[bitcoindev] Demonstrating Pinning Attacks under Real-World Conditions

[bitcoindev] Demonstrating Pinning Attacks under Real-World Conditions

[Antoine Riard]

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Hi list,

I'm following-up on Dave Harding''s proposition in another recent email 
thread.

> How would that work? AFAIK, there's no LN software using TRUC, very few 
> relay nodes are using it (since it isn't yet enabled by default in a 
> release version), and no miners are using it (again, since it hasn't 
> been released). I'm willing to put money at stake to settle a 
> disagreement that can't be settled with words, but I want to at least 
> learn something from the process. 

I think it would benefit greatly the bitcoin ecosystem to have in place few
lightning nodes running on mainnet, against which folks can freely exercise 
sophisticated cross-layers attacks (e.g pinning) to demonstrate their 
feasibility
and severity, in a plain fashion.

Indeed, this is one thing to execute an attack on a private regtest or even
testnet, another on mainnet in real-world conditions where the results can 
be
evaluated and discussed by a wide audience. I already call to put in place 
such 
attack demonstration experiences in the past (cf. in the context of the 
transaction
relay workshop in 2021 [0]) and it would be more akin to the research 
standards
at major sec confs demanding for artifacts.

So if we have more candidates, beyond Dave, who wish to put in place 
"free-to-pown"
lightning nodes, the basic setup could be the following for useful demo 
attacks results:
- a full-node (e.g core or btcd)
- a ligtning node (e.g core-lightning / ldk / lnd)
- running default mainnet setting for both softwares

What else ?

It is more interesting to run with default mainnet settings, as testnet / 
regtest
have usually myriads of specific behaviors and have all the real mempools 
congestion
cycles to deal with. As someone wishing to do attack demo, I'm fine pouring 
the satoshis
funds to open new channels, you only need to be above the dust threshold to 
exercise
interesting attacks.

A cynical observer of bitcoin and lightning protocol development (of which, 
of course
I'm not !), could say that given the level of technical complexity of a 
full-node
software and a lightning implementation and the hardness to evaluate 
cross-layer attacks like pinning, some lightning domain experts and 
maintainers are deliberately abusing the  belief of lightning end-users 
about the protocol robustness and as such misleading end-users about the 
safety of their moneys (and LSPs about the viability of their economics 
units) [1].

From the viewpoint of a security researcher wishing to demonstrate the 
feasibility
and severity of some cross-layers attacks in bitcoin, having running public 
nodes would
be very useful. There is also the option to do that on private infra and 
come back with
a trace on mainnet, though it would lose its public verifiability aspect.

My utmost pleasure to demonstrate some pinning attacks on nodes under 
real-world conditions.

Cheers,
Antoine
ots hash: 63f58d2557beef5eb1b04f530f91d3febd682ae078933790fcdc1ac94356cf40

[0] 
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-May/018925.html
[1] And on that regard, it's often the ones who are spending their time on 
social medias
and numerous podcasts whining about the purity of their intention or always 
recalling their FOSS veterans credentials as some mark of authority who are 
the more suspicious to falter about some sense of accountability towards 
end-users...It can be good to re-read Nietzsche.

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Re: [bitcoindev] Demonstrating Pinning Attacks under Real-World Conditions

[Peter Todd]

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On Tue, Aug 27, 2024 at 02:10:15PM -0700, Antoine Riard wrote:
> My utmost pleasure to demonstrate some pinning attacks on nodes under 
> real-world conditions.

Antoine Riard: until Oct 1st, you have permission to test your attacks against
my Lightning node running at:

    023345274dd80a01c0e80ec48928188783f9bc5281be8f5057c050492f10711a5b@alice.opentimestamps.org:9735

That also happens to be my Alice OpenTimestamps calendar, in production, so
please don't do anything you expect to be CPU or RAM intensive. But if you
accidentally take down the server, not the end of the world: OTS is a very
redundant protocol and one calendar going down for a few hours is unlikely to
do any harm.

