From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.194] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-4.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1Wd07b-00025s-KJ for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Wed, 23 Apr 2014 16:34:07 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.216.181 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.216.181; envelope-from=kevinsisco61784@gmail.com; helo=mail-qc0-f181.google.com; Received: from mail-qc0-f181.google.com ([209.85.216.181]) by sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1Wd07a-0007jV-Io for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Wed, 23 Apr 2014 16:34:07 +0000 Received: by mail-qc0-f181.google.com with SMTP id x3so1182740qcv.26 for ; Wed, 23 Apr 2014 09:34:01 -0700 (PDT) X-Received: by 10.140.41.49 with SMTP id y46mr1419290qgy.104.1398270841127; Wed, 23 Apr 2014 09:34:01 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [192.168.1.115] (ool-43521013.dyn.optonline.net. [67.82.16.19]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPSA id x2sm2541363qas.26.2014.04.23.09.33.59 for (version=TLSv1 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA bits=128/128); Wed, 23 Apr 2014 09:34:00 -0700 (PDT) Message-ID: <5357EB74.1030806@gmail.com> Date: Wed, 23 Apr 2014 12:33:56 -0400 From: Kevin User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:24.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/24.4.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net References: In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Spam-Score: -1.4 (-) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (kevinsisco61784[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 0.2 FREEMAIL_ENVFROM_END_DIGIT Envelope-from freemail username ends in digit (kevinsisco61784[at]gmail.com) -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1Wd07a-0007jV-Io Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Coinbase reallocation to discourage Finney attacks X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 23 Apr 2014 16:34:07 -0000 On 4/23/2014 12:04 PM, Christophe Biocca wrote: > It's not necessary that this "coinbase retribution" be either > profitable or risk-free for this scheme to work. I think we should > separate out the different layers of the proposal: > > 1. Attacking the coinbase instead of orphaning allows for 100 blocks' > time for a consensus to be reached, rather than 10 minutes. This > allows for human verification/intervention if needed (orphaning > decisions would almost always need to be automated, due to the short > timeframe). This is a useful insight, and I don't think it's been > brought up before. > > 2. The original specification of how it's done (redistribution, no > cost to voting) does seem exploitable. This can be fixed by reducing > the incentive (burning instead of redistributing) and/or adding a risk > to the orphaning attempts (a vote that fails destroys X bitcoins' > worth from each voting block's own coinbase). The incentives can be > tailored to mirror those of orphaning a block, to reduce the risk of > abuse. Then the only difference from orphaning are 1) More limited > rewriting of history (only the coinbase, vs all transactions in the > block), and 2) More time to coordinate a response. > > 3. This proposal may be used for things other than punishing > double-spend pools. In fact it might be used to punish miners for > doing anything a significant percentage of hashpower dislikes (large > OP_RETURNs, large blocks, gambling transactions, transactions banned > by a government). But we can make the threshold higher than 51%, so > that this doesn't turn into a significant risk (if 75% of hashpower is > willing to enforce a rule, we're already likely to see it enforced > through orphaning). > > On Wed, Apr 23, 2014 at 11:38 AM, Alex Mizrahi wrote: >>> And it still would. Non-collusive miners cast votes based on the outcome >>> of their own attempts to double spend. >> >> Individually rational strategy is to vote for coinbase reallocation on every >> block. >> >> Yes, in that case nobody will get reward. It is similar to prisoner's >> dilemma: equilibrium has worst pay-off. >> In practice that would mean that simple game-theoretic models are no longer >> applicable, as they lead to absurd results. >> >>> I'm using it in the same sense Satoshi used it. Honest miners work to >>> prevent double spends. That's the entire justification for their existence. >>> Miners that are deliberately trying to double spend are worse than useless. >> >> Miners work to get rewards. >> It absolutely doesn't matter whether they are deliberately trying to >> double-spend or not: they won't be able to double-spend without a collusion. >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> Start Your Social Network Today - Download eXo Platform >> Build your Enterprise Intranet with eXo Platform Software >> Java Based Open Source Intranet - Social, Extensible, Cloud Ready >> Get Started Now And Turn Your Intranet Into A Collaboration Platform >> http://p.sf.net/sfu/ExoPlatform >> _______________________________________________ >> Bitcoin-development mailing list >> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net >> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development >> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > Start Your Social Network Today - Download eXo Platform > Build your Enterprise Intranet with eXo Platform Software > Java Based Open Source Intranet - Social, Extensible, Cloud Ready > Get Started Now And Turn Your Intranet Into A Collaboration Platform > http://p.sf.net/sfu/ExoPlatform > _______________________________________________ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development This all sounds verry restrictive. Is it possible to do a "sweep" in order to "clean up" double spending? Why punish miners for the sake of punishing them? -- Kevin