Hi Conduition, thanks for taking a look. Yes, the landmine would be purposeful bait. The reason it's interesting is because it makes it impossible to reason about how many coins are quantum-safe at any given time. This would have the effect of rendering any "freeze the coins that can't be safely spent" argument moot (or disingenuous), as the vulnerability of _any_ unspent output, Satoshi's included, could not be known until attempting to steal it. UTXO superposition would be an ironic defense against a quantum attacker :) I agree that incentivizing _not_ moving coins seems backwards at first glance, but another way of looking at it is that the coins are "moved" as soon as the landmine is planted, in that they're protected and safely spendable at that point. It's just that their safety is not observable to anyone else. Depending on how forking and migration go, that could be a feature or an anti-feature. I presented these ideas because, as far as I'm aware, there have been no other proposals for turning the tables on a quantum attacker in order to allow but disincentivize it from attacking. The question of "what on-chain transactions should we incentivize" is of course very closely related, but with these thought experiments I aimed to take a step back a bit and instead ask "can we co-exist with an active quantum attacker while maintaining Bitcoin's ethos?". Obviously I can't answer that question myself, but when attempt to reason through it, the most Bitcoiny solutions I could come up with involved financial punishments for theft and rewards for defending the chain against attacks. Landmines achieve both of those. It seems to me that if recovery schemes are on the table, it's worth considering whether we could take them a step further and use them as an actual offense/defense rather than just an escape hatch. The same collateral rules employed by landmines could be added to any recovery scheme in order to change the incentives. I haven't thought it through enough to advocate for or against. And I'm definitely not advocating for anything that could slow migration. Just sharing the idea that it *could* be done with wider audience :) On Tuesday, November 17, 2026 at 11:00:09 AM UTC-5 conduition wrote: > Hi Cory, > > Pre-qday, when Alice funded her trivial quantum-safe output, she also > embedded within it a proof-of-knowledge. > > > If alice was online and aware enough to take such proactive action prior > to Q-day, why wouldn't she simply move her 1 BTC legacy output to an > quantum-safe wallet? Unless you're saying she is leaving coins vulnerable > intentionally to bait a future quantum attacker, which I'd argue is the > wrong thing to incentivize. > > regards, > conduition > > > > On Wednesday, November 4th, 2026 at 2:14 PM, Cory Fields < > fo...@coryfields.com> wrote: > > I've had fun discussing these rough ideas regarding post-quantum migration > to a few people in the last week. Rather than describing mechanics of how > to do any of the below via soft fork, which I do believe to be possible, > I'm leaving those details to a future exercise. The purpose of this post is > just to introduce the ideas as thought experiments. > > For the below, I'm assuming a future where: > - We have a new quantum-safe output type pre-qday > - Some new validation rules are activated post-qday (Something like > Tripwire and/or manually) > - Post qday, all legacy output spends must be fully collateralized in > order to be spent (more on this later) > - Post qday, all legacy output spends must be have outputs that meet > certain conditions (time-locks and alternate spend paths) > > Note that the last two requirements are similar to vault/covenant > constructions, but in this case their behavior could be enforced implicitly > by soft-fork rules. > > ## Quantum Landmines > > This is a commit/reveal scheme, similar to those which have been discussed > here, but with the addition of a payout in the case of proven theft. > > Alice has 3 unspent outputs: 1btc in a legacy output type, 1btc in a > quantum-safe output, and a trivial amount of btc in another quantum-safe > output (the landmine). Let's say that her legacy output is p2pk, though any > legacy output type would work. > > Pre-qday, when Alice funded her trivial quantum-safe output, she also > embedded within it a proof-of-knowledge. For the sake of example, imagine > this is a taproot-like tree. So in addition to its script-spend-path, it > also contains a leaf which commits to a new quantum-safe pubkey and is > signed by her legacy p2pk private key. The existence of this leaf is never > revealed unless/until it is used as a proof. > > Post-qday, in order to spend her legacy p2pk coin, recall that the new > rules require that it must be fully collateralized. So she creates a > transaction consisting of both of her 1btc inputs and a 2btc quantum-safe > output. The output has the following implicit spending conditions: > - If re-spent within (say) 30 days, a proof of pre-qday knowledge of the > private key is sufficient to spend > - If a proof is provided, the output's pubkey must be the same as the one > signed for in the above proof > - If re-spent after the time-out, no proof is required and it can be spent > as usual. > > To see why this is useful, let's now consider the same scenario, except > that a quantum attacker is attempting to steal her p2pk coin after finding > her private key. > > The attacker creates a transaction consisting of their own quantum-safe > 1btc coin (for collateral) as well as Alice's vulnerable 1btc as inputs, > and a 2btc output with the same required spending conditions described > above. Because they have no pre-qday proof-of-knowledge of Alice's key, the > attacker would have to wait the 30 days before they can re-spend the > output. However, Alice notices the transaction in the meantime and spends > the in-limbo output to her committed-to key by including her landmine as an > input and revealing the proof. In doing so, she moves her own coins while > also taking the attacker's collateral. > > Unbeknownst to the attacker, Alice's trivial output, which looked just > like any other quantum-safe output, actually contained a landmine. > > This scheme is especially interesting because it actually incentivizes > Alice to bait a quantum attacker pre-qday in order to double her vulnerable > coins later, and thus makes quantum attackers