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Tue, 17 Nov 2026 09:26:40 -0800 (PST) X-Received: by 2002:a05:6808:14c1:b0:4f6:5279:5c75 with SMTP id 5614622812f47-5773d72d7c3mr424164b6e.28.1794936399993; Tue, 17 Nov 2026 09:26:39 -0800 (PST) Received: by 2002:a05:690c:7484:b0:8b4:c9fa:2c76 with SMTP id 00721157ae682-8b4c9fa32afms7b3; Tue, 17 Nov 2026 09:26:00 -0800 (PST) X-Received: by 2002:a05:690c:4990:b0:8b4:cc42:9b6e with SMTP id 00721157ae682-8b4cc42ad58mr41113597b3.81.1794936359604; Tue, 17 Nov 2026 09:25:59 -0800 (PST) Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 09:25:59 -0800 (PST) From: Cory Fields To: Bitcoin Development Mailing List Message-Id: <6e4b738d-95ce-49ed-bbc6-afb1b64f7bb2n@googlegroups.com> In-Reply-To: References: <40a9f73d-481f-47e6-a64b-acfb2c7f4fa8n@googlegroups.com> Subject: Re: [bitcoindev] Quantum Landmines and Vulnerable Coin Auctions MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="----=_Part_105770_500725089.1794936359267" X-Original-Sender: foss@coryfields.com Precedence: list Mailing-list: list bitcoindev@googlegroups.com; contact bitcoindev+owners@googlegroups.com List-ID: X-Google-Group-Id: 786775582512 List-Post: , List-Help: , List-Archive: , List-Unsubscribe: , X-Spam-Score: -0.7 (/) ------=_Part_105770_500725089.1794936359267 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_Part_105771_1242922849.1794936359267" ------=_Part_105771_1242922849.1794936359267 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi Conduition, thanks for taking a look. Yes, the landmine would be purposeful bait. The reason it's interesting is because it makes it impossible to reason=20 about how many coins are quantum-safe at any given time. This would have=20 the effect of rendering any "freeze the coins that can't be safely spent"= =20 argument moot (or disingenuous), as the vulnerability of _any_ unspent=20 output, Satoshi's included, could not be known until attempting to steal=20 it. UTXO superposition would be an ironic defense against a quantum=20 attacker :) I agree that incentivizing _not_ moving coins seems backwards at first=20 glance, but another way of looking at it is that the coins are "moved" as= =20 soon as the landmine is planted, in that they're protected and safely=20 spendable at that point. It's just that their safety is not observable to= =20 anyone else. Depending on how forking and migration go, that could be a=20 feature or an anti-feature. I presented these ideas because, as far as I'm aware, there have been no=20 other proposals for turning the tables on a quantum attacker in order to=20 allow but disincentivize it from attacking. The question of "what on-chain= =20 transactions should we incentivize" is of course very closely related, but= =20 with these thought experiments I aimed to take a step back a bit and=20 instead ask "can we co-exist with an active quantum attacker while=20 maintaining Bitcoin's ethos?". Obviously I can't answer that question=20 myself, but when attempt to reason through it, the most Bitcoiny solutions= =20 I could come up with involved financial punishments for theft and rewards= =20 for defending the chain against attacks. Landmines achieve both of those. It seems to me that if recovery schemes are on the table, it's worth=20 considering whether we could take them a step further and use them as an=20 actual offense/defense rather than just an escape hatch. The same=20 collateral rules employed by landmines could be added to any recovery=20 scheme in order to change the incentives. I haven't thought it through enough to advocate for or against. And I'm=20 definitely not advocating for anything that could slow migration. Just=20 sharing the idea that it *could* be done with wider audience :) On Tuesday, November 17, 2026 at 11:00:09=E2=80=AFAM UTC-5 conduition wrote= : > Hi Cory, > > Pre-qday, when Alice funded her trivial quantum-safe output, she also=20 > embedded within it a proof-of-knowledge. > > > If alice was online and aware enough to take such proactive action prior= =20 > to Q-day, why wouldn't she simply move her 1 BTC legacy output to an=20 > quantum-safe wallet? Unless you're saying she is leaving coins vulnerable= =20 > intentionally to bait a future quantum attacker, which I'd argue is the= =20 > wrong thing to incentivize. > > regards, > conduition > > > > On Wednesday, November 4th, 2026 at 2:14 PM, Cory Fields < > fo...