It has about $400 of outgoing capacity at the moment, and $2000 inbound. It
gets hardly any donations at the moment, so if you manage to knock LND offline
that's no big deal.

That's not my money - it's donations to the OTS calendars that I have no right
to spend - so I'll ask you to pay for any expenses incurred by it during
testing, and make a $100 net donation when you're done testing to make it
worthwhile for the OTS community. If you manage to lose more than that on
justice transactions, I'll consider that a donation. :)

-- 
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Re: [bitcoindev] Demonstrating Pinning Attacks under Real-World Conditions

[Antoine Riard]

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> That also happens to be my Alice OpenTimestamps calendar, in production,
so
> please don't do anything you expect to be CPU or RAM intensive. But if you
> accidentally take down the server, not the end of the world: OTS is a very
> redundant protocol and one calendar going down for a few hours is
unlikely to
> do any harm.
>
> It has about $400 of outgoing capacity at the moment, and $2000 inbound.
It
> gets hardly any donations at the moment, so if you manage to knock LND
offline
> that's no big deal.
>
> That's not my money - it's donations to the OTS calendars that I have no
right
> to spend - so I'll ask you to pay for any expenses incurred by it during
> testing, and make a $100 net donation when you're done testing to make it
> worthwhile for the OTS community. If you manage to lose more than that on
> justice transactions, I'll consider that a donation. :)

Many thanks Peter for that.

No worries, I won't play with CPU or RAM, it's just all the
transaction-relay
and mempool logic that one can interfere with. I'll make you whole of the
$2400
if the LND node goes down too hard, though I'm just looking for a node
running
on mainnet, for a pinning the attacker has two open to channels and
re-balance
the liquidity at its advantage a bit. I'll provide the liquidity by myself.

If you have an on-chain donation address on the OTS website (?), I'll make a
$100 donation now, it's a nice tool. And for the justice transaction...well
for some scenarios you can use the latest valid commitment state to pin no
risk
of being slashed by a justice transaction.

Best,
Antoine
ots hash: 19d9b61ed5238e2922205a0a0194e0830b260a691f45b4189b1d145f72c9e031

Le mar. 3 sept. 2024 à 13:58, Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org> a écrit :

> On Tue, Aug 27, 2024 at 02:10:15PM -0700, Antoine Riard wrote:
> > My utmost pleasure to demonstrate some pinning attacks on nodes under
> > real-world conditions.
>
> Antoine Riard: until Oct 1st, you have permission to test your attacks
> against
> my Lightning node running at:
>
>
> 023345274dd80a01c0e80ec48928188783f9bc5281be8f5057c050492f10711a5b@alice.opentimestamps.org:9735
>
> That also happens to be my Alice OpenTimestamps calendar, in production, so
> please don't do anything you expect to be CPU or RAM intensive. But if you
> accidentally take down the server, not the end of the world: OTS is a very
> redundant protocol and one calendar going down for a few hours is unlikely
> to
> do any harm.
>
> It has about $400 of outgoing capacity at the moment, and $2000 inbound. It
> gets hardly any donations at the moment, so if you manage to knock LND
> offline
> that's no big deal.
>
> That's not my money - it's donations to the OTS calendars that I have no
> right
> to spend - so I'll ask you to pay for any expenses incurred by it during
> testing, and make a $100 net donation when you're done testing to make it
> worthwhile for the OTS community. If you manage to lose more than that on
> justice transactions, I'll consider that a donation. :)
>
> --
> https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
>

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Re: [bitcoindev] Demonstrating Pinning Attacks under Real-World Conditions

[Antoine Riard]

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Hi all,

> If you have an on-chain donation address on the OTS website (?), I'll 
make a
> $100 donation now, it's a nice tool. And for the justice 
transaction...well
> for some scenarios you can use the latest valid commitment state to pin 
no risk
> of being slashed by a justice transaction.

Been late on demonstrating a real-world pinning attack against a production 
lightning
node. But I swear it's real sport having to jungle with more than one 
category of
exploit to soundly test.

