From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EB93F8A6 for ; Tue, 18 Aug 2015 20:27:06 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: delayed 00:42:31 by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from moe.ows.fr (smtp.ows.fr [194.116.202.39]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 10B121C3 for ; Tue, 18 Aug 2015 20:27:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: from 93-103-156-51.dynamic.t-2.net ([93.103.156.51] helo=[192.168.1.239]) by moe.ows.fr with esmtpa (Exim 4.80) (envelope-from ) id 1ZRmo9-0000hA-Qc for bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org; Tue, 18 Aug 2015 21:44:30 +0200 Message-ID: <55D38B19.2090609@ows.fr> Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2015 21:44:25 +0200 From: cedric perronnet User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/31.7.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org References: In-Reply-To: Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="------------010804030508030306040108" X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 93.103.156.51 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: cp@ows.fr X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.3 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,HTML_MESSAGE, RP_MATCHES_RCVD autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Mon, 26 Dec 2011 16:57:07 +0000) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on moe.ows.fr) Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Dynamically Controlled Bitcoin Block Size Max Cap X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2015 20:27:07 -0000 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------010804030508030306040108 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sounds like a much better approach than arbitrary deciding what the block size should be BR Le 18/08/2015 14:13, Upal Chakraborty via bitcoin-dev a écrit : > Regarding: > http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-August/010295.html > > > > I am arguing with the following statement here... > > /I see problems to this approach. The biggest one I see is that a > miner with 11% of hash power could sabotage block size increases > by only ever mining empty blocks./ > > > > First, I would like to argue from economics' point of view. If someone > wants to hold back the block size increase with 11% hash power by > mining empty blocks, he has to sacrifice Tx fees, which is not > economical. 11% hash power will most likely be a pool and pool miners > will find out soon that they are losing Tx fees because of pool > owner's intention. Hence, they'll switch pool and pool owner will lose > out. This is the same reason why 51% attack will never happen, even if > a pool gets more than 51% hash power. > > > Next, I would like to propose a slightly modified technical solution > to this problem in algorithmic format... > > If more than 50% of block's size, found in the first 2000 of the last > difficulty period, is more than 90% MaxBlockSize > Double MaxBlockSize > Else if more than 90% of block's size, found in the first 2000 of the > last difficulty period, is less than 50% MaxBlockSize > Half MaxBlockSize > Else > Keep the same MaxBlockSize > > This is how, those who want to stop increase, need to have more than > 50% hash power. Those who want to stop decrease, need to have more > than 10% hash power, but must mine more than 50% of MaxBlockSize in > all blocks. In this approach, not only miners, but also the end user > have their say. Because, end users will fill up the mempool, from > where miners will take Tx to fill up the blocks. Please note that, > taking first 2000 of the last 2016 blocks is important to avoid data > discrepancy among different nodes due to orphan blocks. It is assumed > that a chain can not be orphaned after having 16 confirmation. > > Looking for comments. > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev --------------010804030508030306040108 Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sounds like a much better approach than arbitrary deciding what the block size should be
BR

Le 18/08/2015 14:13, Upal Chakraborty via bitcoin-dev a écrit :
Regarding: http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-August/010295.html


I am arguing with the following statement here...

I see problems to this approach. The biggest one I see is that a miner with 11% of hash power could sabotage block size increases by only ever mining empty blocks.


First, I would like to argue from economics' point of view. If someone wants to hold back the block size increase with 11% hash power by mining empty blocks, he has to sacrifice Tx fees, which is not economical. 11% hash power will most likely be a pool and pool miners will find out soon that they are losing Tx fees because of pool owner's intention. Hence, they'll switch pool and pool owner will lose out. This is the same reason why 51% attack will never happen, even if a pool gets more than 51% hash power.


Next, I would like to propose a slightly modified technical solution to this problem in algorithmic format...

If more than 50% of block's size, found in the first 2000 of the last difficulty period, is more than 90% MaxBlockSize
         Double MaxBlockSize
Else if more than 90% of block's size, found in the first 2000 of the last difficulty period, is less than 50% MaxBlockSize
         Half MaxBlockSize
Else
         Keep the same MaxBlockSize

This is how, those who want to stop increase, need to have more than 50% hash power. Those who want to stop decrease, need to have more than 10% hash power, but must mine more than 50% of MaxBlockSize in all blocks. In this approach, not only miners, but also the end user have their say. Because, end users will fill up the mempool, from where miners will take Tx to fill up the blocks. Please note that, taking first 2000 of the last 2016 blocks is important to avoid data discrepancy among different nodes due to orphan blocks. It is assumed that a chain can not be orphaned after having 16 confirmation.

Looking for comments.






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