Re: [bitcoin-dev] Replay attacks make BIP148 and BIP149 untennable

[Tao Effect <contact@taoeffect.com>]

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I don't know what you mean by "render the replay threat moot."

If you don't have replay protection, replay is always a threat. A very serious one.

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> On Jun 6, 2017, at 5:19 PM, Kekcoin <kekcoin@protonmail.com <mailto:kekcoin@protonmail.com>> wrote:
> 
> Hmm, that's not the difference I was talking about. I was referring to the fact that using "post-chainsplit coinbases from the non-148 chain" to unilaterally (ie. can be done without action on the 148-chain) taint coins is more secure in extreme-adverserial cases such as secret-mining reorg attacks (as unfeasibly expensive they may be); the only large-scale (>100 block) reorganization the non-148 chain faces should be a resolution of the chainsplit and therefore render the replay threat moot.
> 


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