OTS is a great project. I'll make a donation to it of 1 gram of gold or the 
equivalent
in fiats or satoshis at settlement (as $100 sounds to be almost equal to 1 
gram of gold,
i.e $84.66 those days) for each month late on doing a demonstrationg of 
real-world pinning
attack, as a lateness penalty.

Beyond it's a great tool to make notarization of any kind of digital info, 
inside the
chain where for every block there are probably two-digit terawatt hours 
burnt, which
starts to be a f*cking lot of hydro power plants.

More generally, I called since late 2020 at least for making real-world 
demonstration
of pinning attacks against lightning nodes, among others types of 
cross-layers attacks,
At the exception of 2 ligthning protocol devs if my memory is correct, all 
the others
ones since then have shunned away from participating in a real-world demo, 
and Peter
Todd was the first one to consent and make available a lightning node 
available for
real-world demos in a "black box" fashion (indeed, it's far easier to 
execute exploits
on testing envs fully set by the researcher...).

In the future, I believe it can only be great if bitcoin security exploits 
are gauged
more or less on the lines of artifacts available, evaluated and reproduced, 
as done 
usually by major infosec confs.

Best,
Antoine
ots hash: 9d227f7832154c4c8bce9fce260ac84537489c1bc8c4b8c2ba990ceb197c84fc
Le mardi 3 septembre 2024 à 21:13:46 UTC+1, Antoine Riard a écrit :

> > That also happens to be my Alice OpenTimestamps calendar, in production, 
> so
> > please don't do anything you expect to be CPU or RAM intensive. But if 
> you
> > accidentally take down the server, not the end of the world: OTS is a 
> very
> > redundant protocol and one calendar going down for a few hours is 
> unlikely to
> > do any harm.
> > 
> > It has about $400 of outgoing capacity at the moment, and $2000 inbound. 
> It
> > gets hardly any donations at the moment, so if you manage to knock LND 
> offline
> > that's no big deal.
> > 
> > That's not my money - it's donations to the OTS calendars that I have no 
> right
> > to spend - so I'll ask you to pay for any expenses incurred by it during
> > testing, and make a $100 net donation when you're done testing to make it
> > worthwhile for the OTS community. If you manage to lose more than that on
> > justice transactions, I'll consider that a donation. :)
>
> Many thanks Peter for that.
>
> No worries, I won't play with CPU or RAM, it's just all the 
> transaction-relay
> and mempool logic that one can interfere with. I'll make you whole of the 
> $2400
> if the LND node goes down too hard, though I'm just looking for a node 
> running
> on mainnet, for a pinning the attacker has two open to channels and 
> re-balance
> the liquidity at its advantage a bit. I'll provide the liquidity by myself.
>
> If you have an on-chain donation address on the OTS website (?), I'll make 
> a
> $100 donation now, it's a nice tool. And for the justice transaction...well
> for some scenarios you can use the latest valid commitment state to pin no 
> risk
> of being slashed by a justice transaction.
>
> Best,
> Antoine
> ots hash: 19d9b61ed5238e2922205a0a0194e0830b260a691f45b4189b1d145f72c9e031
>
> Le mar. 3 sept. 2024 à 13:58, Peter Todd <pe...@petertodd.org> a écrit :
>
>> On Tue, Aug 27, 2024 at 02:10:15PM -0700, Antoine Riard wrote:
>> > My utmost pleasure to demonstrate some pinning attacks on nodes under 
>> > real-world conditions.
>>
>> Antoine Riard: until Oct 1st, you have permission to test your attacks 
>> against
>> my Lightning node running at:
>>
>>     023345274dd80a01c0e80ec4892818878...@alice.opentimestamps.org:9735 
>> <http://023345274dd80a01c0e80ec48928188783f9bc5281be8f5057c050492f10711a5b@alice.opentimestamps.org:9735>
>>
>> That also happens to be my Alice OpenTimestamps calendar, in production, 
>> so
>> please don't do anything you expect to be CPU or RAM intensive. But if you
>> accidentally take down the server, not the end of the world: OTS is a very
>> redundant protocol and one calendar going down for a few hours is 
>> unlikely to
>> do any harm.
>>
>> It has about $400 of outgoing capacity at the moment, and $2000 inbound. 
>> It
>> gets hardly any donations at the moment, so if you manage to knock LND 
>> offline
>> that's no big deal.
>>
>> That's not my money - it's donations to the OTS calendars that I have no 
>> right
>> to spend - so I'll ask you to pay for any expenses incurred by it during
>> testing, and make a $100 net donation when you're done testing to make it
>> worthwhile for the OTS community. If you manage to lose more than that on
>> justice transactions, I'll consider that a donation. :)
>>
>> -- 
>> https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
>>
>

