Re: [Bitcoin-development] blind symmetric commitment for stronger byzantine voting resilience (Re: bitcoin taint & unilateral revocability)

[Caleb James DeLisle <calebdelisle@lavabit.com>]

Not only does the size of the proof grow endlessly as the coin is
passed around, the size of the UTXO set grows endlessly as more and
more of the already spent coins cannot be proven to have been spent
because the proofs are passed out-of-band. I never said the idea was
good, just interesting :)

Thanks,
Caleb


On 05/15/2013 10:45 PM, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
> On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 7:22 PM, Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net> wrote:
>> Conceptually it sounds a lot like ZeroCoin (not in implementation)?
> 
> Zerocoin conceals the connection from everyone forever, assuming the
> underlying trapdoor problem is computational infeasible, but at great
> cost.
> 
> Adamcoin, depending on how its done, at most conceals the transactions
> from people who aren't a party to them... though as time goes on
> eventually everyone becomes a party to a sufficiently old coin, and
> avoiding publication creates quadratic costs in evaluating a private
> clique's claims.... so instead an implementation would make the
> identities public but only once they're burred a bit.
> 
> Perhaps an extreme version of the idea is easier to understand. Ignore
> DOS attacks for a moment and pretend there is never any address reuse:
> 
> Everyone creates txouts paying a P2SH addresses that have a OP_PUSH
> nonce in them and tell you recipient the nonce out of band.
> 
> When the recipients spend those coins they provide the script but not the nonce.
> 
> The recipient knows what coins he's spending, but the public does not.
> 
> The public can tell there is no double spend though, because they'd
> see the same script twice. The person he's paying may be skeptical
> that he actually has any coin and didn't just mine some gibberish, but
> our spender tells that their receiver the nonce, and that person can
> see the coin available for spending in the chain and also see that
> there are no double spends.
> 
> This could actually go on forever with no ambiguity over who owns
> what, but the out of band proofs that you have to give people when you
> spend coins would grow with the history of the coins.
> 
> Since there wouldn't be much privacy once a transaction was
> sufficiently split up in any case, you instead just publish the
> unblindings once transactions are sufficiently buried. Thus bounding
> the growth of the proofs.   The reason I say I need to internalize
> this more is mostly that I need to think about attacks on the
> publication for 'tained' transactions being more or less isomorphic
> to just refusing to allow spending of the 'tainted' coins in any case.
> 
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> AlienVault Unified Security Management (USM) platform delivers complete
> security visibility with the essential security capabilities. Easily and
> efficiently configure, manage, and operate all of your security controls
> from a single console and one unified framework. Download a free trial.
> http://p.sf.net/sfu/alienvault_d2d
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>