From: Matt Corallo <lf-lists@mattcorallo.com>
To: Russell O'Connor <roconnor@blockstream.io>,
Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
<bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] OP_CODESEPARATOR Re: BIP Proposal: The Great Consensus Cleanup
Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 19:50:52 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <6bb308f5-f478-d5ec-064f-e4972709f29c@mattcorallo.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAMZUoK=1kgZLR1YZ+cJgzwmEOwrABYFs=2Ri=xGX=BCr+w=VQw@mail.gmail.com>
Replies inline.
Matt
On 3/7/19 3:03 PM, Russell O'Connor wrote:
>
> * OP_CODESEPARATOR in non-BIP 143 scripts fails the script validation.
> This includes OP_CODESEPARATORs in unexecuted branches of if
> statements,
> similar to other disabled opcodes, but unlike OP_RETURN.
>
>
> OP_CODESEPARATOR is the only mechanism available that allows users to
> sign which particular branch they are authorizing for within scripts
> that have multiple possible conditions that reuse the same public key.
This is true, and yet it does not appear to actually be practically
usable. Thus far, despite a ton of effort, I have not yet seen a
practical use-case for OP_CODESEPARATOR (except for one example of it
being used to make SegWit scripts ever-so-slightly more effecient in
TumbleBit, hence why this BIP does not propose disabling it for SegWit).
> Because of P2SH you cannot know that no one is currently using this
> feature. Activating a soft-fork as describe above means these sorts of
> funds would be permanently lost. It is not acceptable to risk people's
> money like this.
(1) It has been well documented again and again that there is desire to
remove OP_CODESEPARATOR, (2) it is well-documented OP_CODESEPARATOR in
non-segwit scripts represents a rather significant vulnerability in
Bitcoin today, and (3) lots of effort has gone into attempting to find
practical use-cases for OP_CODESEPARATOR's specific construction, with
no successes as of yet. I strongly, strongly disagree that the
highly-unlikely remote possibility that someone created something before
which could be rendered unspendable is sufficient reason to not fix a
vulnerability in Bitcoin today.
> I suggest an alternative whereby the execution of OP_CODESEPARATOR
> increases the transactions weight suitably as to temper the
> vulnerability caused by it. Alternatively there could be some sort of
> limit (maybe 1) on the maximum number of OP_CODESEPARATORs allowed to be
> executed per script, but that would require an argument as to why
> exceeding that limit isn't reasonable.
You could equally argue, however, that any such limit could render some
moderately-large transaction unspendable, so I'm somewhat skeptical of
this argument. Note that OP_CODESEPARATOR is non-standard, so getting
them mined is rather difficult in any case.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-03-07 19:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-03-06 21:39 [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: The Great Consensus Cleanup Matt Corallo
2019-03-07 10:44 ` Luke Dashjr
2019-03-07 19:44 ` Matt Corallo
2019-03-07 15:03 ` [bitcoin-dev] OP_CODESEPARATOR " Russell O'Connor
2019-03-07 19:50 ` Matt Corallo [this message]
2019-03-08 15:57 ` Russell O'Connor
2019-03-08 18:35 ` Matt Corallo
2019-03-09 18:29 ` Russell O'Connor
2019-03-10 3:25 ` Jacob Eliosoff
2019-03-11 17:49 ` Russell O'Connor
2019-03-12 21:08 ` Matt Corallo
2019-03-12 22:39 ` Jacob Eliosoff
2019-03-13 0:54 ` Gregory Maxwell
2019-03-13 1:34 ` Russell O'Connor
2019-03-08 19:12 ` Sjors Provoost
2019-03-08 20:14 ` Matt Corallo
2019-03-10 14:25 ` LORD HIS EXCELLENCY JAMES HRMH
2019-03-10 18:24 ` Moral Agent
2019-03-12 7:34 ` LORD HIS EXCELLENCY JAMES HRMH
2019-03-10 18:28 ` Dustin Dettmer
2019-03-11 19:15 ` Russell O'Connor
2019-03-12 2:23 ` Matt Corallo
2019-03-13 1:38 ` Russell O'Connor
2019-03-09 18:29 ` Russell O'Connor
[not found] ` <PS2P216MB0179EFBEF7BEEE1C3F251F719D4E0@PS2P216MB0179.KORP216.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM>
2019-03-10 15:22 ` Russell O'Connor
2019-03-07 15:16 ` [bitcoin-dev] Sighash Type Byte; " Russell O'Connor
2019-03-07 19:57 ` Matt Corallo
2019-03-08 15:57 ` Russell O'Connor
2019-03-13 1:34 ` Russell O'Connor
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