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Re: [bitcoindev] Demonstrating Pinning Attacks under Real-World Conditions

[waxwing/ AdamISZ]

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Antoine,

Perhaps it would be an idea to write a gist or some other public facing 
page with what you need from volunteers, so it's kind of step by step?
Unlike Peter in this thread, I think most people would want/have to set up 
new nodes to do this.

You have said: Current and default installs of Core/btcd + lnd/cln/ldk . I 
know that e.g. Core has some pretty non-trivial choices but I guess we can 
stick religiously to whatever is default.

But other details like:
amount in channels - does it matter?
How many channels? Channels of specific types (thinking e.g. unannounced)
Should volunteers have channels with each other? is there any aspect of 
topology you require?
Network connectivity - I guess it's not important, but just in case worth 
mentioning, e.g. should/should not use Tor etc.

Forgive me if some of the questions are ignorant, I have not paid a ton of 
attention to the discussion around these attacks.

waxwing/AdamISZ
On Thursday, October 10, 2024 at 6:29:02 PM UTC-6 Antoine Riard wrote:

> Hi all,
>
> > If you have an on-chain donation address on the OTS website (?), I'll 
> make a
> > $100 donation now, it's a nice tool. And for the justice 
> transaction...well
> > for some scenarios you can use the latest valid commitment state to pin 
> no risk
> > of being slashed by a justice transaction.
>
> Been late on demonstrating a real-world pinning attack against a 
> production lightning
> node. But I swear it's real sport having to jungle with more than one 
> category of
> exploit to soundly test.
>
> OTS is a great project. I'll make a donation to it of 1 gram of gold or 
> the equivalent
> in fiats or satoshis at settlement (as $100 sounds to be almost equal to 1 
> gram of gold,
> i.e $84.66 those days) for each month late on doing a demonstrationg of 
> real-world pinning
> attack, as a lateness penalty.
>
> Beyond it's a great tool to make notarization of any kind of digital info, 
> inside the
> chain where for every block there are probably two-digit terawatt hours 
> burnt, which
> starts to be a f*cking lot of hydro power plants.
>
> More generally, I called since late 2020 at least for making real-world 
> demonstration
> of pinning attacks against lightning nodes, among others types of 
> cross-layers attacks,
> At the exception of 2 ligthning protocol devs if my memory is correct, all 
> the others
> ones since then have shunned away from participating in a real-world demo, 
> and Peter
> Todd was the first one to consent and make available a lightning node 
> available for
> real-world demos in a "black box" fashion (indeed, it's far easier to 
> execute exploits
> on testing envs fully set by the researcher...).
>
> In the future, I believe it can only be great if bitcoin security exploits 
> are gauged
> more or less on the lines of artifacts available, evaluated and 
> reproduced, as done 
> usually by major infosec confs.
>
> Best,
> Antoine
> ots hash: 9d227f7832154c4c8bce9fce260ac84537489c1bc8c4b8c2ba990ceb197c84fc
> Le mardi 3 septembre 2024 à 21:13:46 UTC+1, Antoine Riard a écrit :
>
>> > That also happens to be my Alice OpenTimestamps calendar, in 
>> production, so
>> > please don't do anything you expect to be CPU or RAM intensive. But if 
>> you
>> > accidentally take down the server, not the end of the world: OTS is a 
>> very
>> > redundant protocol and one calendar going down for a few hours is 
>> unlikely to
>> > do any harm.
>> > 
>> > It has about $400 of outgoing capacity at the moment, and $2000 
