From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7EBCA47F for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 14:25:47 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from heron.directrouter.co.uk (heron.directrouter.co.uk [89.145.69.228]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0AF1F146 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 14:25:44 +0000 (UTC) Received: from 50-76-32-109-ip-static.hfc.comcastbusiness.net ([50.76.32.109]:53852 helo=[10.0.7.15]) by heron.directrouter.co.uk with esmtpsa (TLSv1:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:256) (Exim 4.85) (envelope-from ) id 1ZKomE-001yzh-4I; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 14:25:42 +0000 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="Apple-Mail=_1BDB8183-955D-4E11-BDC8-432E00175867" Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 8.2 \(2102\)) From: Dave Hudson In-Reply-To: <55BA2329.1080700@thinlink.com> Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 07:25:43 -0700 Message-Id: <58D8CEFE-2763-452E-B731-DDF7AFD77677@hashingit.com> References: <543015348.4948849.1438178962054.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> <55B959A2.9020402@sky-ip.org> <55BA2329.1080700@thinlink.com> To: Tom Harding X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.2102) X-AntiAbuse: This header was added to track abuse, please include it with any abuse report X-AntiAbuse: Primary Hostname - heron.directrouter.co.uk X-AntiAbuse: Original Domain - lists.linuxfoundation.org X-AntiAbuse: Originator/Caller UID/GID - [47 12] / [47 12] X-AntiAbuse: Sender Address Domain - hashingit.com X-Get-Message-Sender-Via: heron.directrouter.co.uk: authenticated_id: dave@hashingit.com X-Source: X-Source-Args: X-Source-Dir: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,HTML_MESSAGE autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] =?utf-8?q?R=C4=83spuns=3A_Personal_opinion_on_the_f?= =?utf-8?q?ee_market_from_a_worried_local_trader?= X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 14:25:47 -0000 --Apple-Mail=_1BDB8183-955D-4E11-BDC8-432E00175867 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii > On 30 Jul 2015, at 06:14, Tom Harding via bitcoin-dev = wrote: >=20 > Another empirical fact also needs explaining. Why have average fees = *as > measured in BTC* risen during the times of highest public interest in > bitcoin? This happened without block size pressure, and it is not an > exchange rate effect -- these are raw BTC fees: >=20 > = https://blockchain.info/charts/transaction-fees?timespan=3Dall&daysAverage= String=3D7 = I've not published any new figures for about 8 months (will try to do = that this weekend), but the thing that that chart doesn't show is what's = actually happening to fees per transaction. Here's a chart that does: = http://hashingit.com/analysis/35-the-future-of-bitcoin-transaction-fees = The data is also taken from blockchain.info so it's apples-for-apples. = It shows that far from a fees going up they spent 3 years dropping. I = just ran a new chart and the decline in fees continued until about 8 = weeks when the "stress tests" first occurred. Even so, they're still = below the level from the end of 2013. By comparison the total = transaction volume is up about 2.4x to 2.5x (don't have the exact = number). > ... more evidence that conclusively refutes the conjecture that a > production quota is necessary for a "functioning fee market." A > production quota merely pushes up fees. We have a functioning market, > and so far, it shows that wider bitcoin usage is even more effective > than a quota at pushing up fees. I think it's equally easy to argue (from the same data) that wider = adoption has actually caused wallet users to become much more effective = at fee selection. Miners (as expected, assuming that they hadn't formed = a cartel) have continued to accept whatever fees are available, no = matter how small. Only where there has been an element of scarcity have = we actually seen miners do anything but take whatever is offered. Clearly history is not an accurate indicator of what might happen in the = future, but it seems difficult to argue that there has been any sort of = fee market emerge to date (other than as a result of scarcity during the = stress tests). --Apple-Mail=_1BDB8183-955D-4E11-BDC8-432E00175867 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
On 30 Jul 2015, at 06:14, Tom Harding via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

Another empirical fact also needs explaining. =  Why have average fees *as
measured in BTC* risen during the times of = highest public interest in
bitcoin?  This = happened without block size pressure, and it is not an
exchange rate effect -- these are raw BTC = fees:

https://blockchain.info/charts/transaction-fees?timespan=3Dall&= amp;daysAverageString=3D7

I've = not published any new figures for about 8 months (will try to do that = this weekend), but the thing that that chart doesn't show is what's = actually happening to fees per transaction. Here's a chart that = does: http://hashingit.com/analysis/35-the-future-of-bitcoin-transact= ion-fees

The data is also taken = from blockchain.info so it's apples-for-apples. It shows that far from a = fees going up they spent 3 years dropping. I just ran a new chart and = the decline in fees continued until about 8 weeks when the "stress = tests" first occurred. Even so, they're still below the level from the = end of 2013. By comparison the total transaction volume is up about 2.4x = to 2.5x (don't have the exact number).

... more evidence that conclusively refutes the = conjecture that a
production quota is = necessary for a "functioning fee market."  A
production quota merely pushes up fees.  We = have a functioning market,
and so far, it shows that = wider bitcoin usage is even more effective
than a quota at pushing up = fees.

I think it's = equally easy to argue (from the same data) that wider adoption has = actually caused wallet users to become much more effective at fee = selection. Miners (as expected, assuming that they hadn't formed a = cartel) have continued to accept whatever fees are available, no matter = how small. Only where there has been an element of scarcity have we = actually seen miners do anything but take whatever is = offered.

Clearly history is not an = accurate indicator of what might happen in the future, but it seems = difficult to argue that there has been any sort of fee market emerge to = date (other than as a result of scarcity during the stress = tests).

= --Apple-Mail=_1BDB8183-955D-4E11-BDC8-432E00175867--