From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A73BB1282 for ; Sat, 3 Oct 2015 12:53:05 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: delayed 00:10:33 by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from relay1.ox.registrar-servers.com (relay1.ox.registrar-servers.com [199.188.203.171]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8EA711F0 for ; Sat, 3 Oct 2015 12:53:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: from imap10-4.ox.privateemail.com (imap10-4.ox.privateemail.com [198.187.29.252]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by relay.ox.registrar-servers.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CD218B01D5 for ; Sat, 3 Oct 2015 08:42:30 -0400 (EDT) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.privateemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 167422400D6 for ; Sat, 3 Oct 2015 08:42:27 -0400 (EDT) X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at imap10.ox.privateemail.com Received: from mail.privateemail.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (imap10.ox.privateemail.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with LMTP id AEr8D4ByQTJz for ; Sat, 3 Oct 2015 08:42:26 -0400 (EDT) Received: from [192.168.42.185] (unknown [95.83.250.131]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.privateemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 6D16F240108 for ; Sat, 3 Oct 2015 08:42:26 -0400 (EDT) From: Jean-Pierre Rupp To: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org References: Message-ID: <560FCD30.9020902@haskoin.com> Date: Sat, 3 Oct 2015 13:42:24 +0100 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/38.2.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00 autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Bitcoin-development] New BIP32 structure for P2SH multisig wallets [BIP-45] X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 03 Oct 2015 12:53:05 -0000 Hello, I have been reviewing BIP-45 today. There is a privacy problem with it that should at least be mentioned in the document. When using the same extended public key for all multisig activity, and dealing with different cosigners in separate multisig accounts, reuse of the same set of public keys means that all cosigners from all accounts will be able to monitor multisig activity from every other cosigner, in every other account. Besides privacy considerations, HD wallet's non-reuse of public keys provide some defence against wallets that do not implement deterministic signing, and use poor entropy for signature nonces. Unless users are expected to establish a single cosigning account, this scheme will result in reuse of public keys, and degradation of privacy. I understand that for convenience it is useful to have a single extended public key that can be handed to every cosigner. This makes setting up accounts or recovering from data loss a easier. I suggest that privacy & potential security degradation due to increased public key reuse in the case of users with multiple multisig accounts should get a mention in the BIP-45 document. Greetings On 25/04/14 23:27, Manuel Araoz wrote: > Hi, I'm part of the team building copay > , a multisignature P2SH HD > wallet. We've been following the discussion regarding standardizing the > structure for branches both on this list and on github (1 > , 2 > , 3 > , 4 > , 5 > ). Soon, we realized the > assumptions in the discussions were not true for a multisig hd wallet, > so we wanted to share our current approach to that, to get feedback and > see if we can arrive to a new standard (and possibly a new BIP) > > These are our assumptions: > - N parties want to share an m-of-n wallet. > - Each party must generate their master private keys independently. > - Use multisig P2SH for all addresses. > - Use BIP32 to derive public keys, then create a multisig script, and > use the P2SH address for that. > - The address generation process should not require communicating with > other parties. (Thus, all parties must be able to generate all public keys) > - Transaction creation + signing requires communication between > parties, of course. > > ------------------------------------------------- > > Following BIP43, we're be using: > > > m / purpose' / * > > where /purpose/ is the hardened derivation scheme based on the new BIP > number. > We then define the following levels: > > > m / purpose' / cosigner_index / change / address_index > > Each level has a special meaning detailed below: > > /cosigner_index/ : the index of > the party creating this address. The indices can be determined > independently by lexicographically sorting the master public keys of > each cosigner. > > /change/: 0 for change, 1 for receive address. > > /address_index/: Addresses are numbered from index 0 in sequentially > increasing manner. We're currently syncing the max used index for each > branch between all parties when they connect, but we're open to > considering removing the index sync and doing the more elegant > used-address discovery via a gap limit, as discussed in BIP44 > . > We feel 20 might be too low though. > > *Wallet high-level description:* > Each party generates their own extended master keypair and shares the > extended purpose' public key with the others, which is stored encrypted. > Each party can generate any of the other's derived public keys, but only > his own private keys. > > *General address generation procedure:* > When generating an address, each party can independently generate the N > needed public keys. They do this by deriving the public key in each of > the different trees, but using the same path. They can then generate the > multisig script and the corresponding p2sh address. In this way, each > path corresponds to an address, but the public keys for that address > come from different trees. > > *Receive address case:* > Each cosigner generates addresses only on his own branch. One of the n > cosigners wants to receive a payment, and the others are offline. He > knows the last used index in his own branch, because only he generates > addresses there. Thus, he can generate the public keys for all of the > others using the next index, and calculate the needed script for the > address. > > /Example: /Cosigner #2 wants to receive a payment to the shared wallet. > His last used index on his own branch is 4. Then, the path for the next > receive address is m/$purpose/2/1/5. He uses this same path in all of > the cosigners trees to generate a public key for each one, and from that > he gets the new p2sh address. > > *Change address case:* > Again, each cosigner generates addresses only on his own branch. One of > the n cosigners wants to create an outgoing payment, for which he'll > need a change address. He generates a new address using the same > procedure as above, but using a separate index to track the used change > addresses. > / > Example: /Cosigner #5 wants to send a payment from the shared wallet, > for which he'll need a change address. His last used change index on his > own branch is 11. Then, the path for the next change address is > m/$purpose/5/0/12. He uses this same path in all of the cosigners trees > to generate a public key for each one, and from that he gets the new > p2sh address. > > > *Transaction creation and signing:* > When creating a transaction, first one of the parties creates a > Transaction Proposal. This is a transaction that spends some output > stored in any of the p2sh multisig addresses (corresponding to any of > the copayers' branches). This proposal is sent to the other parties, who > decide if they want to sign. If they approve the proposal, they can > generate their needed private key for that specific address (using the > same path that generated the public key in that address, but deriving > the private key instead), and sign it. Once the proposal reaches m > signatures, any cosigner can broadcast it to the network, becoming > final. The specifics of how this proposal is structured, and the > protocol to accept or reject it, belong to another BIP, in my opinion. > > *Final comments:* > - We're currently lexicographically sorting the public keys for each > address separately. We've read Mike Belshe's comments about sorting the > master public keys and then using the same order for all derived > addresses, but we couldn't think of any benefits of doing that (I mean, > the benefits of knowing whose public key is which). > - We originally thought we would need a non-hardened version of purpose > for the path, because we needed every party to be able to generate all > the public keys of the others. With the proposed path, is it true that > the cosigners will be able to generate them, by knowing the extended > purpose public key for each copayer? (m/purpose') > - The reason for using separate branches for each cosigner is we don't > want two of them generating the same address and receiving simultaneous > payments to it. The ideal case is that each address receives at most one > payment, requested by the corresponding cosigner. > > > Thoughts? > Manuel > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > Start Your Social Network Today - Download eXo Platform > Build your Enterprise Intranet with eXo Platform Software > Java Based Open Source Intranet - Social, Extensible, Cloud Ready > Get Started Now And Turn Your Intranet Into A Collaboration Platform > http://p.sf.net/sfu/ExoPlatform > > > > _______________________________________________ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development >