>> inbound. It
>> > gets hardly any donations at the moment, so if you manage to knock LND 
>> offline
>> > that's no big deal.
>> > 
>> > That's not my money - it's donations to the OTS calendars that I have 
>> no right
>> > to spend - so I'll ask you to pay for any expenses incurred by it during
>> > testing, and make a $100 net donation when you're done testing to make 
>> it
>> > worthwhile for the OTS community. If you manage to lose more than that 
>> on
>> > justice transactions, I'll consider that a donation. :)
>>
>> Many thanks Peter for that.
>>
>> No worries, I won't play with CPU or RAM, it's just all the 
>> transaction-relay
>> and mempool logic that one can interfere with. I'll make you whole of the 
>> $2400
>> if the LND node goes down too hard, though I'm just looking for a node 
>> running
>> on mainnet, for a pinning the attacker has two open to channels and 
>> re-balance
>> the liquidity at its advantage a bit. I'll provide the liquidity by 
>> myself.
>>
>> If you have an on-chain donation address on the OTS website (?), I'll 
>> make a
>> $100 donation now, it's a nice tool. And for the justice 
>> transaction...well
>> for some scenarios you can use the latest valid commitment state to pin 
>> no risk
>> of being slashed by a justice transaction.
>>
>> Best,
>> Antoine
>> ots hash: 19d9b61ed5238e2922205a0a0194e0830b260a691f45b4189b1d145f72c9e031
>>
>> Le mar. 3 sept. 2024 à 13:58, Peter Todd <pe...@petertodd.org> a écrit :
>>
>>> On Tue, Aug 27, 2024 at 02:10:15PM -0700, Antoine Riard wrote:
>>> > My utmost pleasure to demonstrate some pinning attacks on nodes under 
>>> > real-world conditions.
>>>
>>> Antoine Riard: until Oct 1st, you have permission to test your attacks 
>>> against
>>> my Lightning node running at:
>>>
>>>     023345274dd80a01c0e80ec4892818878...@alice.opentimestamps.org:9735 
>>> <http://023345274dd80a01c0e80ec48928188783f9bc5281be8f5057c050492f10711a5b@alice.opentimestamps.org:9735>
>>>
>>> That also happens to be my Alice OpenTimestamps calendar, in production, 
>>> so
>>> please don't do anything you expect to be CPU or RAM intensive. But if 
>>> you
>>> accidentally take down the server, not the end of the world: OTS is a 
>>> very
>>> redundant protocol and one calendar going down for a few hours is 
>>> unlikely to
>>> do any harm.
>>>
>>> It has about $400 of outgoing capacity at the moment, and $2000 inbound. 
>>> It
>>> gets hardly any donations at the moment, so if you manage to knock LND 
>>> offline
>>> that's no big deal.
>>>
>>> That's not my money - it's donations to the OTS calendars that I have no 
>>> right
>>> to spend - so I'll ask you to pay for any expenses incurred by it during
>>> testing, and make a $100 net donation when you're done testing to make it
>>> worthwhile for the OTS community. If you manage to lose more than that on
>>> justice transactions, I'll consider that a donation. :)
>>>
>>> -- 
>>> https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
>>>
>>

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Re: [bitcoindev] Demonstrating Pinning Attacks under Real-World Conditions

[Antoine Riard]

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Hi waxwing,

Thanks for the idea of writing some gist, yes it's worthy to explain 
step-by-step if there are volunteers.
We did at least once such "blackbox" testing of attacks affecting lightning 
implementation for the dust
outputs inflation vuln, and since then the few skilled devs who knows how 
to set correctly lightning+bitcoind
nodes are usually very busy.

Yes, usually for Core it's sticking to the transaction-relay / mempool 
defaults, as it's how the lightning specs
are mostly written.

