From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.193] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-2.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1YrVYt-0000w5-4j for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Sun, 10 May 2015 18:02:47 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of phauna.org designates 208.82.98.102 as permitted sender) client-ip=208.82.98.102; envelope-from=ogunden@phauna.org; helo=peacecow.phauna.org; Received: from phauna.org ([208.82.98.102] helo=peacecow.phauna.org) by sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:AES256-SHA:256) (Exim 4.76) id 1YrVYs-0003tL-6C for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Sun, 10 May 2015 18:02:47 +0000 Received: from pool-108-5-112-231.nwrknj.fios.verizon.net ([108.5.112.231] helo=[192.168.50.11]) by peacecow.phauna.org with esmtpsa (TLS1.0:DHE_RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA1:16) (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1YrV9Z-0000R6-OM for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Sun, 10 May 2015 12:36:38 -0500 Message-ID: <554F9720.4040105@phauna.org> Date: Sun, 10 May 2015 13:36:32 -0400 From: Owen Gunden User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/31.6.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net References: <16096345.A1MpJQQkRW@crushinator> In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Spam_score: -1.0 X-Spam_score_int: -9 X-Spam_bar: - X-Spam_report: Spam detection software, running on the system "peacecow.phauna.org", has identified this incoming email as possible spam. The original message has been attached to this so you can view it (if it isn't spam) or label similar future email. If you have any questions, see the administrator of that system for details. Content preview: On 05/08/2015 11:36 PM, Gregory Maxwell wrote: > Another related point which has been tendered before but seems to have > been ignored is that changing how the size limit is computed can help > better align incentives and thus reduce risk. E.g. a major cost to the > network is the UTXO impact of transactions, but since the limit is blind > to UTXO impact a miner would gain less income if substantially factoring > UTXO impact into its fee calculations; and without fee impact users have > little reason to optimize their UTXO behavior. [...] Content analysis details: (-1.0 points, 5.0 required) pts rule name description ---- ---------------------- -------------------------------------------------- -1.0 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP X-Spam-Score: -1.6 (-) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain -0.0 T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD Envelope sender domain matches handover relay domain -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1YrVYs-0003tL-6C Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Proposed alternatives to the 20MB step function X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 10 May 2015 18:02:47 -0000 On 05/08/2015 11:36 PM, Gregory Maxwell wrote: > Another related point which has been tendered before but seems to have > been ignored is that changing how the size limit is computed can help > better align incentives and thus reduce risk. E.g. a major cost to the > network is the UTXO impact of transactions, but since the limit is blind > to UTXO impact a miner would gain less income if substantially factoring > UTXO impact into its fee calculations; and without fee impact users have > little reason to optimize their UTXO behavior. Along the lines of aligning incentives with a diversity of costs to a variety of network participants, I am curious about reactions to Justus' general approach: http://bitcoinism.liberty.me/2015/02/09/economic-fallacies-and-the-block-size-limit-part-2-price-discovery/ I realize it relies on pie-in-the-sky ideas like micropayment channels, but I wonder if it's a worthy long-term ideal direction for this stuff.