From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2DB43B64 for ; Fri, 25 Nov 2016 15:26:12 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mx-out02.mykolab.com (mx.kolabnow.com [95.128.36.1]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9FA10165 for ; Fri, 25 Nov 2016 15:26:07 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at kolabnow.com X-Spam-Score: -2.9 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from mx05.mykolab.com (mx05.mykolab.com [10.20.7.161]) by mx-out02.mykolab.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A40EA62A7A for ; Fri, 25 Nov 2016 16:26:00 +0100 (CET) From: Tom Zander To: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org Date: Fri, 25 Nov 2016 16:25:58 +0100 Message-ID: <61681436.SvSR6Fsd9n@strawberry> In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org X-Mailman-Approved-At: Fri, 25 Nov 2016 15:31:46 +0000 Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] The Excessive-Block Gate: How a Bitcoin Unlimited Node Deals With Large Blocks X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 25 Nov 2016 15:26:12 -0000 On Thursday, 24 November 2016 22:39:05 CET Sergio Demian Lerner via bitcoin- dev wrote: > Without a detailed analysis, unlimited block size seems a risky change to > Bitcoin, to me. What exactly do you think is a =E2=80=98change=E2=80=99 in bitcoin here? The concept of proof-of-work is that the longer a chain, the higher=20 probability that that one will be extended for the simple reason that=20 another chain will have to show a higher amount of proof of work to =E2=80= =98win=E2=80=99. As far as I understand the document from Peter, there is no change there at= =20 all. Only chains with more POW will win. Or, to answer your example, miners will prefer to extend the chain with the= =20 most POW. The other fact stays the same as well, if you protect from reorgs by=20 expecting more confirmations. Nothing changes here either. The common-sense= 6=20 confirmations for things like exchange-deposits keep having the same=20 security. The basic idea that we have a 3 or 4 deep fork is a huge problem in Bitcoin= =2E=20 It hasn=E2=80=99t happened for ages, and we like it that way. The miners li= ke it=20 that way too. Its disruptive. The is a problem that is not created by the =E2=80=98excessive block=E2=80= =99 concept. It=20 does, however, provide a possible solution to this very far-fetched problem. You should also realize that the policy of a miner is stored in the=20 coinbase. That said, I=E2=80=99m sure there are improvements to be made to the policy= that BU=20 uses. But since this is a node-local policy, the consensus rules are not=20 affected by it. =2D-=20 Tom Zander Blog: https://zander.github.io Vlog: https://vimeo.com/channels/tomscryptochannel