@coryfields.com> wrote: > > I've had fun discussing these rough ideas regarding post-quantum migratio= n=20 > to a few people in the last week. Rather than describing mechanics of how= =20 > to do any of the below via soft fork, which I do believe to be possible,= =20 > I'm leaving those details to a future exercise. The purpose of this post = is=20 > just to introduce the ideas as thought experiments. > > For the below, I'm assuming a future where: > - We have a new quantum-safe output type pre-qday > - Some new validation rules are activated post-qday (Something like=20 > Tripwire and/or manually) > - Post qday, all legacy output spends must be fully collateralized in=20 > order to be spent (more on this later) > - Post qday, all legacy output spends must be have outputs that meet=20 > certain conditions (time-locks and alternate spend paths) > > Note that the last two requirements are similar to vault/covenant=20 > constructions, but in this case their behavior could be enforced implicit= ly=20 > by soft-fork rules. > > ## Quantum Landmines > > This is a commit/reveal scheme, similar to those which have been discusse= d=20 > here, but with the addition of a payout in the case of proven theft. > > Alice has 3 unspent outputs: 1btc in a legacy output type, 1btc in a=20 > quantum-safe output, and a trivial amount of btc in another quantum-safe= =20 > output (the landmine). Let's say that her legacy output is p2pk, though a= ny=20 > legacy output type would work. > > Pre-qday, when Alice funded her trivial quantum-safe output, she also=20 > embedded within it a proof-of-knowledge. For the sake of example, imagine= =20 > this is a taproot-like tree. So in addition to its script-spend-path, it= =20 > also contains a leaf which commits to a new quantum-safe pubkey and is=20 > signed by her legacy p2pk private key. The existence of this leaf is neve= r=20 > revealed unless/until it is used as a proof. > > Post-qday, in order to spend her legacy p2pk coin, recall that the new=20 > rules require that it must be fully collateralized. So she creates a=20 > transaction consisting of both of her 1btc inputs and a 2btc quantum-safe= =20 > output. The output has the following implicit spending conditions: > - If re-spent within (say) 30 days, a proof of pre-qday knowledge of the= =20 > private key is sufficient to spend > - If a proof is provided, the output's pubkey must be the same as the one= =20 > signed for in the above proof > - If re-spent after the time-out, no proof is required and it can be spen= t=20 > as usual. > > To see why this is useful, let's now consider the same scenario, except= =20 > that a quantum attacker is attempting to steal her p2pk coin after findin= g=20 > her private key. > > The attacker creates a transaction consisting of their own quantum-safe= =20 > 1btc coin (for collateral) as well as Alice's vulnerable 1btc as inputs,= =20 > and a 2btc output with the same required spending conditions described=20 > above. Because they have no pre-qday proof-of-knowledge of Alice's key, t= he=20 > attacker would have to wait the 30 days before they can re-spend the=20 > output. However, Alice notices the transaction in the meantime and spends= =20 > the in-limbo output to her committed-to key by including her landmine as = an=20 > input and revealing the proof. In doing so, she moves her own coins while= =20 > also taking the attacker's collateral. > > Unbeknownst to the attacker, Alice's trivial output, which looked just=20 > like any other quantum-safe output, actually contained a landmine. > > This scheme is especially interesting because it actually incentivizes=20 > Alice to bait a quantum attacker pre-qday in order to double her vulnerab= le=20 > coins later, and thus makes quantum attackers wary of stealing coins as= =20 > they may be secretly guarded by mines. It also muddies the waters so that= =20 > on qday, it's not possible to analyze how many coins are vulnerable to=20 > theft. > > ## Staked Auction > > The obvious problem with relying on landmines alone is that the associate= d=20 > private keys for many vulnerable outputs are believed to be lost, thus a= =20 > quantum attacker could reasonably assume that they are not guarded by=20 > landmines. > > But what if we could devise a similar collateral/commit/reveal scheme to= =20 > empower users who stake their coins pre-qday in order to thwart a quantum= =20 > attacker post-qday and take their collateral? > > Let's add a new required spending condition, so there are now 3 ways to= =20 > spend a legacy output: > - If re-spent before the initial landmine timeout, a proof of pre-qday=20 > knowledge of the private key is sufficient to spend > - If re-spent after the landmine timeout but before the auction timeout, = a=20 > bid is sufficient to spend > - If re-spent after the auction time-out, no proof is required and it can= =20 > be spent as usual. > > Bob suspects that an old legacy unspent output of 50btc has no associated= =20 > landmine and thus a quantum attacker will try to steal it in the future. > > Pre-qday, He creates a quantum-safe output of 50btc with a secret leaf,= =20 > but in this case it commits to a the vulnerable output, a bid amount of= =20 > 40btc, and a new pubkey. This unspent transaction represents a staked bid= =20 > of 40btc in the event that a particular vulnerable output is ever spent. = In=20 > order to keep bidding sane, the allowed depth of bid-leaves could be=20 > constrained. > > Post-qday, a quantum attacker finds the private key associated with the= =20 > vulnerable 50btc unspent output and spends it, along with the required=20 > 50btc of their own as collateral, to an output which has the above spendi= ng=20 > conditions and is worth 95btc. This represents a bid of 45btc. > > Because