats and reports that give you Actionable = Insights > Deep dive visibility with transaction tracing using APM Insight. > http://ad.doubleclick.net/ddm/clk/290420510;117567292;y = > _______________________________________________ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development = > = --------------------------------------------------------------------------= ---- > One dashboard for servers and applications across = Physical-Virtual-Cloud=20 > Widest out-of-the-box monitoring support with 50+ applications > Performance metrics, stats and reports that give you Actionable = Insights > Deep dive visibility with transaction tracing using APM Insight. > = http://ad.doubleclick.net/ddm/clk/290420510;117567292;y___________________= ____________________________ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development --Apple-Mail=_ACE953B9-3758-4DA2-AAA3-021039D5B024 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
I proposed the same thing last year (there's = a video of the presentation I was giving somewhere around). My intuition = was that this would require slowly reducing the inter-block time, = probably by step reductions at particular block heights.

Having had almost a year = to think about it some more there are a few subtleties:

1) I think it could = discourage decentralisation if the nominal 2 week period per difficulty = retarget is retained. If we reached 4032 blocks and a 5 minute block = time then there would be 2x as many blocks at any given difficulty which = increases the odds of a smaller pool finding a block and thus getting a = reward. Block rewards would have to drop in proportion to the reduced = interval to keep the total schedule of 21M coins on track though, but = the reduction in variance is a win for smaller miners.

2) There are limits to = the block time. The speed of light is an ultimately limiting factor = here, but we would want to avoid excessive orphan rates.

3) There would be some = amount of confusion about numbers of confirmations. I actually think = that confirmation numbers are a really misleading idea anyway and it = would be safer to think in terms of "minutes of security". A zero conf = transaction has "zero minutes", while right now 1, 2, 3 and 6 would be = "ten minutes", "twenty minutes", "thirty minutes" and "sixty minutes" = respectively. If our block time were 5 minutes then 8 confirmations = would be "forty minutes" of security; if the block time was 2.5 minutes = then 8 confirmations would be "twenty minutes" of security. The "minutes = of security" measure indicates the mean number of minutes of the entire = network's hash rate would be required to undo a transaction.

4) Reducing the = inter-block time reduces the variance in reaching that "sixty minutes" = of security level. The variance around finding 6 blocks with a ten = minute interval is much wider than the variance for finding 12 blocks = with a 5 minute interval.



On 11 May 2015, at 08:30, Thy = Shizzle <thyshizzle@outlook.com> wrote:

Yes This!

So many people seem hung up on growing the block size! If gaining a = higher tps throughput is the main aim, I think that this proposition to = speed up block creation has merit!

Yes it will lead to an increase in the block chain still due to 1mb ~1 = minute instead of ~10 minute, but the change to the protocol is minor, = you are only adding in a different difficulty rate starting from hight = blah, no new features or anything are being added so there seems to me much less of a security risk! Also that = impact if a hard fork should be minimal because there is nothing but = absolute incentive for miners to mine at the new easier difficulty!

I feel this deserves a great deal of consideration as opposed to blowing = out the block through miners voting etc!!!!
From: Sergio = Lerner
Sent: =E2=80=8E11/=E2=80=8E05/=E2=80=8E2015 5:05 PM
To: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
Subject: [Bitcoin-development] Reducing the block rate instead of = increasing the maximum block size

In this e-mail I'll do my best to argue than if = you accept that
increasing the transactions/second is a good direction to go, then
increasing the maximum block size is not the best way to do it. I = argue
that the right direction to go is to decrease the block rate to 1
minute, while keeping the block size limit to 1 Megabyte (or = increasing
it from a lower value such as 100 Kbyte and then have a step = function).
I'm backing up my claims with many hours of research simulating the
Bitcoin network under different conditions [1].  I'll try to = convince
you by responding to each of the arguments I've heard against it.

