From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp4.osuosl.org (smtp4.osuosl.org [140.211.166.137]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0B540C002D for ; Sat, 9 Jul 2022 21:59:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp4.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C559341572 for ; Sat, 9 Jul 2022 21:59:16 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp4.osuosl.org C559341572 Authentication-Results: smtp4.osuosl.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=protonmail.com header.i=@protonmail.com header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=protonmail3 header.b=FxhgqADz X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.602 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.602 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, FROM_LOCAL_NOVOWEL=0.5, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H2=-0.001, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from smtp4.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp4.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id BwjZlYzy9Ix2 for ; Sat, 9 Jul 2022 21:59:15 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: domain auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.8.0 DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp4.osuosl.org 8306A4155B Received: from mail-4324.protonmail.ch (mail-4324.protonmail.ch [185.70.43.24]) by smtp4.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8306A4155B for ; Sat, 9 Jul 2022 21:59:14 +0000 (UTC) Date: Sat, 09 Jul 2022 21:59:06 +0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=protonmail.com; s=protonmail3; t=1657403951; x=1657663151; bh=6S7Qoxk6D45ErYRmrnmsISrCEmFCWFzqnd8QaU3z2ZQ=; h=Date:To:From:Cc:Reply-To:Subject:Message-ID:In-Reply-To: References:Feedback-ID:From:To:Cc:Date:Subject:Reply-To: Feedback-ID:Message-ID; b=FxhgqADzuTSb26cFlLDGO/YfOMaqwsKvoBfDWTfqkdMHy/6lUZmZ+pC8xnC/Wufr1 JeFnl1pNpLvtsvohxEe2SeeqzDQr+1ua79wcAuT+xJ68S4foJtoMxjxKQu8NOUYFPp 2fH3rPdQsowewxKb/FaPZq1VtsoTYjt3iP0A5huZ0JYxibkLoLNbH5cXxi08URjjTM guEsIeC6E3xnBm5ZlYtkI9F0oTJcNInB3xi5WfEvMZktZ5ISTlpGy85GkZgccGT0fa 6cS1YllsPXZ42j/0bBafNvpdC5WQa/GA8ezlW+8KP/zo2a9EzLCpRyC3NuQGIa147Y V/aajMCgeXZUw== To: Eric Voskuil , Bitcoin Protocol Discussion From: ZmnSCPxj Reply-To: ZmnSCPxj Message-ID: <6xuj-ljJ9hvME-TIgWHmfPpad4aJ-1zTYSH1NBuFL_gi-6hJHMayWLEAhcEyw_lqmkR24ee8uMIAH6n4TDguk_5fJ8och99Em3m5y1R6brE=@protonmail.com> In-Reply-To: References: Feedback-ID: 2872618:user:proton MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Surprisingly, Tail Emission Is Not Inflationary X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 09 Jul 2022 21:59:17 -0000 Good morning e, and list, > Yet you posted several links which made that specific correlation, to whi= ch I was responding. > > Math cannot prove how much coin is =E2=80=9Clost=E2=80=9D, and even if it= was provable that the amount of coin lost converges to the amount produced= , it is of no consequence - for the reasons I=E2=80=99ve already pointed ou= t. The amount of market production has no impact on market price, just as i= t does not with any other good. > > The reason to object to perpetual issuance is the impact on censorship re= sistance, not on price. To clarify about censorship resistance and perpetual issuance ("tail emissi= on"): * Suppose I have two blockchains, one with a constant block subsidy, and on= e which *had* a block subsidy but the block subsidy has become negligible o= r zero. * Now consider a censoring miner. * If the miner rejects particular transactions (i.e. "censors") the miner= loses out on the fees of those transactions. * Presumably, the miner does this because it gains other benefits from th= e censorship, economically equal or better to the earnings lost. * If the blockchain had a block subsidy, then the loss the miner incurs i= s small relative to the total earnings of each block. * If the blockchain had 0 block subsidy, then the loss the miner incurs i= s large relative to the total earnings of each block. * Thus, in the latter situation, the external benefit the miner gains fro= m the censorship has to be proportionately larger than in the first situati= on. Basically, the block subsidy is a market distortion: the block subsidy erod= es the value of held coins to pay for the security of coins being moved. But the block subsidy is still issued whether or not coins being moved are = censored or not censored. Thus, there is no incentive, considering *only* the block subsidy, to not c= ensor coin movements. Only per-transaction fees have an incentive to not censor coin movements. Thus, we should instead prepare for a future where the block subsidy *must*= be removed, possibly before the existing schedule removes it, in case a ma= jority coalition of miner ever decides to censor particular transactions wi= thout community consensus. Fortunately forcing the block subsidy to 0 is a softfork and thus easier to= deploy. Regards, ZmnSCPxj