For the other questions:
amount in channel - does not really matter as long as you can do few non 
dust outputs (i.e above `GetDustThreshold`)
how many channels - only two are necessary for all the pinning kind of 
stuff, maybe one more to rebalance the liquidty accordingly
should volunteers have channels with each other? is there any aspect of 
topology you require? - no, for the simple scenario it's only a routing 
node setup
network connectivity - no Tor connections doesn't play to test the easy 
scenarios.

If you wish to catch-up a bit on all those attacks, see that years-old gist 
of mine which was
documenting a bit transaction-relay jamming: 
https://gist.github.com/ariard/7e509bf2c81ea8049fd0c67978c521af

After browsing it again, a lot of the stuff is still actual, the only big 
thing missing is
the replacement cycling attack. That one I still have remorses towards the 
whole bitcoin community
to not have caught it back at the time in 2020, and that it took me 2 more 
years to find it.

Best,
Antoine
ots hash: fbbc40b46cdf7c2877b5e2720519fd3dcaa99dbd1ac96ac5cbd0c08f0c3e94e5
Le vendredi 11 octobre 2024 à 16:23:47 UTC+1, waxwing/ AdamISZ a écrit :

> Antoine,
>
> Perhaps it would be an idea to write a gist or some other public facing 
> page with what you need from volunteers, so it's kind of step by step?
> Unlike Peter in this thread, I think most people would want/have to set up 
> new nodes to do this.
>
> You have said: Current and default installs of Core/btcd + lnd/cln/ldk . I 
> know that e.g. Core has some pretty non-trivial choices but I guess we can 
> stick religiously to whatever is default.
>
> But other details like:
> amount in channels - does it matter?
> How many channels? Channels of specific types (thinking e.g. unannounced)
> Should volunteers have channels with each other? is there any aspect of 
> topology you require?
> Network connectivity - I guess it's not important, but just in case worth 
> mentioning, e.g. should/should not use Tor etc.
>
> Forgive me if some of the questions are ignorant, I have not paid a ton of 
> attention to the discussion around these attacks.
>
> waxwing/AdamISZ
> On Thursday, October 10, 2024 at 6:29:02 PM UTC-6 Antoine Riard wrote:
>
>> Hi all,
>>
>> > If you have an on-chain donation address on the OTS website (?), I'll 
>> make a
>> > $100 donation now, it's a nice tool. And for the justice 
>> transaction...well
>> > for some scenarios you can use the latest valid commitment state to pin 
>> no risk
>> > of being slashed by a justice transaction.
>>
>> Been late on demonstrating a real-world pinning attack against a 
>> production lightning
>> node. But I swear it's real sport having to jungle with more than one 
>> category of
>> exploit to soundly test.
>>
>> OTS is a great project. I'll make a donation to it of 1 gram of gold or 
>> the equivalent
>> in fiats or satoshis at settlement (as $100 sounds to be almost equal to 
>> 1 gram of gold,
>> i.e $84.66 those days) for each month late on doing a demonstrationg of 
>> real-world pinning
>> attack, as a lateness penalty.
>>
>> Beyond it's a great tool to make notarization of any kind of digital 
>> info, inside the
>> chain where for every block there are probably two-digit terawatt hours 
>> burnt, which
>> starts to be a f*cking lot of hydro power plants.
>>
>> More generally, I called since late 2020 at least for making real-world 
>> demonstration
>> of pinning attacks against lightning nodes, among others types of 
>> cross-layers attacks,
>> At the exception of 2 ligthning protocol devs if my memory is correct, 
>> all the others
>> ones since then have shunned away from participating in a real-world 
>> demo, and Peter
>> Todd was the first one to consent and make available a lightning node 
>> available for
>> real-world demos in a "black box" fashion (indeed, it's far easier to 
>> execute exploits
>> on testing envs fully set by the researcher...).
>>