Arguments against reducing the block interval

1. It will encourage centralization, because participants of mining
pools will loose more money because of excessive initial block = template
latency, which leads to higher stale shares

When a new block is solved, that information needs to propagate
throughout the Bitcoin network up to the mining pool operator nodes,
then a new block header candidate is created, and this header must be
propagated to all the mining pool users, ether by a push or a pull
model. Generally the mining server pushes new work units to the
individual miners. If done other way around, the server would need to
handle a high load of continuous work requests that would be = difficult
to distinguish from a DDoS attack. So if the server pushes new block
header candidates to clients, then the problem boils down to = increasing
bandwidth of the servers to achieve a tenfold increase in work
distribution. Or distributing the servers geographically to achieve a
lower latency. Propagating blocks does not require additional CPU
resources, so mining pools administrators would need to increase
moderately their investment in the server infrastructure to achieve
lower latency and higher bandwidth, but I guess the investment would be = low.

2. It will increase the probability of a block-chain split

The convergence of the network relies on the diminishing probability = of
two honest miners creating simultaneous competing blocks chains. To
increase the competition chain, competing blocks must be generated in
almost simultaneously (in the same time window approximately bounded = by
the network average block propagation delay). The probability of a = block
competition decreases exponentially with the number of blocks. In = fact,
the probability of a sustained competition on ten 1-minute blocks is = one
million times lower than the probability of a competition of one
10-minute block. So even if the competition probability of six = 1-minute
blocks is higher than of six ten-minute blocks, this does not imply
reducing the block rate increases this chance, but on the contrary,
reduces it.

3, It will reduce the security of the network

The security of the network is based on two facts:
A- The miners are incentivized to extend the best chain
B- The probability of a reversal based on a long block competition
decreases as more confirmation blocks are appended.
C- Renting or buying hardware to perform a 51% attack is costly.

A still holds. B holds for the same amount of confirmation blocks, so = 6
confirmation blocks in a 10-minute block-chain is approximately
equivalent to 6 confirmation blocks in a 1-minute block-chain.
Only C changes, as renting the hashing power for 6 minutes is ten = times
less expensive as renting it for 1 hour. However, there is no shop = where
one can find 51% of the hashing power to rent right now, nor probably
will ever be if Bitcoin succeeds. Last, you can still have a 1 hour
confirmation (60 1-minute blocks) if you wish for high-valued = payments,
so the security decreases only if participant wish to decrease it.

4. Reducing the block propagation time on the average case is good, = but
what happen in the worse case?

Most methods proposed to reduce the block propagation delay do it = only
on the average case. Any kind of block compression relies on both
parties sharing some previous information. In the worse case it's = true
that a miner can create and try to broadcast a block that takes too = much
time to verify or bandwidth to transmit. This is currently true on = the
Bitcoin network. Nevertheless there is no such incentive for miners,
since they will be shooting on their own foots. Peter Todd has argued
that the best strategy for miners is actually to reach 51% of the
network, but not more. In other words, to exclude the slowest 49%
percent. But this strategy of creating bloated blocks is too risky in
practice, and surely doomed to fail, as network conditions dynamically =
change. Also it would be perceived as an attack to the network, and = the
miner (if it is a public mining pool) would be probably blacklisted.

5. Thousands of SPV wallets running in mobile devices would need to = be
upgraded (thanks Mike).

That depends on the current upgrade rate for SPV wallets like Bitcoin
Wallet  and BreadWallet. Suppose that the upgrade rate is 80%/year: = we
develop the source code for the change now and apply the change in Q2
2016, then  most of the nodes will already be upgraded by when = the
hardfork takes place. Also a public notice telling people to upgrade = in
web pages, bitcointalk, SPV wallets warnings, coindesk, one year in
advance will give plenty of time to SPV wallet users to upgrade.