no landmine exists, the initial timeout comes and goes. Now an=20 > auction begins and continues until a second time-out. During this auction= =20 > period, Bob reveals his staked 50btc output with a 40btc bid, and uses it= =20 > to take 40btc of the attacker's collateral. The original stolen coins are= =20 > lost, the attacker loses some or all of their collateral, and the auction= =20 > continues. If nobody outbids him, Bob takes the 40btc as profit. > > Carol sees Bob's winning bid and repeats the same process, using her=20 > staked 50btc to reveal her secret bid of 30btc. The auction continues, bu= t=20 > nobody outbids her and the auction times out. She can now claim the 30=20 > coins as profit. > > The staking requirement limits how many vulnerable coins a future quantum= =20 > attacker can bid on before qday.=20 > > There are many ways this could be designed. Bob could get his coins back= =20 > so that a bid carries no risk, or be slashed for a losing bid. Unused=20 > collateral could be burned, or given to Carol, or given to miners, or=20 > thrown into a pot for later use. Staking requirements could be 1:1 or x:y= .=20 > Staked time (coin age) could be taken into consideration. Etc. > > Notice that in this design, as long as there is a landmine or a staked=20 > lower bid on the vulnerable coins, they are never successfully stolen by= =20 > the quantum attacker. The vulnerable coins are burned, and it's the=20 > attacker's collateral that is claimed by the auction winner. The attacker= =20 > only ever makes away with the stolen coins if no one outbids them. Thus= =20 > they're incentivized to make a very conservative bid. > > ## Sats Auction > > When describing the above auction scheme to Neha Narula, she suggested=20 > that the well-understood Dollar Auction game [0] could be used as well. S= ee=20 > the link for more details and intuition, but I'll summarize briefly how i= t=20 > could be used here. > > In this case, there's no need for pre-qday staking. The spending/timeout= =20 > mechanics are similar to a Staked Auction. > > Every spend of legacy coins triggers an auction after the landmine=20 > timeout. The highest bid wins the coins minus the bid, and the=20 > second-highest bid loses its bid and collects nothing. The auction=20 > continues until there are no more bids. Participants may keep bidding mor= e=20 > in order to prevent themselves from ending up as the second-highest bid a= nd=20 > thus having to pay. As a result, it's possible that a quantum attacker=20 > trying to spend a vulnerable 50btc output ends up losing all their=20 > collateral. Bidders could even attach additional inputs to keep the aucti= on=20 > going beyond the value of the vulnerable output. > > This is interesting because, as the Wikipedia article mentions, the=20 > logical conclusion is for the attacker not to play. Also, because there i= s=20 > no pre-qday commitment requirement, the original coin owner (outwardly=20 > indistinguishable from an attacker) would actually have a chance at parti= al=20 > recovery if they chose to start the auction themselves. > > Similar to auction A, there are lots of knobs and levers here: > - Collateral ratio > - Min/Max bids and intervals > - Where do the loser's coins go? > > ## Desired Auction Outcome > > Having thought about these for a week or so, it's clear that there are=20 > lots of interesting ways to dissuade a quantum attack via a vulnerable co= in=20 > auction using incentives and game theory. However, it's unclear what the= =20 > best design would be because it's not even clear to me what the most=20 > desirable outcome would be. > > - Attempt to prevent a quantum attacker from ever attempting to steal in= =20 > the first place? > - Attempt to encourage staking via auctions, with quantum attackers=20 > sometimes winning to encourage the process? > - Attempt to redistribute the coins as randomly as possible? If so, an=20 > auction could be designed to work more like a lottery, where every unspen= t=20 > output is a lottery ticket or authorization to bid. > > To complicate things even further, the most desirable outcome may even=20 > change as time goes on after qday, as the vulnerable coin spender is=20 > increasingly likely to be an attacker as opposed to the original owner. > > [0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dollar_auction=20 > > --=20 > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups= =20 > "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an= =20 > email to bitcoindev+...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion visit=20 > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/40a9f73d-481f-47e6-a64b-acfb= 2c7f4fa8n%40googlegroups.com > . > > > --=20 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "= Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an e= mail to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/= 6e4b738d-95ce-49ed-bbc6-afb1b64f7bb2n%40googlegroups.com. ------=_Part_105771_1242922849.1794936359267 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi Conduition, thanks for taking a look.