wary of stealing coins as > they may be secretly guarded by mines. It also muddies the waters so that > on qday, it's not possible to analyze how many coins are vulnerable to > theft. > > ## Staked Auction > > The obvious problem with relying on landmines alone is that the associated > private keys for many vulnerable outputs are believed to be lost, thus a > quantum attacker could reasonably assume that they are not guarded by > landmines. > > But what if we could devise a similar collateral/commit/reveal scheme to > empower users who stake their coins pre-qday in order to thwart a quantum > attacker post-qday and take their collateral? > > Let's add a new required spending condition, so there are now 3 ways to > spend a legacy output: > - If re-spent before the initial landmine timeout, a proof of pre-qday > knowledge of the private key is sufficient to spend > - If re-spent after the landmine timeout but before the auction timeout, a > bid is sufficient to spend > - If re-spent after the auction time-out, no proof is required and it can > be spent as usual. > > Bob suspects that an old legacy unspent output of 50btc has no associated > landmine and thus a quantum attacker will try to steal it in the future. > > Pre-qday, He creates a quantum-safe output of 50btc with a secret leaf, > but in this case it commits to a the vulnerable output, a bid amount of > 40btc, and a new pubkey. This unspent transaction represents a staked bid > of 40btc in the event that a particular vulnerable output is ever spent. In > order to keep bidding sane, the allowed depth of bid-leaves could be > constrained. > > Post-qday, a quantum attacker finds the private key associated with the > vulnerable 50btc unspent output and spends it, along with the required > 50btc of their own as collateral, to an output which has the above spending > conditions and is worth 95btc. This represents a bid of 45btc. > > Because no landmine exists, the initial timeout comes and goes. Now an > auction begins and continues until a second time-out. During this auction > period, Bob reveals his staked 50btc output with a 40btc bid, and uses it > to take 40btc of the attacker's collateral. The original stolen coins are > lost, the attacker loses some or all of their collateral, and the auction > continues. If nobody outbids him, Bob takes the 40btc as profit. > > Carol sees Bob's winning bid and repeats the same process, using her > staked 50btc to reveal her secret bid of 30btc. The auction continues, but > nobody outbids her and the auction times out. She can now claim the 30 > coins as profit. > > The staking requirement limits how many vulnerable coins a future quantum > attacker can bid on before qday. > > There are many ways this could be designed. Bob could get his coins back > so that a bid carries no risk, or be slashed for a losing bid. Unused > collateral could be burned, or given to Carol, or given to miners, or > thrown into a pot for later use. Staking requirements could be 1:1 or x:y. > Staked time (coin age) could be taken into consideration. Etc. > > Notice that in this design, as long as there is a landmine or a staked > lower bid on the vulnerable coins, they are never successfully stolen by > the quantum attacker. The vulnerable coins are burned, and it's the > attacker's collateral that is claimed by the auction winner. The attacker > only ever makes away with the stolen coins if no one outbids them. Thus > they're incentivized to make a very conservative bid. > > ## Sats Auction > > When describing the above auction scheme to Neha Narula, she suggested > that the well-understood Dollar Auction game [0] could be used as well. See > the link for more details and intuition, but I'll summarize briefly how it > could be used here. > > In this case, there's no need for pre-qday staking. The spending/timeout > mechanics are similar to a Staked Auction. > > Every spend of legacy coins triggers an auction after the landmine > timeout. The highest bid wins the coins minus the bid, and the > second-highest bid loses its bid and collects nothing. The auction > continues until there are no more bids. Participants may keep bidding more > in order to prevent themselves from ending up as the second-highest bid and > thus having to pay. As a result, it's possible that a quantum attacker > trying to spend a vulnerable 50btc output ends up losing all their > collateral. Bidders could even attach additional inputs to keep the auction > going beyond the value of the vulnerable output. > > This is interesting because, as the Wikipedia article mentions, the > logical conclusion is for the attacker not to play. Also, because there is > no pre-qday commitment requirement, the original coin owner (outwardly > indistinguishable from an attacker) would actually have a chance at partial > recovery if they chose to start the auction themselves. > > Similar to auction A, there are lots of knobs and levers here: > - Collateral ratio > - Min/Max bids and intervals > - Where do the loser's coins go? > > ## Desired Auction Outcome > > Having thought about these for a week or so, it's clear that there are > lots of interesting ways to dissuade a quantum attack via a vulnerable coin > auction using incentives and game theory. However, it's unclear what the > best design would be because it's not even clear to me what the most > desirable outcome would be. > > - Attempt to prevent a quantum attacker from ever attempting to steal in > the first place? > - Attempt to encourage staking via auctions, with quantum attackers > sometimes winning to encourage the process? > - Attempt to redistribute the coins as randomly as possible? If so, an > auction could be designed to work more like a lottery, where every unspent > output is a lottery ticket or authorization to bid. > > To complicate things even further, the most desirable outcome may even > change as time goes on after qday, as the vulnerable coin spender is > increasingly likely to be an attacker as opposed to the original owner. > > [0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dollar_auction > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to bitcoindev+...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/40a9f73d-481f-47e6-a64b-acfb2c7f4fa8n%40googlegroups.com > . > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. 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