6. If there are 10x more blocks, then there are 10x more block = headers,
and that increases the amount of bandwidth SPV wallets need to catch = up
with the chain
 
A standard smartphone with average cellular downstream speed = downloads
2.6 headers per second (1600 kbits/sec) [3], so if synchronization = were
to be done only at night when the phone is connected to the power = line,
then it would take 9 minutes to synchronize with 1440 headers/day. If = a
person should accept a payment, and the smart-phone is 1 day
out-of-synch, then it takes less time to download all the missing
headers than to wait for a 10-minute one block confirmation. = Obviously
all smartphones with 3G have a downstream bandwidth much higher,
averaging 1 Mbps. So the whole synchronization will be done less than = a
1-minute block confirmation.
 
According to CISCO mobile bandwidth connection speed increases 20% = every
year. In four years, it will have doubled, so mobile phones with = lower
than average data connection will soon be able to catchup.
Also there is low-hanging-fruit optimizations to the protocol that = have
not been implemented: each header is 80 bytes in length. When a set = of
chained headers is transferred, the headers could be compressed,
stripping 32 bytes of each header that is derived from the previous
header hash digest. So a 40% compression is already possible by = slightly
modifying the wire protocol.
 
7. There has been insufficient testing and/or insufficient research = into
technical/economic implications or reducing the block rate
 
This is partially true. in the GHOST paper, this has been analyzed, = and
the problem was shown to be solvable for block intervals of just a = few
seconds. There are several proof-of-work cryptocurrencies in = existence
that have lower than 1 minute block intervals and they work just = fine.
First there was Bitcoin with a 10 minute interval, then was LiteCoin
using a 2.5 interval, then was DogeCoin with 1 minute, and then
QuarkCoin with just 30 seconds. Every new cryptocurrency lowers it a
little bit. Some time ago I decided to research on the block rate to
understand how the block interval impacts the stability and = capability
of the cryptocurrency network, and I came up with the idea of the = DECOR+
protocol [4] (which requires changes in the consensus code). In my
research I also showed how the stale rate can be easily reduced only
with changes in the networking code, and not in the consensus code.
These networking optimizations ( O(1) propagation using headers-first = or
IBLTs), can be added later.
 
Mortifying Bitcoin to accommodate the change to lower the block rate
requires at least:
 
- Changing the 21 BTC reward per block to 2.1 BTC
- Changing the nPowTargetTimespan constant
- Writing code to hard-fork automatically when the majority of miners
have upgraded.
- Allow transaction version 3, and interpret nLockTimes of = transaction
version 2 as being multiplied by 10.

All changes comprises no more than 15 lines of code. This is much = less
than the number of lines modified by Gavin's 20Mb patch.
 
As a conclusion, I haven't yet heard a good argument against lowering
the block rate.

Best regards,
 Sergio.
 
[0] https://medium.com/@octskyward/the-capacity-cliff-586d1bf7715e<= /a>
[1] https://bitslog.wordpress.com/2014/02/17/5-sec-block-interval/<= /a>
[2] http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks [3]
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/service-provi= der/visual-networking-index-vni/white_paper_c11-520862.html
[4] https://bitslog.wordpress.com/2014/05/02/decor/

= --------------------------------------------------------------------------= ----
One dashboard for servers and applications across Physical-Virtual-Cloud =
Widest out-of-the-box monitoring support with 50+ applications
Performance metrics, stats and reports that give you Actionable = Insights
Deep dive visibility with transaction tracing using APM Insight.
http://ad.doubleclick.net/ddm/clk/290420510;117567292;y
_______________________________________________
Bitcoin-development mailing list
Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-developmen= t
= --------------------------------------------------------------------------= ----
One dashboard for servers and applications across = Physical-Virtual-Cloud
Widest out-of-the-box monitoring = support with 50+ applications
Performance metrics, stats = and reports that give you Actionable Insights
Deep dive = visibility with transaction tracing using APM Insight.
http://ad.doubleclick.net/ddm/clk/290420510;117567292;y________= _______________________________________
Bitcoin-development mailing list
Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-developmen= t

= --Apple-Mail=_ACE953B9-3758-4DA2-AAA3-021039D5B024--