From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 50C481088 for ; Fri, 5 Jul 2019 23:16:27 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: domain auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-40135.protonmail.ch (mail-40135.protonmail.ch [185.70.40.135]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5416970D for ; Fri, 5 Jul 2019 23:16:26 +0000 (UTC) Date: Fri, 05 Jul 2019 23:16:17 +0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=protonmail.com; s=default; t=1562368583; bh=fyKs0pEw197396lameOwjT3f9jVdJhoPj1o6xb61LBI=; h=Date:To:From:Cc:Reply-To:Subject:In-Reply-To:References: Feedback-ID:From; b=GXsOMqgglIqrtQ67pfGO9zavVIItHiY13XUP7hSH5rqzE1L5FaET8sfP/79Ob15cz X7XG7YPC+ezTqNoYHoCF/JTf0jvcSAkD97XpWChukGilDYFHCqOggGYp71cDEIk0/O DQZ4chs6++Dt5AoG0dNMYm+eVvV1kOS2O4odXv3A= To: Eric Voskuil From: ZmnSCPxj Reply-To: ZmnSCPxj Message-ID: <4mT6iC4Va7Afg15a5NLbddAnF2a_vAcQSXYr_jg_5IyEK2ezblJff7EJZakoqvp4BJlLitt9Zlq1_l5JadR0nVss7VDPW-pv8jXGh7lkFC4=@protonmail.com> In-Reply-To: References: <0DBC0DEA-C999-4AEE-B2E1-D5337ECD9405@gmail.com> <0AA10217-E1CC-46D1-9B43-038CEEF942CD@gmail.com> <6B9A04E2-8EEE-40A0-8B39-64AA0F478CAB@voskuil.org> Feedback-ID: el4j0RWPRERue64lIQeq9Y2FP-mdB86tFqjmrJyEPR9VAtMovPEo9tvgA0CrTsSHJeeyPXqnoAu6DN-R04uJUg==:Ext:ProtonMail MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.2 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, FREEMAIL_FROM, FROM_LOCAL_NOVOWEL, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org X-Mailman-Approved-At: Sat, 06 Jul 2019 01:34:57 +0000 Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Generalized covenants with taproot enable riskless or risky lending, prevent credit inflation through fractional reserve X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 05 Jul 2019 23:16:27 -0000 Good morning Eric, Sent with ProtonMail Secure Email. =E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90 Original Me= ssage =E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90 On Saturday, July 6, 2019 3:27 AM, Eric Voskuil wrote: > > On Jul 4, 2019, at 21:05, ZmnSCPxj ZmnSCPxj@protonmail.com wrote: > > Good morning Eric, > > > > > As with Bitcoin mining, it is the consumed cost that matters in this = scenario, (i.e., not the hash rate, or in this case the encumbered coin fac= e value). Why would the advertiser not simply be required to burn .1 coin f= or the same privilege, just as miners burn energy? Why would it not make mo= re sense to spend that coin in support of the secondary network (e.g. payin= g for confirmation security), just as with the burning of energy in Bitcoin= mining? > > Good morning ZmnSCPxj, > > > Using the unspentness-time of a UTXO allows for someone advertising a s= ervice or producer to "close up shop" by simply spending the advertising UT= XO. > > For instance, if the advertisement is for sale of a limited stock of go= ods, once the stock has been sold, the merchant (assuming the merchant used= own funds) can simply recover the locked funds, with the potential to rein= vest them elsewhere. > > This allows some time-based hedging for the merchant (they may be willi= ng to wait indefinitely for the stock to be sold, but once the stock is sol= d, they can immediately reap the rewards of not having their funds locked a= nymore). > > This is a materially different concept than proposed by Tamas. > > =E2=80=9C...he gives up his control of the coins until maturity, he can n= ot use them elsewhere until then.=E2=80=9D Possibly. In a way, this is giving up control of the coin, until he no longer needs t= he advertisement, i.e. dynamically select the maturity age needed. > > Similarly, an entity renting out a UTXO for an advertisement might allo= w for early reclamation of the UTXO in exchange for partial refund of fee; = as the value in the UTXO is now freed to be spent elsewhere, the lessor can= lease it to another advertiser. > > You appear to be proposing a design whereby either the owner or the rente= r (not entirely clear to me which) can spend the =E2=80=9Clocked up= =E2=80=9D coin at any time (no maturity constraint), by dropping the covena= nt. > > If the renter can do this he can simply steal the coin from the owner. > > If the owner can do this there is no value to the renter (or as a proof o= f cost), as the owner retains full control of the coin. > Obviously this will require a 2-of-2 multisig, with an timelocked transacti= on that lets the owner recover at a futuredate, so that it is the agreement= of *both* that is needed to perform any actions before the timelock. I already described this in the link I provided. > If you mean that the age of the encumbrance is the proof of cost, this re= quires no covenant. I don=E2=80=99t believe this is what you intended, just= covering all bases. Not age of encumbrance, quite. Instead, it is the simple fact that the UTXO is a UTXO (and not yet spent),= that validates the advertisement. No, it does not *require* a covenant. However, covenants do make it easier to use, in the sense that the renter c= an repurpose the UTXO (e.g. change details of advertisement) without having= to contact the owner. > > > Burnt funds cannot be "un-burnt" to easily signal the end of a term for= an advertisement. > > And as I have shown above, nor can a =E2=80=9Clocked-up=E2=80=9D coin be = unlocked to do the same. You have shown no such thing, merely shown that you have not understood the= proposal. Regards, ZmnSCPxj