From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp2.osuosl.org (smtp2.osuosl.org [140.211.166.133]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 021C7C002D for ; Fri, 19 Aug 2022 05:34:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp2.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D1194400D3 for ; Fri, 19 Aug 2022 05:34:35 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp2.osuosl.org D1194400D3 Authentication-Results: smtp2.osuosl.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=gazeta.pl header.i=@gazeta.pl header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=2013 header.b=Z4aFQYsw X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.099 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.099 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from smtp2.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp2.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id yN3dShW-gqde for ; Fri, 19 Aug 2022 05:34:34 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.8.0 DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp2.osuosl.org 2AEE9400CE Received: from smtpa14.poczta.onet.pl (smtpa14.poczta.onet.pl [213.180.142.14]) by smtp2.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2AEE9400CE for ; Fri, 19 Aug 2022 05:34:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: from pmq6v.m5r2.onet (pmq6v.m5r2.onet [10.174.33.77]) by smtp.poczta.onet.pl (Onet) with ESMTP id 4M89Rk12pPzlg9YH; Fri, 19 Aug 2022 07:34:25 +0200 (CEST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gazeta.pl; s=2013; t=1660887266; bh=/YCHE27JOhgY75SarinSdI0PaqVBGqDA94Qsyky/b9c=; h=From:To:Date:Subject:From; b=Z4aFQYswjfAjNLIyj4Ef3yN/1lUIvspIpDPrIyWVk7oK3Lw9Xtn/EznWIHuOdhzA4 M9s3KTDu7C3dOP/tjwGXXZmKg+K8mQoIOs7cUl3rHPOkOBTbhQcfiU2298xoO5tn/C 2cAqigtjihNjzxRMYBo3wxc8eyLqAnfrBZyfQjxU= Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Received: from [31.61.165.201] by pmq6v.m5r2.onet via HTTP id ; Fri, 19 Aug 2022 07:34:25 +0200 From: vjudeu@gazeta.pl X-Priority: 3 To: Billy Tetrud , Bitcoin Protocol Discussion , , "jk_14@op.pl" , , Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Date: Fri, 19 Aug 2022 07:34:25 +0200 Message-Id: <73904836-123affd52a139f11587a4971b0df5f07@pmq6v.m5r2.onet> X-Mailer: onet.poczta X-Onet-PMQ: ;31.61.165.201;PL;4 X-Mailman-Approved-At: Fri, 19 Aug 2022 08:55:10 +0000 Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Surprisingly, Tail Emission Is Not Inflationary X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 19 Aug 2022 05:34:36 -0000 > If we actually wanted to solve the potential problem of not-enough-fees t= o upkeep mining security, there are less temporary ways to solve that. For = example, if fees end up not being able to support sufficient mining, we cou= ld add emission based on a constant fraction of fees in the block. For exam= ple, every block could emit new bitcoin amounting to 10% of the fees collec= ted in that block. This would tie coinbase rewards to the real world (since= the fee market is tied to the real economy) and ensure higher block revenu= e indefinitely - ie not just for another 50 years. Miners can game this system by moving their own coins in 100% fees transact= ions, just to produce more coins. You have one million BTC? No problem, jus= t move them as fees, and you just created 100k BTC out of thin air, just be= cause you are a wealthy miner. And even if that amount will be stolen, when= some other miner will reorg your block, then still, miners will keep creat= ing coins by moving them as fees, and the strongest miner will get the whol= e pot. And guess what: 100 blocks later you can reuse newly created 100k BT= C to make another 10k BTC, so it will exponentially explode as (amountOfCoi= ns*(1+0.1))^n function. And guess what: (1.1)^8 is 2.14358881. That means, = after eight moves, you can double your coins, if you are a wealthy miner. A= nd you can start with smaller amounts, to play it safe, but eventually, thi= s system will degrade into "coin doubler after 800 blocks" or something sim= ilar. On 2022-08-18 18:45:43 user Billy Tetrud via bitcoin-dev wrote: While constant tail emission does in fact converge to 0 inflation over time= (which bitcoin's halvings do as well mind you), tail emission does *not* s= olve the potential problem of mining rewards, it only delays it. A tail emi= ssion of 200,000 btc/year (~1% of the=C2=A0current supply) would be equival= ent to halvings every ~50 years rather than every 4 years. Were we to imple= ment this kind of thing right after the last non-" destructive" halving, it= would buy us 46 years of extra time. Nothing more, nothing less. While its mildly interesting to know that tail emission converges to a stab= le point, while no inflation implies monetary deflation at the rate of loss= , this feels very likely to be an insignificant problem. I think 1% loss ra= te per year is an absurdly high estimate these days, and the loss rate is l= ikely to decrease as methods of storing bitcoin mature. Imagine bitcoin was= worth $1 trillion (not so hard, since it was not too long ago), then try i= magining people losing $10 billion of bitcoin every year. Highly unlikely I= MO. A rate of loss of 0.01%/year might be more realistic for a near-future = mature bitcoin. That's not going to be enough to make a significant differe= nce=C2=A0even over 100s of years.=C2=A0 If we actually wanted to solve the potential problem of not-enough-fees to = upkeep mining security, there are less temporary ways to solve that. For ex= ample, if fees end up not being able to support sufficient mining, we could= add emission based on a constant fraction of fees in the block. For exampl= e, every block could emit new bitcoin amounting to 10% of the fees collecte= d in that block. This would tie coinbase rewards to the real world (since t= he fee market is tied to the real economy) and ensure higher block revenue = indefinitely - ie not just for another=C2=A050 years.=C2=A0 But its also worth saying that blockchain security (which mining revenue co= rrelates with) does *not* need to increase indefinitely. There is some amou= nt of security (and therefore some amount of mining revenue) that is suffic= ient, beyond which additional security is simply unnecessary, unwarranted, = and wasteful (you wouldn't buy a $1000 safe to store $1000 of valuables). D= o we, as the bitcoin community, have some good idea how much security we ne= ed? Do we have some idea how costly a 51% attack must be where we can be co= mfortable it will never happen? I'm curious to hear what people think about= that. Because without having some kind of estimates of what "enough securi= ty" is, there's absolutely no way of evaluating whether or not its likely t= hat bitcoin fees alone will be able to sustain enough security.=C2=A0 On Wed, Aug 17, 2022 at 9:31 AM Jaroslaw via bitcoin-dev wrote: On one scale you puts the Trust to the large stakeholders (why we avoid ple= nty of small stakeholders, btw), and on the other side I put game theory and well defined Prisoner's Dilemma. Again: large stakeholders WILL NOT incentivised to mine, they will have the= hundreds excuses why not to switch-on Antminers back. That's how it simply works.=C2=A0 Bitcoin would fail miserably if Satoshi w= as based his concept mainly on existence of idealists. If we will observe lack of hashrate recovery four years after some halving = and still unprepared like today - means the trust in large stakeholders was a very costly mistake. Superiority of Proof of Work against Proof of Stake has been discussed enou= gh either The overall conclusion with what I fully agree=C2=A0 is: swapping PoW to Po= S - would be a degradation. You can stop talking about degradation to proof of stake, but just: degrada= tion. Degradation of Bitcoin, due to human greed. Now you mine and you have an INSTANT gratification. Then you will mine and it will cost you real money, but simple switch - and= you have a DELAYED, maybe some day in the future, maybe only a tiny - puni= shment. And The Punishment Won't Be Tiny. "If the pain after hitting the hand with a hammer would appear after a mont= h - people would notoriously walk with swollen fingers" 100% (^2) Regards Jaroslaw W dniu 2022-08-17 13:10:38 u=C5=BCytkownik Erik Aronesty nap= isa=C5=82: > you can stop talking about=C2=A0 the "security of the system" as meaningf= ul > this has been discussed enough > if fees are not sufficient, clearance times increase and large stakeholde= rs are incentivised to mine=C2=A0 > in the best case, fees are sufficient > in the worst case, it degrades to proof of stake > i'm sure you can see how that's fine either=C2=A0way _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev