Re: [bitcoin-dev] Generalized covenants with taproot enable riskless or risky lending, prevent credit inflation through fractional reserve

[Eric Voskuil <eric@voskuil.org>]

> On Jul 2, 2019, at 00:08, Tamas Blummer <tamas.blummer@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> 
>> On Jul 1, 2019, at 20:52, Eric Voskuil <eric@voskuil.org> wrote:
>> 
>> I said that I would make no further comment given the belief that no new ideas were surfacing. However, after giving it some more thought on my own, I believe I have found the one case in which a person could value such encumbered coins.
>> 
>> In the case of tracking an asset that becomes worthless at a specific time, one could value a record of ownership, and the ability to trade ownership of the asset during the period. Consider colored coin type tracking of a theater ticket for a specific show, where the ticket is worthless by the end of the show.
> 
> 
> In other words you now see the utility of a register offered by UTXOs that are only temporary availability to current owner. If there is a utility there is also a value in it for them.

In other words I discovered a potentially-valid use case for you. The concern I expressed was that you had not presented one.

> I am glad we are on the same side on this utility

My goal is never to discourage, but understanding of provable behavior and utility. Our space is replete with unsupportable conjecture and hyperbole. There are no sides, just discovery of truth.

> and thanks to you and ZmnSCPxj we now have two additional uses cases for UTXOs that are only temporarily accessible to their current owner.

Actually you have a single potentially-valid use case, the one I have presented. The others I have shown to be invalid (apart from scamming) and no additional information to demonstrate errors in my conclusions have been offered.

I’ve noticed that in subsequent posts you continue to imply that there is economic value in such tracking of any asset, and of course here imply the validity of your other use case, monetary lending. This, as I have shown, is not the case. Tracking of an asset of value beyond the net compound interest cost of dust is more cheaply accomplished by burning than by renting, and as I have shown, it is not accurate to claim that the encumbered coin can be used as money (or to track any asset of perpetual value). When the coin expires the money/asset holder becomes a bag holder, invalidating any initial value apart from scamming.

In the valid use case that I have demonstrated (tracking of expiring assets), the marketable value of the rented coin is not the market price of that coin, but the price paid for it. So for example, 1 coin rented at 10% APR for one year is worth .1 coin. And when a renter resells this tracking coin it is worth the fraction of this amount for the time remaining. The coin itself (i.e. its face value) cannot be used by the renter to purchase anything.

As such this is truly not a loan in the financial or economic sense. Given an actual loan the borrower can use the full value of the amount borrowed to purchase goods that can be used in production. Subsequent generation of products and thereby revenue is the source of yield on a loan (economically equivalent to dividend on an equity contract). This allows the borrower to repay the loan with interest. Without *any* usable capital over the term of the rental, there is no investment possible and the time value of the rented coin cannot be realized by the renter.

So the one potentially-valid scenario, a fixed-term tracking rental, is entirely an *expense*, not a loan. A financial loan incurs an interest expense, but also implies the value of the amount loaned is fully usable (i.e., consumed or traded) during the term (the reason to pay interest). That is money over time, yielding the time value of money. In this case the value of the loan at any time to the renter is simply the amortized interest remaining. This implies that no income can be generated from the rental “principle” by the renter. A price is paid for the rental and that value of the rental is fully exhausted by the end of the term, with no other benefit than the tracking that was purchased.

The person renting the fixed-term tracking coin (i.e. “owner”) can earn income by selling dust+1 outputs at the cost of capital, limited to a maximum term dictated by the cost of capital and the dust limit (as shown previously). Economically speaking, all business returns gravitate toward the cost of capital, including lending, and this is no different. But it cannot be said that the owner is a financial lender. The owner is simply selling non-depreciating (from his perspective) fixed-term tracking space.

The owner can of course trade rights to the controlling output. The rental contract has been prepaid (by your design, in order to shift counterparty risk). As such the traded contract has no yield and therefore contracting for its sale is a currency future, not an interest rate future as would be implied by a debt market. Yet FX speculation already exists for Bitcoin, requiring no covenant or rental market. This would seem to undermine any secondary market for these more complex and limited currency futures.

Finally, valuation is based on the assumption of a non-zero dust+1, which BTC enforces as a 0 satoshi dust limit (i.e. 0 sats is considered dust and is not valid). Anything above this is policy-enforced only. As such a miner can undercut the cost of tracking an individual asset down to 1 sat. Given that there is no financial incentive to a higher dust limit for a miner, but a positive financial incentive to undercut the rental price for the same return, this is economically rational and therefore must be assumed.

One might argue that a lower dust policy would hurt BTC and therefore its miners collectively, creating an offsetting negative financial pressure. However given that the apparent cost is socialized in relation to individual benefit, this is not an economically rational conclusion. Furthermore, as the tracking outputs become unspendable due to the nature of the covenant, there is no actual dust accumulation (implementation dependent).

As such the return on any fixed-term tracking output, given a 10% APR, would become as low as .1 sat per year, assuming such a market could continue to function at that level. But it is also the case that a 1 sat output can be burned directly by the tracker and used indefinitely. This would presumably undermine any robust market for fixed-term tracking rental.

Best,
Eric

> Since ZmnSCPxj also raised the question if covenants are needed at all, let me continue my thoughts on this in reply to his mail.

> Tamas Blummer
> 
>> 
>> 
>>> On Jun 30, 2019, at 13:26, Tamas Blummer <tamas.blummer@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>> My argument does not need the comparison with ICOs.
>>> 
>>> They were just an example that people pay for the utility of register even though others think the tokens they keep track of are worthless.
>>> 
>>> Tamas Blummer
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> On Jun 30, 2019, at 22:13, Eric Voskuil <eric@voskuil.org> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> ICO tokens can be traded (indefinitely) for other things of value, so the comparison isn’t valid. I think we’ve both made our points clearly, so I’ll leave it at that.
>>>> 
>>>> Best,
>>>> Eric
>>>> 
>>>>> On Jun 30, 2019, at 12:55, Tamas Blummer <tamas.blummer@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> On Jun 30, 2019, at 20:54, Eric Voskuil <eric@voskuil.org> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Could you please explain the meaning and utility of “unforgeable register” as it pertains to such encumbered coins?
>>>>> 
>>>>> I guess we agree that some way of keeping track of ownership is prerequisite for something to aquire value.
>>>>> We likely also agree that the security of that ownership register has great influence to the value.
>>>>> 
>>>>> The question remains if a register as utility in itself gives value to the thing needed to use that register.
>>>>> I think it does, if people are interested in what it keeps track of, for whatever reason, even for reasons you find bogus.
>>>>> 
>>>>> It was not intentional, but I think I just explained why Ethereum aquired higher market value by being register of ICO tokens.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Now back to the coins encumbered with the debt covenant:
>>>>> Transactions moving them constitute a register of covered debt and you need them to update that register.
>>>>> Should some people find such a register useful then those coins needed to update this register will aquire value.
>>>>> Does not matter if you think the concept of covered debt is just as bogus as ICOs.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Here some good news: If they aquire value then they offer a way to generate income for hodler by temporarily giving up control.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Tamas Blummer
>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> The meaning in terms of Bitcoin is clear - the “owner” of outputs that represent value (i.e. in the ability to trade them for something else) is recorded publicly and, given Bitcoin security assumptions, cannot be faked. What is not clear is the utility of a record of outputs that cannot be traded for something else. You seem to imply that a record is valuable simply because it’s a record.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> e
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On Jun 30, 2019, at 11:35, Tamas Blummer <tamas.blummer@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On Jun 30, 2019, at 19:41, Eric Voskuil <eric@voskuil.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> On Jun 30, 2019, at 03:56, Tamas Blummer <tamas.blummer@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Hi Eric,
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> On Jun 29, 2019, at 23:21, Eric Voskuil <eric@voskuil.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> What loan? Alice has paid Bob for something of no possible utility to her, or anyone else.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Coins encumbered with the described covenant represent temporary control of a scarce resource.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Can this obtain value? That depends on the availability of final control and ability to deal with temporary control.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> For something to become property (and therefore have marketable value) requires that it be both scarce and useful. Bitcoin is useful only to the extent that it can be traded for something else that is useful. Above you are only dealing with scarcity, ignoring utility.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> There is a deeper utility of Bitcoin than it can be traded for something else. That utility is to use its unforgeable register.
>>>>>>> We have only one kind of units in this register and by having covenants we would create other kinds that are while encumbered not fungible with the common ones.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Units are certainly less desirable if encumbered with a debt covenant. You say no one would assign them any value.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> I am not that sure as they still offer the utility of using the unforgeable register, in this case a register of debt covered by reserves.
>>>>>>> You also doubt forcing debt to be covered by reserves is a good idea, I got that, but suppose we do not discuss this here.
>>>>>>> If there are people who think it is a good idea, then they would find having an unforgeable register of it useful and therefore units needed to maintain that register valuable to some extent.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> I think you do not show the neccesary respect of the market.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> I’m not sure what is meant here by respect, or how much of it is necessary. I am merely explaining the market.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> You are not explaining an existing market but claim that market that is not yet there will follow your arguments.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Your rant reminds me of renowed economists who still argue final control Bitcoin can not have value, you do the same proclaiming that temporary control of Bitcoin can not have value.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> It seems to me you have reversed the meaning of temporary and final. Bitcoin is useful because of the presumption that there is no finality of control. One presumes an ability to trade control of it for something else. This is temporary control. Final control would be the case in which, at some point, it can no longer be traded, making it worthless at that point. If this is known to be the case it implies that it it worthless at all prior points as well.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> These are distinct scenarios. The fact that temporary (in my usage) control implies the possibility of value does not imply that finality of control does as well. The fact that (renowned or otherwise) people have made errors does not imply that I am making an error. These are both non-sequiturs.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> I say, that temporary control does not have value until means dealing with it are offered, and that is I work on. Thereafter might obtain value if final control is deemed too expensive or not attainable, we shall see.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> The analogy to rental of a consumable good does not apply to the case of a non-consumable good. If it cannot be traded and cannot be consumed it cannot obtain marketable value. To this point it matters not whether it exists.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> I meant with control the control of entries in the register which I think is the deeper utility of Bitcoin. Final control is meant to be the opposite of temporary which is the time limited control with some expiry.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Thank you for your thoughts as they help to sharpen my arguments.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Best,
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Tamas Blummer
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Best,
>>>>>>>> Eric
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Tamas Blummer
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