public inbox for bitcoindev@googlegroups.com
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Police Terror <PoliceTerror@dyne.org>
To: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Even more proposed BIP extensions to BIP 0070
Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2016 21:31:29 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <576C5531.90608@dyne.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CABqynx+KGxD3ZwAAcD9VBcO8U13LKC=5kfOhsX32MxdM_hnHxA@mail.gmail.com>

In England under RIPA 2000 legislation, it's irrelevant whether you have
the data or not. If the authorities compel you to hand over that
information, and it is within your means to obtain it then you are
obliged to do so under threat of criminal offense.

So any mechanism whereby data could be collected from Bitcoin users,
whether it's stored ephemerally or not, if the police have reasonable
suspicion to think it exists then they can compel all parties to work to
get them the data they require.

If the mechanism flat out does not exist, that is miles better than
could exist. Deniability is not a defense when served with a police
notice for disclosing data.

You have to think not only about the end result, but also about how
these mechanisms can be used for intimidating users or leveraging
technologies.

Justin Newton via bitcoin-dev:
> On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 1:46 PM, s7r via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>>
>> Any kind of built-in AML/KYC tools in Bitcoin is bad, and might draw
>> expectations from _all_ users from authorities. Companies or individuals
>> who want and/or need AML/KYC can find ways and do it at their side
>> isolated from the entire network, and the solutions shouldn't come from
>> upstream. AML/KYC/<insert other regulation here> differ from country to
>> country and will be hard to implement in a global consensus network even
>> if it would be worth it.
>>
>>
> This was precisely our thinking as well.
> 
> This is actually exactly why BIP 75 was designed the way that it was.  Any
> (voluntary) identity exchange is done at the application level, on an
> encrypted https (or other) connection between the sender and receiver.
> Identity data is not passed through or stored on the blockchain, and there
> is actually no mark left on the blockchain that identity was even exchanged
> on that transaction.
> 
> The only people who know identity info was exchanged, or what the identity
> was is the counterparties in the transaction, and depending on
> implementation, their service provider.  (At a high level, many software
> based wallet providers wouldn’t have any visibility into identity info,
> where many hosted services would, for example)
> 
> We did this to protect user privacy as well as fungibility.
> 
> We are allowing the people who want or need to exchange identtity info
> (either self signed or 3rd party validated) the option to exchange it, in a
> standards based way, directly between peers, without touching the
> blockchain or network itself.
> 
> Is this more clear?
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
> 


  reply	other threads:[~2016-06-23 21:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-06-20 17:33 [bitcoin-dev] Even more proposed BIP extensions to BIP 0070 Erik Aronesty
2016-06-21  9:43 ` Andreas Schildbach
2016-06-21 17:09   ` Erik Aronesty
2016-06-21 19:50   ` Andy Schroder
2016-06-21 20:44 ` Luke Dashjr
2016-06-21 21:42   ` Erik Aronesty
2016-06-22  0:36     ` Luke Dashjr
2016-06-21 22:10   ` Peter Todd
2016-06-21 22:19   ` Peter Todd
2016-06-21 20:56 ` James MacWhyte
2016-06-21 21:17   ` Matt David
2016-06-21 22:13 ` Peter Todd
2016-06-21 22:50   ` James MacWhyte
2016-06-21 23:02     ` Peter Todd
2016-06-22  0:14   ` Justin Newton
2016-06-23 10:56     ` Peter Todd
2016-06-23 11:30       ` Pieter Wuille
2016-06-23 11:39         ` Peter Todd
2016-06-23 12:01           ` Pieter Wuille
2016-06-23 12:10             ` Peter Todd
2016-06-23 12:16               ` Pieter Wuille
2016-06-23 12:43                 ` Peter Todd
2016-06-23 13:03       ` Erik Aronesty
2016-06-23 16:58       ` Aaron Voisine
2016-06-23 20:46       ` s7r
2016-06-23 21:07         ` Justin Newton
2016-06-23 21:31           ` Police Terror [this message]
2016-06-23 22:44             ` Justin Newton
2016-06-24  2:26               ` Erik Aronesty
2016-06-24  5:27                 ` James MacWhyte
2016-06-22  7:57 ` Thomas Voegtlin
2016-06-22 14:25   ` Erik Aronesty
2016-06-22 15:12     ` Andy Schroder
2016-06-22 15:30       ` Erik Aronesty
2016-06-22 16:20         ` Andy Schroder
2016-06-22 17:07           ` Erik Aronesty
2016-06-22 20:11             ` James MacWhyte
2016-06-22 20:37               ` Erik Aronesty
2016-06-23 11:50     ` Andreas Schildbach

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=576C5531.90608@dyne.org \
    --to=policeterror@dyne.org \
    --cc=bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox