From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.191] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-1.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1XjUKI-0006sR-Db for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Wed, 29 Oct 2014 14:34:18 +0000 X-ACL-Warn: Received: from p3plsmtpa08-03.prod.phx3.secureserver.net ([173.201.193.104]) by sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) id 1XjUKH-0002Bf-1y for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Wed, 29 Oct 2014 14:34:18 +0000 Received: from [192.168.0.23] ([201.231.95.129]) by p3plsmtpa08-03.prod.phx3.secureserver.net with id 92a91p00E2nUpUh012aAJ6; Wed, 29 Oct 2014 07:34:11 -0700 Message-ID: <5450FAE1.5040508@certimix.com> Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2014 11:34:09 -0300 From: Sergio Lerner User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:16.0) Gecko/20121026 Thunderbird/16.0.2 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net References: In-Reply-To: X-Enigmail-Version: 1.4.6 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Spam-Score: 0.0 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -0.0 RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE RBL: Sender listed at http://www.dnswl.org/, no trust [173.201.193.104 listed in list.dnswl.org] X-Headers-End: 1XjUKH-0002Bf-1y Subject: [Bitcoin-development] Death by halving (pro-active proposals) X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2014 14:34:18 -0000 Instead of discussing what will happen when the subsidy is halved (which nobody really knows) maybe we can think about of what we can do to mitigate any damage in case something unwanted happens. Let's be proactive. For instance, any form of merged-mining (like higher frequency side-chains) will end-up increasing miners profit, even by a small margin. Then that margin can compensate miners not to turn off their equipment. Then we can encourage merge-mining on SHA-256, instead of discouraging SHA-256 alt-coins. Also we can encourage mining during the "trouble" period by creating a donation pool: suppose we manage to convince miners to donate 1% of their revenue in order to pay back to the miners for the first month after the reward halving. If every block pays 1% for 10 months, then every block during the first month of halving will earn 20% more. Of course, convincing miners of this may be difficult, but not impossible. It could be done automatically with nLockTime freeze of transactions with high fees, so no TTP is necessary. So here are two proposals, any other idea? Best regards, Sergio.