Yes, the landmine would= be purposeful bait.

The reason it's interesting is because it m= akes it impossible to reason about how many coins are quantum-safe at any g= iven time. This would have the effect of rendering any "freeze the coins th= at can't be safely spent" argument moot (or disingenuous), as the vulnerabi= lity of _any_ unspent output, Satoshi's included, could not be known until = attempting to steal it. UTXO superposition would be an ironic defense again= st a quantum attacker :)

I agree that incentivizing _not_ moving= coins seems backwards at first glance, but another way of looking at it is= that the coins are "moved" as soon as the landmine is planted, in that the= y're protected and safely spendable at that point. It's just that their saf= ety is not observable to anyone else. Depending on how forking and migratio= n go, that could be a feature or an anti-feature.

I presented th= ese ideas because, as far as I'm aware, there have been no other proposals = for turning the tables on a quantum attacker in order to allow but disincen= tivize it from attacking. The question of "what on-chain transactions shoul= d we incentivize" is of course very closely related, but with these thought= experiments I aimed to take a step back a bit and instead ask "can we co-e= xist with an active quantum attacker while maintaining Bitcoin's ethos?". O= bviously I can't answer that question myself, but when attempt to reason th= rough it, the most Bitcoiny solutions I could come up with involved financi= al punishments for theft and rewards for defending the chain against attack= s. Landmines achieve both of those.

It seems to me that if recov= ery schemes are on the table, it's worth considering whether we could take = them a step further and use them as an actual offense/defense rather than j= ust an escape hatch. The same collateral rules employed by landmines could = be added to any recovery scheme in order to change the incentives.
I haven't thought it through enough to advocate for or against. And I'm = definitely not advocating for anything that could slow migration. Just shar= ing the idea that it *could* be done with wider audience :)
On Tuesday, November 17, = 2026 at 11:00:09=E2=80=AFAM UTC-5 conduition wrote:
Hi Cory,

Pre-qday, when Alice funded her trivial quantum-safe out= put, she also embedded within it a proof-of-knowledge.