>> In the future, I believe it can only be great if bitcoin security 
>> exploits are gauged
>> more or less on the lines of artifacts available, evaluated and 
>> reproduced, as done 
>> usually by major infosec confs.
>>
>> Best,
>> Antoine
>> ots hash: 9d227f7832154c4c8bce9fce260ac84537489c1bc8c4b8c2ba990ceb197c84fc
>> Le mardi 3 septembre 2024 à 21:13:46 UTC+1, Antoine Riard a écrit :
>>
>>> > That also happens to be my Alice OpenTimestamps calendar, in 
>>> production, so
>>> > please don't do anything you expect to be CPU or RAM intensive. But if 
>>> you
>>> > accidentally take down the server, not the end of the world: OTS is a 
>>> very
>>> > redundant protocol and one calendar going down for a few hours is 
>>> unlikely to
>>> > do any harm.
>>> > 
>>> > It has about $400 of outgoing capacity at the moment, and $2000 
>>> inbound. It
>>> > gets hardly any donations at the moment, so if you manage to knock LND 
>>> offline
>>> > that's no big deal.
>>> > 
>>> > That's not my money - it's donations to the OTS calendars that I have 
>>> no right
>>> > to spend - so I'll ask you to pay for any expenses incurred by it 
>>> during
>>> > testing, and make a $100 net donation when you're done testing to make 
>>> it
>>> > worthwhile for the OTS community. If you manage to lose more than that 
>>> on
>>> > justice transactions, I'll consider that a donation. :)
>>>
>>> Many thanks Peter for that.
>>>
>>> No worries, I won't play with CPU or RAM, it's just all the 
>>> transaction-relay
>>> and mempool logic that one can interfere with. I'll make you whole of 
>>> the $2400
>>> if the LND node goes down too hard, though I'm just looking for a node 
>>> running
>>> on mainnet, for a pinning the attacker has two open to channels and 
>>> re-balance
>>> the liquidity at its advantage a bit. I'll provide the liquidity by 
>>> myself.
>>>
>>> If you have an on-chain donation address on the OTS website (?), I'll 
>>> make a
>>> $100 donation now, it's a nice tool. And for the justice 
>>> transaction...well
>>> for some scenarios you can use the latest valid commitment state to pin 
>>> no risk
>>> of being slashed by a justice transaction.
>>>
>>> Best,
>>> Antoine
>>> ots hash: 
>>> 19d9b61ed5238e2922205a0a0194e0830b260a691f45b4189b1d145f72c9e031
>>>
>>> Le mar. 3 sept. 2024 à 13:58, Peter Todd <pe...@petertodd.org> a écrit :
>>>
>>>> On Tue, Aug 27, 2024 at 02:10:15PM -0700, Antoine Riard wrote:
>>>> > My utmost pleasure to demonstrate some pinning attacks on nodes under 
>>>> > real-world conditions.
>>>>
>>>> Antoine Riard: until Oct 1st, you have permission to test your attacks 
>>>> against
>>>> my Lightning node running at:
>>>>
>>>>     023345274dd80a01c0e80ec4892818878...@alice.opentimestamps.org:9735 
>>>> <http://023345274dd80a01c0e80ec48928188783f9bc5281be8f5057c050492f10711a5b@alice.opentimestamps.org:9735>
>>>>
>>>> That also happens to be my Alice OpenTimestamps calendar, in 
>>>> production, so
>>>> please don't do anything you expect to be CPU or RAM intensive. But if 
>>>> you
>>>> accidentally take down the server, not the end of the world: OTS is a 
>>>> very
>>>> redundant protocol and one calendar going down for a few hours is 
>>>> unlikely to
>>>> do any harm.
>>>>
>>>> It has about $400 of outgoing capacity at the moment, and $2000 
>>>> inbound. It
>>>> gets hardly any donations at the moment, so if you manage to knock LND 
>>>> offline
>>>> that's no big deal.
>>>>
>>>> That's not my money - it's donations to the OTS calendars that I have 
>>>> no right
>>>> to spend - so I'll ask you to pay for any expenses incurred by it during
>>>> testing, and make a $100 net donation when you're done testing to make 
>>>> it
>>>> worthwhile for the OTS community. If you manage to lose more than that 
>>>> on
>>>> justice transactions, I'll consider that a donation. :)
>>>>
>>>> -- 
>>>> https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
>>>>
>>>

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