If alice was = online and aware enough to take such proactive action prior to Q-day, why w= ouldn't she simply move her 1 BTC legacy output to an quantum-safe wall= et? Unless you're saying she is leaving coins vulnerable intentionally = to bait a future quantum attacker, which I'd argue is the wrong thing t= o incentivize.

regards,
conduition



On Wednesday, November 4th, 2026 at 2:14 PM, Cory Fields <fo...@coryfields.com> wrote:
I've had fun discussing these rough ideas regarding post-qu= antum migration to a few people in the last week. Rather than describing me= chanics of how to do any of the below via soft fork, which I do believe to = be possible, I'm leaving those details to a future exercise. The purpos= e of this post is just to introduce the ideas as thought experiments.
For the below, I'm assuming a future where:
- We have a new quantu= m-safe output type pre-qday
- Some new validation rules are activated po= st-qday (Something like Tripwire and/or manually)
- Post qday, all legac= y output spends must be fully collateralized in order to be spent (more on = this later)
- Post qday, all legacy output spends must be have outputs t= hat meet certain conditions (time-locks and alternate spend paths)

N= ote that the last two requirements are similar to vault/covenant constructi= ons, but in this case their behavior could be enforced implicitly by soft-f= ork rules.

## Quantum Landmines

This is a commit/reveal schem= e, similar to those which have been discussed here, but with the addition o= f a payout in the case of proven theft.

Alice has 3 unspent outputs:= 1btc in a legacy output type, 1btc in a quantum-safe output, and a trivial= amount of btc in another quantum-safe output (the landmine). Let's say= that her legacy output is p2pk, though any legacy output type would work.<= br>
Pre-qday, when Alice funded her trivial quantum-safe output, she als= o embedded within it a proof-of-knowledge. For the sake of example, imagine= this is a taproot-like tree. So in addition to its script-spend-path, it a= lso contains a leaf which commits to a new quantum-safe pubkey and is signe= d by her legacy p2pk private key. The existence of this leaf is never revea= led unless/until it is used as a proof.

Post-qday, in order to spend= her legacy p2pk coin, recall that the new rules require that it must be fu= lly collateralized. So she creates a transaction consisting of both of her = 1btc inputs and a 2btc quantum-safe output. The output has the following im= plicit spending conditions:
- If re-spent within (say) 30 days, a proof = of pre-qday knowledge of the private key is sufficient to spend
- If a p= roof is provided, the output's pubkey must be the same as the one signe= d for in the above proof
- If re-spent after the time-out, no proof is r= equired and it can be spent as usual.

To see why this is useful, let= 's now consider the same scenario, except that a quantum attacker is at= tempting to steal her p2pk coin after finding her private key.

The a= ttacker creates a transaction consisting of their own quantum-safe 1btc coi= n (for collateral) as well as Alice's vulnerable 1btc as inputs, and a = 2btc output with the same required spending conditions described above. Bec= ause they have no pre-qday proof-of-knowledge of Alice's key, the attac= ker would have to wait the 30 days before they can re-spend the output. How= ever, Alice notices the transaction in the meantime and spends the in-limbo= output to her committed-to key by including her landmine as an input and r= evealing the proof. In doing so, she moves her own coins while also taking = the attacker's collateral.

Unbeknownst to the attacker, Alice= 9;s trivial output, which looked just like any other quantum-safe output, a= ctually contained a landmine.

This scheme is especially interesting = because it actually incentivizes Alice to bait a quantum attacker pre-qday = in order to double her vulnerable coins later, and thus makes quantum attac= kers wary of stealing coins as they may be secretly guarded by mines. It al= so muddies the waters so that on qday, it's not possible to analyze how= many coins are vulnerable to theft.

## Staked Auction

The ob= vious problem with relying on landmines alone is that the associated privat= e keys for many vulnerable outputs are believed to be lost, thus a quantum = attacker could reasonably assume that they are not guarded by landmines.
But what if we could devise a similar collateral/commit/reveal scheme = to empower users who stake their coins pre-qday in order to thwart a quantu= m attacker post-qday and take their collateral?

Let's add a new = required spending condition, so there are now 3 ways to spend a legacy outp= ut:
- If re-spent before the initial landmine timeout, a proof of pre-qd= ay knowledge of the private key is sufficient to spend
- If re-spent aft= er the landmine timeout but before the auction timeout, a bid is sufficient= to spend
- If re-spent after the auction time-out, no proof is required= and it can be spent as usual.

Bob suspects that an old legacy unspe= nt output of 50btc has no associated landmine and thus a quantum attacker w= ill try to steal it in the future.

Pre-qday, He creates a quantum-sa= fe output of 50btc with a secret leaf, but in this case it commits to a the= vulnerable output, a bid amount of 40btc, and a new pubkey. This unspent t= ransaction represents a staked bid of 40btc in the event that a particular = vulnerable output is ever spent. In order to keep bidding sane, the allowed= depth of bid-leaves could be constrained.

Post-qday, a quantum atta= cker finds the private key associated with the vulnerable 50btc unspent out= put and spends it, along with the required 50btc of their own as collateral= , to an output which has the above spending conditions and is worth 95btc. = This represents a bid of 45btc.

Because no landmine exists, the init= ial timeout comes and goes. Now an auction begins and continues until a sec= ond time-out. During this auction period, Bob reveals his staked 50btc outp= ut with a 40btc bid, and uses it to take 40btc of the attacker's collat= eral. The original stolen coins are lost, the attacker loses some or all of= their collateral, and the auction continues. If nobody outbids him, Bob ta= kes the 40btc as profit.

Carol sees Bob's winning bid and repeat= s the same process, using her staked 50btc to reveal her secret bid of 30bt= c. The auction continues, but nobody outbids her and the auction times out.= She can now claim the 30 coins as profit.

The staking requirement l= imits how many vulnerable coins a future quantum attacker can bid on before= qday.

There are many ways this could be designed. Bob could get hi= s coins back so that a bid carries no risk, or be slashed for a losing bid.= Unused collateral could be burned, or given to Carol, or given to miners, = or thrown into a pot for later use. Staking requirements could be 1:1 or x:= y. Staked time (coin age) could be taken into consideration. Etc.

No= tice that in this design, as long as there is a landmine or a staked lower = bid on the vulnerable coins, they are never successfully stolen by the quan= tum attacker. The vulnerable coins are burned, and it's the attacker= 9;s collateral that is claimed by the auction winner. The attacker only eve= r makes away with the stolen coins if no one outbids them. Thus they're= incentivized to make a very conservative bid.

## Sats Auction
When describing the above auction scheme to Neha Narula, she suggested th= at the well-understood Dollar Auction game [0] could be used as well. See t= he link for more details and intuition, but I'll summarize briefly how = it could be used here.

In this case, there's no need for pre-qda= y staking. The spending/timeout mechanics are similar to a Staked Auction.<= br>
Every spend of legacy coins triggers an auction after the landmine t= imeout. The highest bid wins the coins minus the bid, and the second-highes= t bid loses its bid and collects nothing. The auction continues until there= are no more bids. Participants may keep bidding more in order to prevent t= hemselves from ending up as the second-highest bid and thus having to pay. = As a result, it's possible that a quantum attacker trying to spend a vu= lnerable 50btc output ends up losing all their collateral. Bidders could ev= en attach additional inputs to keep the auction going beyond the value of t= he vulnerable output.

This is interesting because, as the Wikipedia = article mentions, the logical conclusion is for the attacker not to play. A= lso, because there is no pre-qday commitment requirement, the original coin= owner (outwardly indistinguishable from an attacker) would actually have a= chance at partial recovery if they chose to start the auction themselves.<= br>
Similar to auction A, there are lots of knobs and levers here:
- = Collateral ratio
- Min/Max bids and intervals
- Where do the loser= 9;s coins go?

## Desired Auction Outcome

Having thought about= these for a week or so, it's clear that there are lots of interesting = ways to dissuade a quantum attack via a vulnerable coin auction using incen= tives and game theory. However, it's unclear what the best design would= be because it's not even clear to me what the most desirable outcome w= ould be.

- Attempt to prevent a quantum attacker from ever attemptin= g to steal in the first place?
- Attempt to encourage staking via auctio= ns, with quantum attackers sometimes winning to encourage the process?
-= Attempt to redistribute the coins as randomly as possible? If so, an aucti= on could be designed to work more like a lottery, where every unspent outpu= t is a lottery ticket or authorization to bid.

To complicate things = even further, the most desirable outcome may even change as time goes on af= ter qday, as the vulnerable coin spender is increasingly likely to be an at= tacker as opposed to the original owner.

[0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dollar_auction

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